The plurilateral negotiations in the WTO on services domestic regulation and investment facilitation for development, commonly referred to as joint statement initiatives, were running in parallel until the end of 2021. Both negotiations seek to devise or have come up with disciplines that would apply good regulatory principles to WTO members’ regulatory procedures and requirements affecting services trade and cross-border investment. These disciplines pursue the objective of creating a more transparent and predictable regulatory environment that would facilitate the uptake of economic activities by (foreign) services/service suppliers and investors. This chapter examines the approach taken by the two initiatives to regulatory disciplines. It shows that their approach to regulatory disciplines is largely similar, but their stance on special and differential treatment sets them apart.

This chapter assesses whether the adoption of the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement would bring a transformative change to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and analyzes its relationship with WTO agreements related to trade in goods and intellectual property rights. The study finds that rules under existing WTO agreements already apply to measures related to investment to some extent, despite the long-time reluctance of WTO members to introduce investment rules. The IFD Agreement would complement existing WTO agreements and contribute to enhanced transparency and streamlined administrative procedures and requirements. As international transactions expand beyond traditional trade in goods to services and intellectual properties, the multilateral rules under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO have evolved to cover such areas. The IFD Agreement is seen as another step in the evolutionary development of the WTO, rather than a transformative change. Formal negotiations on the IFD Agreement began in September 2020.

This chapter examines how the multilateral discussion on a multilateral framework on Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) currently taking place at the World Trade Organization (WTO) differs from provisions on the same topic found in existing international investment agreements (IIAs). For that purpose, it defines investment facilitation and presents its main elements and a typology of its more common provisions. The chapter then reviews existing IIAs that include investment facilitation provisions, identifying regulatory convergence (or lack thereof) across them. Finally, it discusses whether there is an added value of the IFD compared to existing IIAs and if there is room for innovation in the current negotiations.

Investment facilitation provisions are incorporated in many international investment agreements (IIAs). Especially, because investment facilitation measures have their root in international trade law and investment law and national law, disputes concerning these measures could be settled through methods in these different legal regimes. Notably, such disputes could be submitted to investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) or WTO dispute settlement, or both, by different types of disputants and relying on different treaties or laws. This makes settlement of investment facilitation disputes a complicated issue. This chapter presents a structural review of the issue of settlement of investment facilitation disputes, including dispute prevention, settlement of investment facilitation disputes through ISDS, and WTO dispute settlement, and explores the issue of parallel jurisdiction over investment facilitation disputes.

We quantify the impacts of a potential Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement under negotiation at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The analysis is based on an innovative multiregion general equilibrium simulation model including bilateral representative firms. Consideration is given to foreign direct investment (FDI) and monopolistic competition. The model shows empirically relevant gains associated with removal of investment barriers in the form of transaction costs faced by foreign investors. The expected global welfare gains range between 0.56% and 1.74% depending on the depth of a potential IFD Agreement. The benefits are concentrated among the participants of the agreement with the highest welfare increase for the low-income and middle-income countries. Notable spillovers accrue to nonparticipants, which can be further increased by joining the agreement. Our results contribute to the relatively scarce research on investment facilitation and provide policymakers with information on the potential effects of the negotiated IFD Agreement.

This chapter uses the investment facilitation index (IFI) to map the adoption of over 100 investment facilitation measures in more than 140 countries. The study finds a wide variation in investment facilitation frameworks across and within world regions and income groups, with measures related to internal and external cooperation less frequently adopted in low-income countries. Few countries have well-functioning single-window mechanisms, and focal points are either completely missing or lacking many important functions. The study highlights the importance of binding multilateral commitments and support structures for implementing investment facilitation reforms in countries of lower income levels, as foreseen in the nascent Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement. The findings suggest potential for regional and international initiatives through peer-learning and sharing of best practices to improve investment facilitation frameworks worldwide.

This chapter examines how the facilitation of foreign direct investment (FDI) through the World Trade Organization (WTO) can contribute to fulfilling the right to development and achieving UN Sustainable Development Goals. It assesses how the WTO facilitates investment related to sustainable development in developing countries through liberalization of trade in services, restrictions on trade-related investment measures, and promotion of intellectual property rights. The study finds that reform efforts to make these WTO disciplines more conducive to sustainable development have been slow and of limited significance. The chapter also looks at how investment is facilitated through investment treaties and domestic investment legislation, highlighting the importance of domestic investment legislation for promoting investment for sustainable development, particularly for least developed countries. Finally, the chapter discusses whether and how the draft WTO Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement can most effectively achieve its objective in relation to countries most in need of development-related investment, considering the relative roles of the home and host states of FDI.

Investment facilitation, aiming for improvements in the transparency, efficiency, and predictability of domestic investment frameworks, plays an important role in complementing currently prevailing international measures for attracting external development. Finance and various investment facilitation reform initiatives are under way at multiple levels. However, empirical evidence on currently prevailing levels of adoption of investment facilitation measures and resulting reform and support needs is still scarce.

