In 2018, the Dutch Government proposed to establish an independent international ombudsman, known as the International Ombuds for Humanitarian and Development Aid (IOHDA), to hold non-governmental organizations (NGOs) accountable for their safeguarding and accountability failures, notably the Oxfam GB sexual abuse scandal in Haiti (March 2018) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (April 2021). While establishing an international ombudsman would fill a regulatory and accountability gap in global governance, there are many legal and logistic challenges, some of which have been identified by the IOHDA proposal itself, that undermine the creation of this brand new body. Besides the legal and logistic challenges outlined in the proposal, this article argues that the IOHDA is unlikely to succeed because of three additional challenges. First, the IOHDA’s scope is too broad and misinterprets the ombudsman’s jurisdiction and traditional role. Second, the IOHDA neglects that existing ombudsman schemes present limitations in enacting accountability and does not learn any lessons from them. Third, the IOHDA lacks support from NGOs, a driving force, and the principal standard-setters for an international accountability mechanism, like the proposed ombudsman. This article provides a series of recommendations to mitigate these three challenges whilst identifying alternative routes to enact NGO accountability.

In almost 20 years of existence, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has managed to be at the forefront of public discussions on international organizations (IOs). Transparency in the WTO decision-making has been on the agenda of the multilateral trading system for several years. Pressures from developing countries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the civil society in particular have led to significant improvements towards more openness and participation in the WTO decision-making. This article posits the WTO within the current debates about more institutional transparency in IOs. It discusses the current features of good governance in the WTO decision-making and the consensus rule in particular, in an attempt to identify the pros and cons of this voting tradition in a modern IO. It also discusses the recent selection of the new WTO Director-General. A central insight of the paper is that input and output transparency of the WTO could be further enhanced by increased, managed participation of NGOs. As the WTO is gradually becoming a genuine IO in terms of membership and gets involved in global discussions relating to finance, climate change, or poverty eradication, public scrutiny will only increase and thus improved governance is an irreversible process. However, divergences in the views of WTO Members as to the proper scope of WTO input and output transparency will most probably lead to extended negotiations. Some thoughts about the future prospects of and possible avenues for the WTO system are also identified.