Fundamentalists in the Russian Orthodox Church see contemporary state institutions as sources of threat because of their fragility and unreliability. Thus, in response, they engage in ritual and political actions aimed at restoring the spiritual unity of the Russian people (sobornost) that would allow the monarchy to be restored and resume the God-given mission of the Russian Orthodox Church to delaying the apocalypse. In this article, the author reveals the ways the concept of an averted or delayed apocalypse shapes fundamentalists’ approaches to institution and network building as alternatives to existing public institutions, which they consider incapable in the face of the approaching End Time. The author distinguishes between anti-systemic fundamentalists (those unwilling to have anything in common with the existing sociopolitical system) and symbiotic fundamentalists (those involved in provisional cooperation with state agencies). Anti-systemic fundamentalists insist on Russians’ verbal repentance for the sin of abandoning their mission of averting the Apocalypse; sometimes they live in walled communities. Symbiotic fundamentalists are building networks or communities that do not necessarily imply living together. Using these communities as a tool, symbiotic fundamentalists hope to rebuild the spiritual unity of the Russians. They envision their activities as repentance by works that in the future would allow the Orthodox monarchy to be restored and to resume the God-given mission of the church.

Although the earliest political text from early China, namely the Canon of Documents, comprises speeches attributed to ancient kings, for most of the Eastern Zhou period (770–255 BCE) monarchs remained conspicuously silent. This article surveys the instances of the rulers’ speeches in major historical collections and a sample of philosophical texts from the Warring States period. I demonstrate that the rulers’ voice in these texts is overwhelmingly confined to short questions, approval of proposed policies, or other insignificant uttering. I argue that this silence was deliberately built into the texts by their composers, so as to preserve the intellectual authority in the hands of the educated elite. It was only with the imperial unification of 221 BCE and the dramatic change in the balance of power between the emperors and the intellectuals that the royal speech regained its prominence and political importance.

In 2018, Russia's last tsar, Nicholas II, was the most popular of all Russian historical figures of the twentieth century; the fame of White officers such as Alexander Kolchak and Anton Denikin was also on the rise. Obviously, broad sympathy for the last Romanov does not imply support for a potential restoration of the monarchy, yet the past few years have seen the activation of several monarchist lobbies, especially around the Russian Orthodox Church and in some well-connected Kremlin circles that seek the ideological hardening of the Putin regime. In this article, I use the case study of the monarchist idea to explore how the Kremlin manages the production of a large and diversified set of ideologies. I explore how the relationship between state authorities, ideological entrepreneurs, and some societal actors such as the Church is articulated along a continuum of permanent complementarity and competition in the production of ideologies.

This obituary surveys the biography and major works of Liu Zehua, a leading scholar of China’s intellectual history, political thought, and political culture. It explores the impact of Liu Zehua’s personal experience, in particular the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, on his conceptualization of Chinese political culture as subjugated to the overarching principle of monarchism. Liu Zehua’s critical engagement with China’s past distinguished him from proponents of revival of traditional values and made him one of the powerful opponents of cultural conservatives in China.