Despite the promise of a well-ordered trading system and expansion of trade liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, why is trade governance deadlocked? This puzzle is addressed by elaborating the meaning of “crisis of success” and what such a crisis looks like at the global trading order. I argue that the global trading system is revealing a “crisis of success” in that its current failure to ensure functional trade liberalization change is a result of the initial accomplishment in successfully undergoing a power shift in global trade governance especially at the WTO, marked by greater inclusion of new emerging powers. The success of the initial first phase of trade governance (1990s–2008/2012), especially in aiding an institutional power shift at the global level, created conditions for new problems, leading to a fragmented turn toward preferential trade agreements as well as trade-mediated conflictual strategies rather than sustainable peaceful change. The chapter’s dynamic historical argument delineates how early successes in global trade policies and governance led to maximalist peaceful change, followed by crisis leading to greater use of tariffs and ensuing US–China economic and trade competition. The mechanisms that underwrote the paradox of crisis despite institutional strength are elaborated.

This chapter identifies three distinct reasons why China took a middle-of-the-road position in the debate on the COVID-19 TRIPS waiver at the WTO. It also recounts the country’s more assertive position in the run-up to the adoption of the Ministerial Decision on the waiver. Drawing eight lessons from the international debate on the waiver and the subsequent Ministerial Decision, the chapter offers insights into the future role China can or will play in future international policy debates at the intersection of intellectual property and public health, including during the next pandemic.

The protection of intellectual property (IP) is a question of life and death. COVID-19 vaccines, partially incentivized by IP, are estimated to have saved nearly 20 million lives worldwide during the first year of their availability in 2021. The vast majority of the benefit of this lifesaving technology, however, went to high- and upper-middle-income countries. Despite 10 billion vaccines having been produced by the end of 2021, only 4 percent of people in low-income countries were fully vaccinated. Paradoxically, IP may also be partly responsible for hundreds of thousands of lives lost in 2021, due to insufficient supply of vaccines and inequitable access during the critical first year of vaccine rollout, most notably in low-income countries that lacked the ability to buy or manufacture vaccines to save their populations. The contributors to this book diagnose a number of causes for the inequitable distribution of life-saving COVID-19 vaccines, from misguided reliance on intellectual property rights and voluntary mechanisms to share knowledge and vaccines, to the rise of vaccine nationalism and vaccine diplomacy, to unequal global intellectual property institutions that disenfranchise low-income countries and continue to reproduce colonial era dependency by poor countries on high income nations for life-saving technologies. Global experts herein suggest several reforms to prevent such inequity in the next pandemic, including delinking vaccine development from monopoly rights in technology, enhanced legal requirements to share publicly-funded technologies in pandemic times, and investment in technology transfer hubs and local vaccine manufacturing capacity in low and middle-income countries.

Authors in this volume make a wide range of important proposals on intellectual property, innovation, and access. The question this chapter asks is: which of these might work in an actual pandemic? By tracing the first year of COVID-19 vaccine distribution, it shows the critical importance of aligning choice of policy mechanisms with political forces. Indeed, it argues that an openness paradigm may have been more effective not only for reasons of justice, but because it could accommodate populist politics and vaccine nationalism.

Informal institutions in global governance are generally expected to favor powerful states. According to conventional arguments, procedural justice is best secured through formal institutional rules that constrain power, while informal institutions reinforce power asymmetries. This chapter revisits this position and asks, how and under what conditions can informal institutions enhance the voice and influence of less powerful or marginalized actors in global governance? The chapter argues that while informal institutions are useful to powerful states because they remove constraints to individual action, they can also be useful to less powerful states to the extent that they positively support action through social-integrative effects. Specifically, interactions within informal groups generate two types of social effects – capacity-building and coalition-building – that can enhance the voice of developing countries and increase their control over collective decisions. The chapter illustrates the arguments by profiling informal groups in the global governance of trade and finance.

Chapter 1 is the introduction to the book. The chapter provides the background to the problem. The anti-dumping investigations are conducted with complicated procedural rules so that exporters cannot cooperate with the investigating authorities. Investigating authorities tend to inflate anti-dumping duties and use anti-dumping for protectionist purposes taking advantage of the non-cooperation. In this context, research questions are listed in connection to the main problem. The scope of the research is also set in Chapter 1.

Australia’s extraordinary economic boom continued throughout the period covered by this volume. By the end of 2005, the economy had enjoyed fifty-seven quarters of consecutive economic growth: Paul Keating’s ‘recession we had to have’ was a distant memory. Unemployment fell to slightly more than 5 per cent, the lowest rate for three decades. The government’s budget was enjoying record surpluses. Australia’s economic growth rate in the period was substantially above that of the average for the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the grouping of leading industrialised economies. Australia’s ranking in the OECD on per capita income rose from eighteenth in the early 1990s to eighth by 2005. Astute intervention by the Reserve Bank of Australia through the imposition of a marginal increase in interest rates in early 2005 appeared to have succeeded in deflating the housing bubble and in ensuring a soft landing for the economy.

Energy intersects with the environment at every stage of its life cycle. The energy supply chain can have adverse effects on nature and public health, including GHG emissions, air, land and water pollution as well the generation of harmful waste, among others. In order to reduce our dependence on high-carbon energy, more needs to be done to increase renewable energy generation and improve energy efficiency. As energy is involved in trade and investment projects, it is covered by the trade and investment branches of international economic law and regulated in these fields mainly by the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), regional trade agreements (RTAs) and international investment agreements (IIAs). This book aims to contribute to the existing scholarship by providing a comprehensive analysis of the energy–environment nexus under trade law and investment law, showing, where relevant, their similarities, differences or even (potential) conflicts at the energy–environment interface. It examines the legal foundations of the energy–environment nexus and associated issues regarding trade control, subsidies, technical standards, investment protection and technology policies.