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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
Two instances of race discrimination which came before the court were aimed against aliens. Truax v. Raich annulled an Arizona statute which required every employer of not more than five workers to employ not less than 80 per cent qualified electors or native born citizens of the United States. The decision was based, not only on the equal protection clause, but also on the principle that the states must not interfere with the acknowledged powers of the nation. The power to admit aliens which Congress possesses and has exercised would be nugatory if the states after their admission could deny them the opportunity of a livelihood.
But neither of these principles was held applicable to the exclusion of aliens from employment on public works. The opinions in Heim v. McCall and Crane v. New York went so far as to declare that a state must be as free as an individual to decide for itself what persons shall be employed on work done for it. Yet it must be seriously doubted whether the court by actual decision would go so far as to sanction discriminations against Quakers or Methodists or Republicans or Democrats. The exclusion of aliens may be justified on grounds which would not apply to other whimsicalities.
2 (1915) 239 U. S. 33. See 22 Case and Comment 780, 29 Harvard Law Review 219, 9 Maine Law Review 126, 64 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 616, and 3 Virginia Law Review 398.
3 (1915) 239 U. S. 175. See Powell, T. R., “The Right to Work for the State,” 16 Columbia Law Review 99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also 4 California Law Review 405, 16 Columbia Law Review 67, 1 Cornell Law Quarterly 175, 29 Harvard Law Review 452, 2 Iowa Law Bulletin 140, 14 Michigan Law Review 246, 1 Southern Law Quarterly 165, 1 Virginia Law Register, n. s. 707, 710, and 3 Virginia Law Review 390. For comments on the decision in the state court see 15 Columbia Law Review 263, 28 Harvard Law Review 628, and 13 Michigan Law Review 695.
4 (1915) 239 U. S. 195.
5 (1915) 238 U. S. 368.
6 (1915) 238 U. S. 347. See 81 Central Law Journal 19, 1 Cornell Law Quarterly 32, 8 Lawyer and Banker 233, 1 Southern Law Quarterly 46, and 3 Virginia Law Review 74.
7 (1915) 238 U. S. 383.
8 (1914) 235 U. S. 151. See 49 American Law Review 600, 80 Central Law Journal 43, 28 Harvard Law Review 417, 18 Law Notes 182, 213, 50 National Corporation Reporter 595, and 20 Virginia Law Register 781.
9 (1914) 235 U. S. 133. See 2 Virginia Law Review 385.
10 The case before the court involved two negroes. Rivers had been convicted of petit larceny and fined $15 with costs of $43.75. Reynolds paid his fine and costs and in turn therefor Rivers agreed to work for him nine months and twenty-four days at $6 per month. He quit after a month and was thereupon arrested and convicted and fined one cent, with costs of $87.05. To avoid imprisonment he made a contract with one Bronghton as surety whereby Broughton became responsible for the fine and costs and Rivers agreed to work for him for fourteen months and fifteen days at the rate of $6 per month.
In the case of Fields, the other negro, a conviction of selling mortgaged property brought a fine of $50 with costs of $69.75. The unfortunate saved himself from imprisonment by agreeing to work for one who became his surety, at the rate of $6 a month for nineteen months and twenty-nine days. In both eases the contract included board, lodging and clothing, but the money payment stipulated in the contract was just enough to reimburse the surety for payment of the fine, so that none of it would find its way to the pocket of the indented laborer.
11 (1911) 219 U. S. 219.
12 (1916) 240 U. S. 328.
13 Willoughby v. Chicago, (1914) 235 U. S. 45; Cleveland & P. R. Co. v. Cleveland, (1914) 235 U. S. 50; Kryger v. Wilson, (1916) 242 U. S. 169.
14 (1915) 239 U. S. 31.
15 (1916) 240 U. S. 142.
16 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Behrman, (1914) 235 U. S. 164.
17 New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire City Subway Co., (1914) 235 U. S. 179.
18 (1916) 242 U. S. 100.
19 (1915) 239 U. S. 126.
20 (1915) 236 U. S. 674.
21 (1915) 236 U. S. 687.
22 (1915) 238 U. S. 174.
23 (1916) 242 U. S. 238. See 15 Michigan Law Review 430, and 26 Yale Law Journal 500.
24 (1916) 242 U. S. 15.
25 (1916) 240 U. S. 457.
26 (1915) 237 U. S. 33.
27 (1916) 242 U. S. 272. See 1 Minnesota Law Review 347.
28 (1916) 240 U. S. 305.
29 (1912) 224 U. S. 665.
30 (1914) 235 U. S. 441.
31 (1917) 243 U. S. 464.
32 (1915) 239 U. S. 414.
33 (1916) 243 U. S. 549.
34 (1915) 238 U. S. 393.
35 (1916) 242 U. S. 85. See 30 Harvard Law Review 400.
36 (1916) 242 U. S. 199. See 84 Central Law Journal 66.
37 (1915) 237 U. S. 632.
38 (1917) 244 U. S. 362.
