Rising income and wealth inequality across the developed world has prompted a renewed focus on the mechanisms driving inequality. This paper contributes to the existing literature by studying the impact from life-cycle savings, intergenerational transfers, and fertility differences between the rich and the poor on the wealth distribution. We find that bequests increase the level of wealth inequality and that fertility differences between the rich and the poor amplify this relationship. The counterfactual exercises show that the interaction between bequests and differential fertility is quantitatively important for understanding wealth inequality in the United States.

Individuals routinely engage in instrumental transactional legal behavior, from generating tax returns to signing leases to negotiating employment terms. While some individuals undertake these activities equipped with the skills, knowledge, and capacity to behave strategically, others do not. In this article, we introduce the concept of legal actuation to describe this legal behavior and theorize its role as a source of inequality under the law. Using estate planning as an empirical example, we consider how variation in legal actuation may serve to reproduce economic inequalities and investigate the role of legal socialization, knowledge, and capability as mechanisms of advantage. In doing so, we draw attention to an understudied dimension of everyday legal behavior that has important implications for equal justice and the relationship between law and inequality.

Explanations for the emergence and abandonment of the Chalcolithic Trypillia mega-sites have long been debated. Here, the authors use Gini coefficients based on the sizes of approximately 7000 houses at 38 Trypillia sites to assess inequality between households as a factor in the rise and/or demise of these settlements. The results indicate temporarily reduced social inequality at mega-sites. It was only after several generations that increased social differentiation re-emerged and this may explain the subsequent abandonment of the mega-sites. The results indicate that increases in social complexity need not be associated with greater social stratification and that large aggregations of population can, for a time at least, find mechanisms to reduce inequality.

A uniform value of a statistical life (VSL) is part of established practice within the federal government. Some people have applauded a uniform VSL on the ground that it respects the equality of persons; takes harm to poor people as seriously as it does harm to wealthy people; avoids expressive harms; and builds appropriate wealth redistribution into regulatory policy. Other people have strenuously objected to a uniform VSL, emphasizing that to reduce mortality risks, poor people are willing to pay less than rich people are, and urging that poor people should not have to pay more than they are willing to pay. Whether a uniform VSL is in the interest of poor people depends on whether we are dealing with subsidies or regulations. In the case of subsidies, a uniform VSL is highly likely to benefit poor people. If we are dealing with regulations, we cannot know whether a uniform VSL helps or harms poor people without knowing the incidence of costs (and benefits).

A large body of survey research offers evidence that citizens are not always fully aware of the economic and political realities in their respective countries. Norton and Ariely (2011) extended this research to the domain of wealth inequality, showing that Americans were surprisingly unaware of the shape of the wealth distribution in America. Using an alternative methodology, Eriksson and Simpson (2012) found that asking Americans to estimate the average wealth of quintiles, rather than the percent of wealth owned by each quintile, led to relatively more accurate estimates. We note, however, that the Eriksson and Simpson (2012) results do not challenge Norton and Ariely’s (2011) conclusion that Americans desire a much more equal distribution of wealth.

Liberal egalitarians argue that the state is justified in taxing members of a political community to achieve distributive justice and ensure political equality and regime stability. This involves an uneasy compromise between equality and efficiency, a compromise that many argue has recently been undermined by the growth of unchecked wealth and income inequality. This essay argues that there is also a trade-off between selecting fair processes for taxation and aiming for particular distributive outcomes. The way people accumulate wealth, and the way states tax often matters more than distributive outcomes. Policymakers must allow for the fair assessment of tax liabilities, avoid excessive enforcement costs and prevent political actors from using tax systems to achieve their partial ends. Recognizing these considerations justifies a systematic scheme of taxation while constraining the mechanisms for collecting revenue. I justify this position using comparative analysis, which I contrast with the conceptual intuitionistic approach associated with egalitarianism.

This paper engages with and aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion regarding the role of economic and political elites in inequality dynamics and their reproduction over time. We reconstruct the distribution of wealth employing a sample of wills from the El Colegio de Sonora database covering the period of 1871-1910. We show that the rapid industrialisation and modernisation process that occurred in northern Mexico during the late-19th and early-20th centuries led to a continuous increment in wealth concentration at the top of the distribution. The Gini index measure of 0.58 for the 1871-1885 period rose to 0.80 in 1901-1910. Rather than a natural or «Kuznetsian» inevitability fundamental (kuznetsian) necessity, however, our subsequent analysis of the wills of the upper classes suggests a critical role played by the political economy at the time and highlights the importance of control over natural resources on inequality dynamics.

