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Transparency in the WTO's Decision-Making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 July 2014

PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS
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Abstract

In almost 20 years of existence, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has managed to be at the forefront of public discussions on international organizations (IOs). Transparency in the WTO decision-making has been on the agenda of the multilateral trading system for several years. Pressures from developing countries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the civil society in particular have led to significant improvements towards more openness and participation in the WTO decision-making. This article posits the WTO within the current debates about more institutional transparency in IOs. It discusses the current features of good governance in the WTO decision-making and the consensus rule in particular, in an attempt to identify the pros and cons of this voting tradition in a modern IO. It also discusses the recent selection of the new WTO Director-General. A central insight of the paper is that input and output transparency of the WTO could be further enhanced by increased, managed participation of NGOs. As the WTO is gradually becoming a genuine IO in terms of membership and gets involved in global discussions relating to finance, climate change, or poverty eradication, public scrutiny will only increase and thus improved governance is an irreversible process. However, divergences in the views of WTO Members as to the proper scope of WTO input and output transparency will most probably lead to extended negotiations. Some thoughts about the future prospects of and possible avenues for the WTO system are also identified.

Keywords

good governancelegitimacynon-governmental organizations (NGOs)transparencyWorld Trade Organization (WTO)
Type
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 27 , Issue 3 , September 2014 , pp. 701 - 726
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2014 

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References

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37 Art. V:2 WTOA.

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44 Art. XII WTOA.

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52 Art. IX:1 WTOA.

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56 See C. D. Birkbeck and M. Harbourd, ‘Developing Country Coalitions in the WTO: Strategies for Improving the Influence of the WTO's Weakest and Poorest Members’, GEG Working Paper 2011/63 (July 2011).

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60 The Warwick Commission, The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward? (2007).

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82 See Pedersen, P., ‘The WTO Decision-Making Process and Internal Transparency’, (2006) 5 (1)World Trade Review 103CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 107.

83 See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, (12 October 1988) AB-1998–4, WT/DS58/AB/R at [180–183]; and Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Selected Customs Matters, (13 November 2006) AB-2006–4, WT/DS315/AB/R at [302].

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85 See J. Helmer and R. Wolfe, ‘Trade Policy Begins at Home: Information and Consultation in the Trade Policy Process’, 2007 available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1365111≥.

86 Compare the similar argumentation used by the EU General Court: Case T-233/09, Access Info Europe v. Council of the European Union [2011] ECR II-1073 at [56ff].

87 See also Doha Declaration, supra 66, at [10].

88 See D. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (1994) at 27–8 (discussing the role of environmental NGOs in the NAFTA).

89 Webcasting of such meetings with the collection of feedback taking place in another room or electronically is also a possibility.

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95 See J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (1981) at 286–7.

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98 Piewitt, M., ‘Participatory Governance in the WTO: How Inclusive Is Global Civil Society?’, (2010) 44 (2)Journal of World Trade 467Google Scholar at 485. Interestingly, Piewitt suggests that there is a persistent North–South divide in global civil society in the WTO and a dominance of the business sector.

99 See, e.g., J. Politi, A. Thomson, and J. Leahy, ‘Brazil in Tight Race with Mexico to Head WTO’, Financial Times (6 May 2013). Kenya, which nominated a candidate, also complained formally about a procedural matter relating to the confidential consultations. See ICTSD, ‘Candidate Field Narrows for WTO Director-General's Race’, (2013) 17(3) Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest.

100 Interestingly, the term ‘consensus’ is mentioned ten times in the adopted procedures: See WTO, supra note 2.

101 See WTO, supra note 2, para. 8. The candidates were: Azevêdo (Brazil); Blanco (Mexico); González (Costa Rica); Kyerematen (Ghana); Mohamed (Kenya); Pangestu (Indonesia); Hindawi (Jordan); Groser (New Zealand); and Bark (South Korea).

102 See WTO General Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 29–31 January 2013’, WT/GC/M/142 (16 May 2013).

103 See WTO, supra note 2 at [17–18]. Also WTO, ‘Appointment of the next Director-General – Further Progress: Informal General Council Meeting at the Level of Heads of Delegations’, Statement by the Chairman, JOB/GC/39, (19 March 2013).

104 See WTO, supra note 2 at [17].

105 See ICTSD, ‘WTO Members Choose Brazil's Azevêdo as Next Director-General’ (2013) 2(2) Bridges Africa Review.

106 See, e.g., Hoekman, B. and Mavroidis, P. (eds.), Race for the WTO Director-General job – Seven Candidates Speak (2013)Google Scholar; also Meléndez-Ortiz, R. (ed.), Global Challenges and the Future of the WTO (2013)Google Scholar.

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109 See Fisher, supra note 6 at 276.

110 See Hirschman, A., ‘Exit, Voice and the State’, (1978) 31 (1)World Politics 90CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 106.

111 See Hocking, B., ‘Changing the Terms of Trade Policy Making: From the “Club” to the “Multistakeholder” Model’, (2004) 3 World Trade Review 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

112 See, e.g., the reforms that accompanied the EU Better Regulation Initiative.

113 See Keohane, R., Macedo, S., and Moravcsik, A., ‘Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism’, (2009) 63 International Organization 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 23.

114 For a more nuanced view, see Pauwelyn, J., ‘The Transformation of World Trade’, (2005) 104 Michigan Law Review 1Google Scholar, at 34.

115 Trachtman, J., ‘The Constitutions of the WTO’, (2006) 17 EJIL 623CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 638.

116 Having said this, one should refer to recent evidence suggesting that the GATT/WTO managed to spur on the trade of developing economies. See Goldstein, J., Rivers, D., and Tomz, M., ‘Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade’, (2007) 61 International Organization 37CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 57.

117 See J. Bacchus, ‘A Few Thoughts on Legitimacy, Democracy, and the WTO’, in Petersmann, supra note 41, 429 at 430.

118 Here I refer particularly to those countries which are at the outskirts of the developing world, with few possibilities of affecting terms of trade.