39 (1915) 236 U. S. 79. See 49 American Law Review 597, 80 Central Law Journal 121, 13 Michigan Law Review 427, and 20 Virginia Law Register 955.
40 To the same effect is Curtin v. United States, (1915) 236 U. S. 96.
41 (1916) 240 U. S. 391.
42 (1915) 237 U. S. 180. See 80 Central Law Journal 379, 15 Columbia Law Review 524, 6 Journal of Criminal Law 436, 19 Law Notes 52, 50 National Corporation Reporter 697, and 1 Virginia Law Register, n. s. 396, 555.
43 (1915) 238 U. S. 482.
44 Collins v. Johnston, (1915) 237 U. S. 502. This case also held that the extradition treaty with Great Britain does not give to persons extradited for one crime an immunity from prosecution for another crime committed after their return.
45 (1915) 236 U. S. 660.
46 (1915) 236 U. S. 273.
47 (1917) 243 U. S. 588. See 54 National Corporation Reporter 862.
48 (1915) 237 U. S. 309. See Goldin, G. B., “The United States Supreme Court and the Frank Case,” 80 Central Law Journal 29Google Scholar, and Schofield, H., “Federal Courts and Mob Domination of State Courts,” 10 Illinois Law Review 479.Google Scholar See also 15 Columbia Law Review 166, 545, and 28 Harvard Law Review 793.
49 Another point on which all the members of the court were agreed was that it was not a violation of the ex post facto clause if the state court reached a decision as to the waiver of the right to be present at the rendition of the verdict, which was inconsistent with previous decisions, and to the disadvantage of the accused. The clause was said to be directed against legislative action only. See Goldin, G. B., “Presence of the Defendant at Rendition of the Verdict in Felony Cases,” 16 Columbia Law Review 18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
50 (1916) 241 U. S. 166.
51 (1917) 243 U. S. 52.
52 (1916) 241 U. S. 565.
53 (1916) 241 U. S. 295.
54 (1917) 244 U. S. 68.
55 McDonald v. Mabee, (1917) 243 U. S. 90. See 17 Columbia Law Review 441, 30 Harvard Law Review 761, 15 Michigan Law Review 493, 45 Washington Law Reporter 329, and 26 Yale Law Journal 703. In the opinion of the court Mr. Justice Holmes hinted that in view of the fact that the defendant was still technically domiciled in the state, not having as yet acquired a domicile elsewhere, and since his family was still located within the state, “a summons left at his last and usual place of business would have been enough.” But the statement is of course dictum, and is qualified by a “perhaps.” The opinion recognizes that some of the language in Pennoyer v. Neff, (1878) 95 U. S. 714, warrants the inference that the rule requiring personal service on nonresidents applies also to residents, but Mr. Justice Holmes plainly implies that some relaxation of that rule might be made in the case of absent citizens.
The case came up in curious fashion. After the rendition of the judgment in issue, the plaintiff sued again on the same cause of action, and the defendant resisted, urging that suit was barred by reason of the prior judgment obtained against him on service by publication. It was the plaintiff who claimed that the former judgment in his favor was void because it denied due process to the defendant. Mr. Justice Holmes declared that “the obligations of the judgment are reciprocal, and the fact that here the defendant is asserting and the plaintiff denying its personal effect does not alter the case.” The judgment being absolutely void, its invalidity could be relied on by the person in whose favor it was obtained, where it was asserted as a defense against him in another action.
56 Riverside & D. R. Cotton Mills Co. v. Menefee, (1915) 237 U. S. 189. See Henderson, Gerard, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law, pages 64–87.Google Scholar See also 80 Central Law Journal 397. It had previously been established that a judgment founded on such service was not entitled to recognition in other states, but this was the first time that the Supreme Court definitely laid down that it would grant relief against the enforcement of such a judgment in the courts of the state which rendered it.
57 Simon v. Southern R. Co., (1915) 236 U. S. 115. See Cahill, W. F., “Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and Individuals who Carry on Business within the Territory,” 30 Harvard Law Review 676.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also 28 Harvard Law Review 804, and 13 Michigan Law Review 520. In this case the federal district court, acquiring jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship, enjoined the judgment creditor from enforcing his judgment, and the Supreme Court sustained the injunction, declaring the judgment absolutely void under the due-process clause.
58 Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Min. & M. Co., (1917) 243 U. S. 93. See 84 Central Law Journal 359, 2 Southern Law Quarterly 235, and 26 Yale Law Journal, 794.
59 Western Life Indemnity Co. v. Rupp, (1914) 235 U. S. 261. The court, in approving the practice here declared not inconsistent with due process of law, remarked that it prevented a plaintiff from seeking to get a binding judgment in his favor by the exercise of the court's jurisdiction, and at the same time reserving a chance to defeat a judgment in favor of his opponent on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction. The practice in the federal courts of allowing questions of jurisdiction to be raised at any stage in the proceedings was said to be based on the rule that the parties cannot by consent or waiver confer on federal courts a jurisdiction not granted them by the Constitution, and therefore to set no standard which must be followed by state courts.
