The preponderance and influence of the public sector in the financial system have long been a defining characteristic of Brazilian capitalism. While exerting control over the national credit system through targeted lending policies and other regulatory tools, the federal government also wields significant weight through its state-owned institutions. This article delves into the role of Banco do Brasil (BB), a prominent financial institution and policymaking instrument of the Brazilian government, during the zenith of the developmental state between 1964 and 1982. In contrast to the prevailing focus on financing public spending, this study investigates the international engagements of BB and unveils its participation in managing the country’s external imbalances. BB’s financing proved crucial in bypassing the IMF and reinforcing the government’s commitment to industrialization and developmentalism. The article offers new insights into the forces of Brazil’s state-led finance and the political economy shaping its current banking and regulatory landscape.

The shortcomings and potential dangers of international financial flows for the health and stability of domestic banking systems in developing countries have been copiously discussed over the last decades. While the importance of capital controls and regulation as determining factors has been widely emphasised, the extent to which these policies work in episodes of financial crisis is still a matter of debate. This article examines the relationship between supervisory frameworks and banking fragility in Mexico and Brazil in the wake of the international debt crisis of 1982. It shows that the model of international banking intermediation that evolved out of the stringent capital mobility system in Brazil was considerably less vulnerable to crisis than in Mexico, which had a more lightly regulated regime. These findings provide insights into historical debates about the implications of prudential regulation and capital controls for the development and expansion of foreign finance, and whether the risks underlying international banking are necessarily inherent in the process of financial globalisation.

This article examines the relationship between international commercial banks and military regimes in South America. The focus is on how military regimes in the Southern Cone of Latin America and Brazil in the 1970s became heavily dependent on foreign capital provided by international banks based in Britain and France. It makes use of previously unavailable archival evidence to examine the interactions between international banks and South American governments, showing how these interactions intensified once military rule was established. It shows that international capital was used for a wide variety of purposes, including arms imports. When global banks cut loans once the debt crisis erupted in 1982, they aggravated the economic crisis but also fostered democratic change.

This article explores the international expansion of Mexican banks and its implications for the domestic banking system during the decade leading up to the 1982 debt crisis. In contrast to the prevalent focus in the literature on profitability and performance, I examine the asset and liability structure of the banking sector and show that there were clear signs of deterioration in its financial condition well before the onset of the crisis. Financial statement analysis reveals that the banks engaged in international lending and foreign funding were the ones with the greatest propensity to be adversely affected by this problem. The international expansion of Mexican banks emerged and developed as an exit option to domestic funding problems and increasing competition from foreign bank loans, in a context of growing needs for financing and foreign exchange in Mexico.