In the last years of Idi Amin’s reign, modern dance was introduced at Namasagali College, a Catholic boarding school in rural Uganda, as a means of encouraging modern, liberal self-awareness in students. Drawing on interviews with Namasagali’s former headmaster, teachers, and students, this article offers the first scholarly consideration of this important school, and contextualizes its modern dance curriculum within Africa’s historical modernity/modernization problematic. The school’s progressive educational program, with its focus on creative exploration and ownership of the body, was framed within a neocolonial regimen of discipline and punishment that aimed to drill modern behavior into students. In its clashing modes of government, this school exhibited contradictions that have perennially troubled Western liberal intervention in Africa.

This article offers a critique of widely disseminated portrayals of northern Malian Tuareg by outside media, which tend to portray all Tuareg as warriors and criminals and to project pseudo-scientific concepts of “race” onto relationships between Tuareg and other Malians, recalling the now discredited colonial “Hamitic Myth” in Rwanda. It also analyzes local oral historical accounts that present themes of Mali as both a protected fortress and welcoming crossroads, a country that both resists and absorbs intruders, and that also express concepts of identity based on language, culture, and flexible social affiliation. The article is based partly on interviews with internationally known local musicians who function as mediating “third voices,” and concludes with a discussion of wider implications of these findings for notions of voice, authority, and the mutual construction of ideas of Africa.

This bibliography attempts to list all known theses on sub-Saharan Africa accepted by the University of California at Berkeley, and catalogued by the University Library through January, 1969. The earliest item is dated 1914. The list was compiled from a card file of theses arranged by academic department which is maintained by the Library's General Reference Service.

The availability of theses on interlibrary loan is indicated by symbols following the number of leaves (L) in the thesis. An asterisk indicates that the Library has catalogued more than one copy of a title, and that the second copy may be borrowed on interlibrary loan. The symbol # indicates that the Library's Graduate Social Science branch has an uncatalogued copy of the thesis which may be borrowed. Absence of these symbols indicates that the title is not available on interlibrary loan. Photocopies of all M.A. and those Ph.D. these completed before September, 1962 may be purchased from the Library's Photographic Service; those Ph.D. theses from September, 1962 on, from University Microfilms, Inc.

The bibliography is in two parts. The first part contains those items which cover more than one country, and is divided into General, Central Africa, East Africa, and West Africa; the second part, arranged by country (present name), lists those titles dealing with only one political unit.

The General Assembly of the United Nations passed two conflicting resolutions on the Korean question at its thirtieth session in 1975. One was sponsored by the United States, Japan, and 24 pro-western countries, and the other by the Soviet Union, China, and 41 pro-eastern countries. The pro-eastern proposal demanded the dismantling of the United Nations Command and the withdrawal of all foreign forces under the United Nations flag by 1 January, 1976. The pro-western proposal concurred, on the condition that the parties directly concerned came to a new agreement which will replace the existing truce agreement before the withdrawal of the United Nations forces. The pro-western proposal was supported by eight black African countries, and the pro-eastern proposal by 26 black African countries.

The Korean question is the oldest cold war issue debated in the United Nations. Since it was brought to the United Nations in the wake of the Korean war in 1950, it has been debated and voted on in the General Assembly almost every year (see Goodrich, 1956; U. S. Department of State, 1960; Cho, 1967).

The purpose of this paper is to investigate, through a case study approach, the nature of African non-alignment and the African perception of the cold war, especially as related to divided countries. I will first review how the diplomatic relations between newly independent African states and North and South Korea have developed, and next explore how African countries have been voting on the Korean question in the United Nations. Finally, I will discuss the implications of the relationships between the two Koreas and African countries, both in and out of the United Nations.

The political climate of the post-war world did not permit the United States to embark on a new era of isolationism in 1945, but few Americans demonstrated much awareness of Asian or African developments. French North Africa was more familiar than many colonial areas because American military operations during the war had acquainted the public with Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. When demonstrations against French control erupted throughout the Maghrib after VE Day, a minority of Americans recognized that this region of French rule, but of intensely nationalist feelings, could become a serious trouble spot. With the subsiding of the riots, however, even the largest newspapers in the United States offered only limited information on North African events.

During the next decade, leaders of the independence movements waged a campaign to familiarize Americans with the situation in their countries and gain support for their views on how Franco-Maghribi problems could best be resolved. In outlining that campaign and discussing its strategy, this essay attempts to asses the importance which North Africans attached to American sympathy, the methods which they utilized to attain it, and the results which they achieved.

Late in 1946, a spokesman for the Committee for the Liberation of North Africa called the public's attention to the inadequacy of the coverage of the American press. In a lengthy letter to the New York Times, M. Aboul Ahrass accused France of denying foreign newsmen access to North Africa because of the fear that their reports would discredit the French administrations (December 30, 1946: 18).

Jungle imagery and prejudiced stereotypes still abound in American knowledge of Africa. In a 1967 survey of American schoolchildren, E. Perry Hicks and Barry K. Beyer found that the majority still saw Africa through a web of myth and unfavorable stereotypes which appeared to increase as students progressed from grade seven through grade twelve (1970, pp. 158-166). In closing remarks as President of the African Studies Association, Philip D. Curtin noted this dilemma and posed a compelling challenge to the Africanist community. “The 1970's,” Professor Curtin stated,

This essay is written in response to Professor Curtin's challenge and as an attempt to begin a dialogue on how to teach African history effectively. It is our contention that African studies is a recent enough arrival on the academic scene that teachers have not yet developed, or have not yet shared, techniques of instruction to cope with the special problems inherent in the subject matter.

The Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (Zimcord) was held in Salisbury from March 23-27, 1981. Thirty-one nations and twenty-six international agencies pledged about $1.45 billion in economic aid to be disbursed over a three-year period beginning in July of 1981. The United States government, through the Agency for International Development, pledged $225 million. USAID has just begun to set up a mechanism for the distribution of those funds. Because of the presence of well-trained personnel and the substantial bureaucracy that has remained intact during the transition from a white- to a black-led government, USAID intends to utilize the existing decision-making structure in Salisbury as much as possible. For those interested in potential Zimbabwean projects, one of the key documents that needs to be studied is the Zimcord Conference Document. In the following discussion the main points of the document are summarized.

In the decade since Nigeria ended its civil war. Southern Africa has become the paramount concern of Nigerian foreign policy. No other foreign-relations issue generates such a unified Nigerian response as does opposition to White supremacy in the Southern redoubt. At the same time, extraordinary wealth from petroleum exports has provided a new capability to influence developments in Southern Africa and, ultimately, the outcome of the confrontation between Black and White in South Africa. With its strategic impact on the economies of the United Kingdom and the United States, Lagos has demonstrated a willingness to use its leverage to attain policy goals in the region. The Nigerian government appears to be offering the West a choice. It expects the Western nations to be more attentive to Nigerian concerns and demands on African issues if they are not to face economic retaliation. During the past four years Lagos began to define this choice in its relations with Great Britain. A consideration of these relations would be instructive for the United States; the political and economic implications of this policy should be clear to London and Washington as they piece together parallel approaches to Southern Africa.

In assessing the outlook for the administration of justice under the second Nigerian Republic, one should consider in retrospect the political significance of courts and police, particularly as these agencies affect the work of political development and nation-building. Perhaps in deference to the myth of the apolitical judicial and legal process, little attention has been paid to the political impact of both courts and police, beyond the judicial-review powers of the higher courts or the use of the police as agents of terror.’ Comment on the more “ordinary” doings of police and courts is all too often an afterthought or is missing entirely.

Development does not occur at the same rate everywhere. The resultant unequal distribution of development concerns planners throughout the world. A variety of spatial investment strategies which affect the development pattern have been proposed. They range from the dispersed, equality oriented investment of Tanzania's ujamaa to the primate city concentration of Ivory Coast's efficiency oriented “African Riviera” project in Abidjan. Most countries throughout the world have sought a middle course—one of “deconcentrated concentration”—in an attempt to balance efficiency and equality considerations. Specifically they have chosen to invest their development capital in “growth centers”—urban areas that have a high potential for generating development in their immediate area and throughout their region. This policy prescription is based on the optimistic belief that development generated in the urban center will spread to the hinterlands of the region.

Kenya has explicitly incorporated a policy of growth centers into their Development Plans. That the country's planners subscribe to the belief of positive spread effects is evident in the following Plan statements:

The interdependence between rural and urban areas grows in the process of development and with it comes the enhancement of the role of the town as the producer of goods and services and the consumer of agricultural production. This interaction leads to cumulative self-sustaining growth (Kenya, 1974a: 114).

Rural life cannot be complete without towns any more than towns can be complete without access to the countryside, and it will be an objective of Government policy to promote the growth of a number of towns to a size where they are large enough to provide the people of the surrounding districts with many of the facilities and amenities available in a modern city (Kenya, 1969: 15).

It is ironic that the United States, a nation purportedly born, out of revolution, should he so naive in its understanding and reticent in its recognition of other indigenous uprisings and nationalist aspirations. In the post-World War II era, no area has experienced more political upheaval than the continent of Africa. The rejection of colonialism within a wave of nationalist insurgency has produced no less than forty independent states. North Africa, in particular, provides a faithful reflection of the road to independence for the whole of Africa. The four Muslim states have attained sovereignty through United Nations supervision, French concessionary reluctance, and bloody civil war. Yet, in all cases, the United States belatedly withheld sympathetic diplomatic action.

American political insensitivity toward the Maghrib is evidenced by the scarcity of published materials on United States-North African relations. Perhaps if American interests in the area were only the product of the post-1945 period, this historiographical inadequacy could be excused within the argument of unfamiliarity and other foreign priorities. Yet the argument would be a shallow one. The United States has enjoyed deep-rooted, though irregular, historical connections with North Africa both before and during the colonial period. Although material on United States relations with North Africa, 1776-1945, centers on only a handful of topics, those sources of contact alone would partially invalidate the specious excuse of unfamiliarity and irrelevance which ethnocentric scholars raise.

Judging by public tone, style, and ideological emphasis alone, the casual observer of U.S. foreign policy is impressed by the novelty of the Carter Administration’s approach toward Southern Africa. Kissinger had stressed America’s tangible interests, sought alliances with ideological “enemies” to advance or at least to protect those interests, and operated a clever, manipulative and secretive diplomacy with calculated ambiguity. The Carter Administration now seems to espouse once more American ideals and principles, open diplomacy for announced clearly-stated objectives, and decision-making by consent. But what is really involved is a reversion to the active use of ideology and salesmanship to manage its political and economic interests. It is of a piece with “helping our little brown brothers” in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines, making the world “safe for democracy” and saving Vietnam from Communism.