Over the past decade there have been repeated calls for the greater taxation of wealth. These calls have had little impact on policy. There has been a global trend to reduce or abolish taxes on wealth. The contrast suggests that it may be better now to explore how taxes on wealth may be made a reality rather than designing new tax proposals. What are the barriers to tax wealth? This paper addresses this by conducting a case study of a high profile plan for introducing a one-off wealth tax in the UK. It identifies a tyranny of the status quo, framing and the policy process as key barriers to tax reform. It uses thematic analysis to study how the plans for a one-off wealth tax were discussed in the media and the UK Parliament. This paper argues that there were important shortfalls in both the way the case for a wealth tax was framed as well as the engagement with the policy process. It claims that a stronger framing would have discussed wealth inequality in greater depth and there was a need for a less equivocal case to Parliamentarians.

Recent large-scale comparative archaeological studies of wealth differences have used Gini coefficients to assess inequality, employing house-floor area as a standardised, cross-cultural proxy for wealth. Two such studies have found that storage capacity produces higher Gini coefficients than floor area, suggesting that the latter measures household wealth, while the former reflects anticipated income. Here, the authors test these relationships using the floor area and storage capacity of excavated houses on the Lower Columbia River in the Pacific Northwest. The results, which reflect those from previous studies, support the cross-cultural nature of the pattern, and show that storage capacity reflects food-surplus deployment strategies rather than anticipated household income.

This article advances the hypothesis that the transformation of farming from a labour-limited form to a land-limited form facilitated the emergence of substantial and sustained wealth inequalities in many ancient agricultural societies. Using bioarchaeological and other relevant evidence for the nature of ancient agrosystems, the authors characterise 90 Western Eurasian site-phases as labour- vs land-limited. Their estimates of wealth inequality (the Gini coefficient), which incorporate data on house and household storage size and individual grave goods—adjusted for comparability using new methods—indicate that land-limited farming systems were significantly more unequal than labour-limited ones.

Archaeological evidence provides the only basis for comparative research charting wealth inequality over vast stretches of the human past. But researchers are confronted by a number of problems: small sample sizes; variable indicators of wealth (including individual grave goods, the area of household dwellings or storage spaces); overrepresentation of the wealthy, or invisibility of those without wealth; and vastly different population sizes. Here, the authors develop methods for estimating the Gini coefficient—a measure of wealth inequality—that address these challenges, allowing them to provide a set of 150 comparable estimates of ancient wealth inequality.

This paper studies the evolution of wealth inequality in an economy with endogenous borrowing constraints. In the model economy, young agents need to borrow to finance human capital investments but cannot commit to repaying their loans. Creditors can punish defaulters by banishing them permanently from the credit market. At equilibrium, loan default is prevented by imposing a borrowing limit tied to the borrower's inheritance. The heterogeneity in inheritances translates into heterogeneity in borrowing limits: endogenously, some borrowers face a zero borrowing limit, and some are partly constrained, whereas others are unconstrained. Depending on the initial distribution of inheritances, it is possible that all lineages are attracted either to the zero-borrowing-limit steady state or to the unconstrained-borrowing steady state—long-run equality. It is also possible that some lineages end up in one steady state and the rest in the other—complete polarization.

In the discussion on the causes of the financial crisis three main lines of argument can be distinguished: The „regulatory failure“ argument, the theory of the cyclical instability of financial markets, and analyses of „financialization“. From a sociological point of view, the latter analyses deserve particular interest, as they consider the crisis in the context of the larger structural changes of mature capitalist societies that have developed since the last decades of the 20th century. The paper first provides an overview of the financialization literature, focussing of the interplay between the changes on the macro-, meso- and micro levels of society that led to the present dominance of the financial services sector over the economy. Moreover, the historical analyses of Arrighi and Silver are considered. The second part of the paper offers a theoretical reconceptualization of the empirical findings in the framework of a multilevel model of capitalist dynamics. The model shows how a prosperous capitalist economy like the Western one in the second half of the 20th century can be transformed into a financialized economy due to its own internal dynamics. From a sociological perspective, financialization can thus be understood as a hegemonial regime of financial investors over entrepreneurs.

This paper analyzes the aggregate growth and distributional effects of tax policy using an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous agents having “catching up with the Joneses” (CUJ) types of preferences. We characterize the aggregate equilibrium of this economy, as well as its distributional properties, and show that the consumption externality present with CUJ preferences produces greater income inequality than is obtained with conventional time-separable preferences. The consumption externality substantially alters the effects of tax policy, mostly quantitatively, but in some cases qualitatively as well. Extensive numerical simulations are conducted and used to compare the consequences of different modes of taxation, highlighting the tradeoffs involved.