The Sovereign Military Order of St. John of Jerusalem (of Malta)–a charitable organization dating back to about a thousand years ago, and still in existence –received Papal recognition as an autonomous organization in 1113, having previously been admitted as such by the King of Jerusalem. Shortly afterwards, the Order was granted its first supranational statute. From that viewpoint the institution, the principal aim of which was, and still continues to be, to assist the sick and the poor on an international basis, can be regarded as the oldest–after the Holy See— international organization recorded in history. Does not the XIVth-century chronicle of the Masters of the Order refer to "our lords, the sick," their motto for centuries having been "Infirmes et infirmas benigne reci, pere"? In this respect the Order of St. John can be regarded as the forerunner of the Bed Cross with the object of giving assistance through charity to human beings; from the outset the members of the Order founded innumerable institutions and hospitals, including those in the field, and, during military campaigns in more recent times, sanitary trains and hospital ships.

In a reeent work entitled The Psychology of Nations we are told that “International Law must be made intelligible to very young minds, and now that we are to have an international seat of congresses and courts, the interest must be made in its existence to give reality to the idea of internationalism.” This admonition by a psychologist is illustrative of a widespread attitude toward international law; that it is a matter readily understood, for which there need be no specialized training, everyone being competent to pass judgment upon any subject about which international law is supposed to be concerned.

The growth of the treaty-making power in Canada is a very interesting subject, but any attempt to state in a legal way the source of this power or to give a clear, juridicial analysis of the international and inter-Empire status of Canada is extremely difficult.

Many commentators argued that a central problem with the government’s actions after the attacks of September 11, 2001, was executive unilateralism. For example, in criticizing President George W. Bush’s initial effort to establish military commissions to try terrorists, Professors Neal Katyal and Laurence Tribe argued that, “in the absence of an emergency that threatens truly irreparable damage to the nation or its Constitution, that Constitution’s text, structure, and logic demand approval by Congress if life, liberty, or property are to be significantly curtailed or abridged.” These commentators therefore invited the courts to play a “democracy-forcing” role to prompt greater congressional participation, through, in particular, the application of “clear statement” requirements. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court accepted this invitation. In holding that the military commission system that President Bush had established to try terrorist detainees was invalid, the Court relied on what it believed to be restrictions in the Uniform Code of Militaryjustice (U.C.M.J.), a statute that is of course subject to amendment by Congress. Thus, as Justice Stephen Breyer and other Justices noted in a concurrence, “Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”

Perhaps the easiest way to miss the legal significance of the Schuman Plan and the Treaty to which it gave rise is to study it in terms of familiar legal concepts. Like most really historical documents, the Treaty Constituting the European Coal and Steel Community,though conditioned by the legal concepts with which its drafters were familiar, makes history primarily because it takes a step beyond those traditional concepts.

On April 19, 2016, in The Case Concerning the Resolution of the Question of the Possibility to Execute in Accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 4 July 2013 in the Case of Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia in Connection with the Request of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation (Anchugov & Gladkov (Russ.)), the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (Constitutional Court) held that decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) are binding on Russian courts, in accordance with Article 15(4) of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the Constitutional Court stressed the necessity of ensuring a reasonable balance between the obligation to implement ECtHR judgments and respect for the fundamental principles of the Russian Federation's constitutional system. The Constitutional Court found that because the ECtHR judgment in question implicitly conflicted with provisions of the Russian Constitution, Russian courts are not obliged to comply with the judgment regarding issues that remain in conflict; however, other means are available to the Russian legislature to give effect to the judgment. While the decision marks an important development in Russia's relationship with the European system of human rights, it is not inconsistent with the approach taken by a substantial number of European domestic courts in holding that treaty obligations to enforce decisions of international courts cannot justify violating domestic constitutional norms.

On July 12, 2016, a five-person panel of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, constituted as an Arbitral Tribunalunder Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) (UNCLOS), handed down a judgment that is surely the most important set of jurisprudential rulings in the modern history of the international law of the sea.

In a case brought in 2013 by the Philippines against China to contest Chinese claims and actions in the South China Sea, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines on virtually every issue of the dispute. The Tribunal also clarified many murky issues and problems inherent in provisions of the UNCLOS. The judg-ment, therefore, is a landmark ruling that is significant not only for the South China Sea, but also for contested maritime rights and responsibilities in other maritime areas of the world.

For several generations past international lawyers have discussed the problem whether recognition of states, governments and belligerency is a matter of law or of policy. They have been unable to reach uniform conclusions. Some of them, like Professor Lauterpacht in his book on recognition, have advocated the view that there is a right to recognition and a duty to recognize.

The joint 108th American Society of International Law (ASIL) Annual Meeting and 76th International Law Association (ILA) Biennial Conference was organized under the theme “The Effectiveness of International Law.” In conjunction with this theme, the ASIL Legal Theory Interest Group hosted a panel discussion exploring the theoretical dimensions of the concept of “effectiveness” as understood in international law. Panelists discussed three related questions:

1. (1) Is the effectiveness of international law an empirical question measured through evaluating compliance with international legal norms?

2. (2) What conceptions of effectiveness might exist beyond compliance? Could such conceptions be captured in theoretical or moral terms?

3. (3) Why is international law concerned with effectiveness at all?

The failure of the U.S.-led embargo against Haiti had become notorious long before the time President Clinton decided to invade Haiti in order to restore President Aristide to office. The embargo had failed to unseat the junta and it had worked enormous hardship on the poor people of Haiti—so much so that thousands were willing to risk their lives on the high seas in makeshift vessels to seek asylum in the United States. This comment deals not with the legalities of the President’s action—which seem clear enough in view of the Security Council resolutions—but, rather, with the political consequences of the economic embargo in Haiti as well as elsewhere.