60 Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, (1917) 244 U. S. 25. See 85 Central Law Journal 1, 55 National Corporation Reporter 9, 27 Yale Law Journal 121, and 45 Washington Law Reporter 535. The Supreme Court declared that even if the decision of the state court was erroneous, this was merely a mistake of law, and did not constitute a violation of due process. Mr. Justice Holmes observed that “whenever a wrong judgment is entered against a defendant, his property is taken when it should not have been; but whatever the ground may be, if the mistake is not so gross as to be impossible in a rational administration of justice, it is no more than the imperfection of man, not a denial of constitutional rights.”
The brief for the defendant in error contended that there was no federal question to give jurisdiction to the Supreme Court on a writ of error; but the Supreme Court by taking jurisdiction indicates that a state may deny due process of law by giving to the judgment of a sister state more faith and credit than that to which it is entitled. But the opinion warrants the inference that the only case in which the Supreme Court would grant relief is where the sole issue in the court below is whether the court first rendering the judgment could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction, and where the second state by its decision has given effect to a judgment which the Supreme Court deems absolutely void.
61 (1915) 237 U. S. 413.
62 (1916) 241 U. S. 624.
63 (1915) 236 U. S. 133.
64 (1915) 239 U. S. 356.
65 (1916) 242 U. S. 20.
66 (1915) 236 U. S. 412.
67 (1915) 236 U. S. 56. See 81 Central Law Journal 146.
68 United Surety Co. v. American Fruit Product Co., (1915) 238 U. S. 140.
69 Pennington v. Fourth National Bank, (1917) 243 U. S. 269. See 84 Central Law Journal 319, 16 Michigan Law Review 184, 3 Virginia Law Register, n. s. 68, and 26 Yale Law Journal 66.
70 Seaboard A. L. R. Co. v. Koennecke, (1915) 239 U. S. 352.
71 Parker v. McLain, (1915) 237 U. S. 469.
72 De La Rama v. De La Rama, (1916) 241 U. S. 154.
73 Porter v. Wilson, (1915) 239 U. S. 170.
74 Chesapeake & R. R. Co. v. Carnahan, (1916) 241 U. S. 241. See 3 Virginia Law Review 312, and 4 Virginia Law Review 69.
75 Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis (1916) 241 U. S. 211. See 83 Central Law Journal 21, and 15 Michigan Law Review 166.
76 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Stewart, (1916) 241 U. S. 261; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Kelly, (1916) 241 U. S. 485; and Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Gainey, (1916) 241 U. S. 494.
77 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown, (1916) 241 U. S. 223.
78 (1916) 240 U. S. 620.
79 (1915) 238 U. S. 503. See 81 Central Law Journal 146.
80 (1916) 241 U. S. 518. See 83 Central Law Journal 20, and 30 Harvard Law Review 86.
81 (1915) 237 U. S. 487. See 3 California Law Review 489.
82 (1917) 242 U. S. 394. See 30 Harvard Law Review 486. 2 Southern Law Quarterly 230, and 26 Yale Law Journal 403.
83 (1915) 237 U. S. 611. See 51 National Corporation Reporter 50.
84 (1916) 242 U. S. 171. See 17 Columbia Law Review 441, and 26 Yale Law Journal 405. For comment on the decision in the state court, see 1 Iowa Law Bulletin 92.
85 (1915) 237 U. S. 662.
86 (1915) 237 U. S. 531. See 81 Central Law Journal 74, 82 Central Law Journal 8, 29 Harvard Law Review 98, and 25 Yale Law Journal 324.
87 (1917) 243 U. S. 521. See 15 Michigan Law Review 593. For comment on the decision in the court below, see 30 Harvard Law Review 384.
88 (1917) 243 U. S. 389.
89 (1916) 241 U. S. 103.
90 (1915) 239 U. S. 299. See 22 Case and Comment 779, 20 Law Notes 146, 14 Michigan Law Review 233, and 1 Virginia Law Register, n. s. 865.
91 (1917) 244 U. S. 416. See 85 Central Law Journal 131, 31 Harvard Law Review 308, 25 Journal of Political Economy 746, 2 Minnesota Law Review 55, and 63 Ohio Law Bulletin 6.
92 Mention should be made also of South Carolina v. McMaster, (1915) 237 U. S. 63, which sustained the action of the South Carolina insurance commissioner in refusing to grant a license permitting a foreign insurance company to do business within the state, unless it invested one-fourth of the required reserve on policies issued in South Carolina, in approved South Carolina securities.
For another case sustaining requirements imposed on a foreign corporation as a condition of doing business within the state, see Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Missouri, (1915) 238 U. S. 41.
93 (1916) 240 U. S. 136.
94 (1916) 241 U. S. 440.
95 Detroit & M. R. Co. v. Michigan R. Com., (1916) 240 U. S. 564.
96 (1915) 235 U. S. 601.
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