Decision makers often save money for a specific goal by forgoing discretionaryconsumption and instead putting the money toward the savings goal. Wehypothesized that reference points can be exploited to enhance this type ofsaving. In two hypothetical scenario studies, subjects made judgments of theirlikelihood to forgo a small expenditure in order to put the money toward thesavings goal. In Experiment 1, judgments were higher if the savings goal waspresented as composed of weekly subgoals (e.g., save $60 per week to buya $180 iPod). Experiment 2 replicated this finding and demonstrated thatthe subgoal manipulation increased judgments of likelihood to save money onlywhen the money saved from the foregone consumption would allow the decisionmaker to meet the weekly subgoal exactly (not under or overshoot it). Theseresults suggest a reference point mechanism and point to ways that behavioraldecision research can be harnessed to improve economic behaviors.

This paper used a randomised field experiment to test if tailoring an email invitation induces pension scheme participants to delve into their online personal pension situation. Action perspective and degree of urgency conveyed in the invitation were tailored based on gender and age. Overall, our empirical findings show that such tailoring had no positive effects on (1) the probability that pension scheme participants click on the weblink to access information about their pension situation and (2) the probability to log in to a tool for pension check.

Automatic enrollment has substantially increased employee participation in defined contribution plans. Yet little is known about how retirement plan design features influence retirement wealth accumulation in a setting of labor market turnover. We find that employees separating from jobs with automatic enrollment plans are significantly more likely to take a cash distribution (and potentially pay a tax penalty) than those separating from jobs with voluntary enrollment plans, offsetting some of the benefits from automatic enrollment. Yet given the sizeable improvements in plan participation from automatic enrollment, wealth accumulation for automatically enrolled participants, net of cash-outs and penalties, remain higher than it would have been under voluntary enrollment.

Financial and prosocial biases in favor of attractive adults have been documented in the labor market, in social transactions in everyday life, and in studies involving experimental economic games. According to the taste-based discrimination model developed by economists, attractiveness-related financial and prosocial biases are the result of preferences or prejudices similar to those displayed toward members of a particular sex, racial, ethnic, or religious group. Other explanations proposed by economists and social psychologists maintain that attractiveness is a marker of personality, intelligence, trustworthiness, professional competence, or productivity. Evolutionary psychologists have argued that attractive adults are favored because they are preferred sexual partners. Evidence that stereotypes about attractive people are causally related to financial or prosocial biases toward them is weak or nonexistent. Consistent with evolutionary explanations, biases in favor of attractive women appear to be more consistent or stronger than those in favor of attractive men, and biases are more consistently reported in interactions between opposite-sex than same-sex individuals. Evolutionary explanations also account for increased prosocial behavior in situations in which attractive individuals are simply bystanders. Finally, evolutionary explanations are consistent with the psychological, physiological, and behavioral changes that occur when individuals are exposed to potential mates, which facilitate the expression of courtship behavior and increase the probability of occurrence of mating. Therefore, multiple lines of evidence suggest that mating motives play a more important role in driving financial and prosocial biases toward attractive adults than previously recognized.

Personal financial decision making plays an important role in modern finance. Decision problems about consumption and insurance are in this article modelled in a continuous-time multi-state Markovian framework. The optimal solution is derived and studied. The model, the problem, and its solution are exemplified by two special cases: In one model the individual takes optimal positions against the risk of dying; in another model the individual takes optimal positions against the risk of losing income as a consequence of disability or unemployment.