This paper explores influences on the legal activity of attorneys in five federally funded legal services agencies. I examine the effect on legal activity of three sets of variables: lawyer characteristics, organizational features, and interorganizational en vironment. The data suggest that legal activity is influenced most directly by the nature of the interorganizational environment. The influence of personnel and organizational characteristics is indirect and situational, conditioned by the interorganizational context. The findings call into question many of the criticisms expressed by opponents of the Legal Services Corporation. They also suggest that constraints imposed by local organizations on legal services activities are at least as important as national attempts to modify the corporation's mission.

This paper sketches a new theoretical approach to the study of professions and uses that approach to analyze differences that have emerged between the American and English legal professions since the late nineteenth century. Earlier studies have generally emphasized professional structure and organization while ignoring work and its control. I argue that control of work is central to professional development. Since work is central and since professions compete for it, interprofessional competition is the determining fact in the history of professions. This paper analyzes the work available to the legal profession, the numbers and types of legal personnel available to do that work, and the various competitors contesting it. Studying in detail complaints of unqualified practice in England (1870–1940) and two American states (1910–50), I locate the types of contested work and the competitors involved, using these to explain important aspects of the two legal prof essions today. Throughout, a variety of theoretical concepts are developed and applied to the particular case. One striking discovery is the contrast in competitors; American lawyers' chief competitors were corporations, while British lawyers' chief competitor was the state. I close by evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the particular methodology here used—the study of conflicts—and suggest alternative methods using the same theoretical framework.

How did advocacy at each level of the federal judiciary help shape the leading decision in American law of treason? This article, adapted from a forthcoming biography of Judge Harold R. Medina, is a case study based on Justice Department archives and the personal papers of Medina, Charles Fahy, and seven Supreme Court Justices. It analyzes the whole case, from the lawyers'standpoint, to illuminate the role of counsel in transforming a minor wartime incident into the first treason case decided on the merits by the Supreme Court and the tribunal's only decision during World War II to limit constitutional war powers. Accenting litigation strategy and the use of history in constitutional interpretation, it is a story also of the struggle by counsel on both sides of the case to uphold high professional standards amid the passions of total war.

This essay presents a moral justification for the current generally accepted amoral ethical role of the lawyer. The justification is premised primarily upon the values of individual autonomy, equality, and diversity. Based upon these values, the author argues that the amoral role is the correct moral stance for the lawyer as a professional, is a “good” role. The essay then responds to two of the most frequent criticisms of that moral stance: the first based upon economic inequality and the fact that lawyers'services must be purchased; the second based upon the absence of the “adversary system” context for most lawyer work. The author then elaborates a serious problem created by the conjunction of the amoral role and the dominant legal philosophy of American lawyers, “legal realism.” If the limit on a lawyer's conduct under the traditional amoral role is the law, then the realist emphasis on the indeterminacy and manipulability of “law” leave the lawyer in a difficult moral position. Finally, a series of possibilities are presented to deal with this problem, the most promising of which is the “moral dialogue” between lawyer and client as an adjunct to the amoral role.

The anecdotal literature suggests that the process of legal education impairs the maintenance of emotional well-being in law students. The purpose of this article is to present the results of a cross-sequential research design that empirically assessed the validity of this hypothesis. Data were collected, using four standardized self-report instruments (Brief Symptom Inventory, Beck Depression Inventory, Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist, and Hassle Scale) on subjects before and during law school and after graduation. Before law school, subjects expressed psychopathological symptom responses that were similar to the normal population. Yet during law school and after graduation symptom levels were significantly elevated. The implications of these results are presented.

Lawyer-discipline systems underwent substantial reorganization in a majority of states during the 1970s, with responsibility for their operation moving from the bar associations in which they had been located for almost a century to agencies of the state supreme courts. While this transfer of the locus of lawyer discipline resulted in a diminution of the power of the organized bar, it encouraged the professionalization of the process. In this paper the reasons for the willingness of the bar associations in Illinois to cede control over such a central component of professional regulation are examined and their implications for the sociology of the legal profession discussed. Unable to maintain the status quo in the face of extensive criticism, the Illinois bar associations chose not to meet the high costs of upgrading the discipline process but rather to divest themselves of a function that, although at one time central to their identity and authority, had become inconvenient and damaging to their image. It is suggested that the bar associations were willing to countenance such a divestiture because their positions as collective representatives of the profession in Illinois were secure and the major parameters of lawyer discipline well established. Whereas immediate control over self-regulation processes may be necessary during the developmental phase of professionalism, it is not so important once the profession has achieved a dominant market position.

Legal occupations vary dramatically from country to country—in scope of activity, education, organization, and institutional setting. This essay proposes to study legal occupations focusing on their relations to the state rather than on their character as “professions.” It builds on the recent renaissance of state-centered approaches in the social sciences. A review of the diversity of law work and legal occupations in different countries leads to state-centered conceptualizations that identify institutionally comparable features of law work. A sketch of the European historical background of modern legal professions yields theoretical principles that can inform the proposed approach. Variations in the role of the state and in the relation of lawyers to the state apparatus are then shown to be related to differences between national legal professions. Even where the law is primarily seen as a profession, the character of law work is better understood when related to the state.

In this study, relations between criminal defense lawyers and their clients are explored from the attorneys' perspective using interviews with 155 defense counsel from nine felony trial courts. Attorneys claim public clients are more skeptical and less willing to accept their professional authority than private clients and that they need to take extra steps to gain their cooperation. The accountability of attorneys is investigated in relationship to the need to establish “client control.” This problem is resolved through a gamelike situation leading to the apparent paradox that attorneys share decision-making power with public clients contrary to their expectations.

This article seeks to weave together the limited information available on the legal professions of the Canadian provinces. Following the same general format as the other comparative studies in this series, it also offers several critical observations of special interest to readers in the United States, whose experience the Canadian bar so closely tracks. The phenomenon of stratification—familiar to American observers—is clearly visible in the Canadian legal profession. Combined with other centrifugal forces, it threatens the unity of a profession which, until recently, has managed to preserve a high degree of cohesion in training, ideology, and institutional structures. On the other hand, in certain respects, the Canadian experience seems to differ from that of the United States, especially in the strength and peculiar structure of publicly funded legal aid schemes, in the profession's continuing formal autonomy and relative immunity from public regulation, and in its long-lasting attachment to apprenticeship as a necessary stage in professional formation. These and other convergences and divergences between the two countries raise questions of general significance: To what extent do the similarities between Canada and the United States verify the assumption implicit in the theoretical literature (principally Abel, Freidson, and Larson) that there is an empirical referent for something called legal professionalism? And to what extent do the differences suggest that containing societies contribute distinctive characteristics to their legal professions, whose qualities are therefore highly contingent?

Defendants’ perceptions of the fairness of their criminal processing outcomes have been the stated concern of some criminal justice reformers. Past research has suggested that these perceptions are influenced by characteristics of the outcome received as well as by characteristics of the process through which the outcome is imposed. This analysis tests a theoretical path model of perceived outcome fairness, which examines the relative influence of both outcome and process characteristics, using survey data collected from 619 prison inmates incarcerated in Minnesota and Illinois. The results indicate that factors related to both outcome and process significantly influence sample inmates’ perceptions of their criminal justice processing outcomes and together explain a substantial portion of the total variance. However, two process-related characteristics are found to be the most powerful predictors of perceived outcome fairness. Inmates’ perceptions that they are fairly treated by their lawyer, judge, and prosecutor are the strongest correlates of perceived outcome fairness, followed by the mode of disposition through which their outcomes are imposed; inmates who plea bargain are more likely than those who go to trial to perceive their outcome as fair.