Introduction

Antisthenes appears occasionally in Xenophon's Memorabilia and in his Symposium. His performance is often in character: he is presented as not the most subtle debater or participant in the talks that Xenophon describes, or rather in the talks that Xenophon constructs. Xenophon is not reliable, as is well known. His claims to have been present at conversations he describes are notorious because at times it is obvious that he could not have been present (e.g. being only seven in 422 B.C., the date of his Symposium). Nevertheless, this does not imply that everything he tells us is false. We have to reckon with the fact that he could have used authentic material that he couched in the form of the conversations or descriptions. There are indeed many subjects presented in Xenophon's works which were also discussed by Antisthenes. We have already seen the interest of both writers in Cyrus, and both have something to say about the teachability of virtue, although they differ on this point. But there is much more correspondence. In Giannantoni there is a long list of the possible influences Antisthenes had on Xenophon – bait for scholarly discussion because many of the socalled influences are not much more than vague suggestions.

There is an interesting fragment that states that Antisthenes was one of Socrates’ closest friends and followers and that he never abandoned him (Mem. 2.11.17). When Xenophon makes Antisthenes appear in a conversation about friendship, he explicitly says that he, Xenophon, heard this conversation (Mem. 2.5.1-5). Xenophon must have been keen on what Antisthenes had to say about Socrates and his views.

Jealousy and envy

Antisthenes said that jealousy consumes people the way rust affects iron: ‘As iron is eaten away by rust, so he said, the envious are consumed by their own habit’. In Xenophon and also elsewhere (e.g. Plato Apology 33A6-8), Socrates says that he does not ‘begrudge’ (ϕθονέω, ϕθόνος) or refuse to grant other people the benefits of his companionship. In fact, we find the same notion in Xenophon's Symposium spoken by the character Antisthenes, who says that he distributes the riches of his soul to his friends without jealousy or grudge.

Introduction: moral strength

As far as we can see in the debris of his works, Antisthenes’ ethical doctrines have no systematic character. There are a limited number of titles on Diogenes Laertius’ list that promise ethical discussions. But one cannot always trust one's eyes – even in works with a mythological title moral issues can come extensively to the fore. Nor are these titles united by a leading theme; instead there are multiple themes. We have already offered some remarks on his theory of pleasure (if it deserves to be called a theory), and some discussion of his tendency to mitigate strong pronouncements once they have done their work by drawing attention.

The evidence concerning moral strength is found in a number of fragments. We have two core concepts in a fragment which states that ponos (‘effort’, ‘exertion’) is a good (ὅτι ὁ πόνος ἀγαθόν). One could suppose that exertion, even strain, might be a bad phenomenon, but Antisthenes, eager to establish that ponos is a good thing, illustrates this by pointing to Heracles’ efforts in accomplishing his works (as a Greek example), and to his idol Cyrus and his efforts (as a foreign example). We have already noted that pleasure after effort is good, or in any case acceptable, whereas there is also the strong utterance that Antisthenes would rather be mad than move a finger for pleasure. There is furthermore a fragment which compares efforts to dogs because they also bite the unfamiliar; the intention here seems to be that if one is not accustomed to efforts they cause pain, so one had better get used to ponos. This is in line with the remark that to exercise virtue all one needs is the strength of a man like Socrates, one of the few references to the name ‘Socrates’ in what remains of Antisthenes’ works. It is an important reference because Socrates was an ethical model, an ideal for many including Antisthenes. Socrates was reportedly immune to influences from outside; his long vigil at Delium was proverbial. In Xenophon's Symposium there is a portrait of Antisthenes’ conducting a conversation in which ethical issues play an important role.

Antisthenes and monotheism: was Antisthenes the first monotheist?

It will appear that what we have found out about Antisthenes’ provocative attitude and methods returns, not only in his views on theology, but also in the field of Homeric research. Theology and Homeric research are strongly connected. Antisthenes’ views on theology contain a form of monotheism, but as it turns out this is not sharply distinguished from polytheism.

Antisthenes’ understanding of the opposition between daily practice or custom (nomos) and nature (physis), which he borrowed from the Sophists, led him to a monistic concept of the godhead. This is expressed in the work On Nature (Πϵρὶ ϕύσϵως, α´ β´): ‘According to daily practice (nomos), there are many gods; according to nature (physis), only one’; or as Cicero puts it: ‘there are many popular gods, but one natural god’. Antisthenes is also reported to have said: ‘god does not resemble anyone, hence nobody can get knowledge of him from a statue’. Already in Xenophanes one encounters verses that attempt to free the gods from anthropomorphic features; however, they refer to polytheistic gods and for Antisthenes it is about the one god. With his utterances Antisthenes became the first so-called monotheist without being aware of it and without being followed in this respect either. Monotheism was still an unknown phenomenon and certainly not understood in opposition to polytheism. Furthermore, it had no future in classical antiquity because the philosophers themselves gave the gods a place in their systems, or were able to rationalize their existence within these systems, even if they assumed that one god was the greatest. As Xenophanes says: ‘One god, the greatest among gods and among men as well, both in form and power of mind not equal to the mortals’. There was no need to abolish the gods or to replace them by one god in classical antiquity. Antisthenes had no need to do so either; in his conversations the gods emerge as usual. For example, we know that when asked by a man what education his son should get, he said: ‘If he wants to live together with the gods, he needs to become a philosopher; if he wishes to be with people, a rhetor’.

Alcibiades and beauty

Alcibiades was an imposing but controversial figure who has provoked a lot of literature. There are many works entitled Alcibiades: two dialogues ascribed to Plato, one of Phaedo, and one of Aeschines. Antisthenes is also among these writers. We have some fragments of his Alcibiades that speak about the title character's beauty. According to one of the fragments, Antisthenes met Alcibiades in person and was impressed by his beauty, describing him as strong, manly, well educated, daring and in the bloom of youth (or beautiful), beloved by all Greece. Antisthenes – fond of Homer as he was – compared him to Achilles: ‘If Achilles was not such, he was not ripe (or beautiful) at all’. Thus, if Achilles was not as beautiful as Alcibiades he was not beautiful at all (the distance in beauty would be great), for Achilles was the most beautiful in his day. As a kind of proof Antisthenes alludes to Homer's comment about Nireus: ‘Nireus, the most beautiful man who came to Ilion, of all Danaoi after the excellent son of Pelias [i.e. Achilles]’. Conclusion: Achilles was the most beautiful man of his day, hence Alcibiades was, in his day, the Achilles of ancient times in terms of beauty.

Socrates also enters this work because, as Antisthenes tells us, he pleaded to give the prize for valour to Alcibiades at Delium (or Potidaea): the armour and the crown of victory. Thus, Alcibiades’ epithet ‘daring’ was deserved. It is interesting that there is a quotation in the form of a dialogue in which Socrates answers a stranger who said that he (Socrates) had received the prize of valour in Boeotia: ‘We heard that in the war against the Boiōtoi you received the prize of valour. – Silence stranger! It was the gift of honour given to Alcibiades, not me. – But you gave it, as we have heard’.

This little piece of dialogue confirms the history of the prize of valour, but what is perhaps more interesting, we have here a rare authentic piece of an Antisthenean dialogue where two persons are involved: Socrates himself, so that we know explicitly that Socrates figures in a dialogue of Antisthenes, and a stranger, who is unknown to us.