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Chapter 11 chronicles the efforts of Nigeria’s colonial government to construct and consolidate an effective administrative and legal system, detailing the numerous challenges faced in this endeavor. This “system” of law of order was not singular, varying from region to region, nor was it static. Over the colonial period, its legal, judicial, and law enforcement systems would evolve to better suit the wants and needs of the British Empire. Once an aspect of this system is explained, the chapter explores their broader impact on the pre-existing Indigenous institutions and people.
Competition policy is one important aspect of trade liberalization. However, when examining preferential trade agreements (PTAs), a major type of policy tools to liberalize trade, competition provisions are revealed not to be uniformly distributed across these treaties. What explains the variation in the design of competition clauses in PTAs? Borrowing insights from the rational design of international institutions and combining them with those from treaty ratification and policy diffusion literatures, I identify five major causal mechanisms through which competition provisions are incorporated into PTAs. In evaluating them, I employ a range of operationalization techniques to capture the proposed mechanisms. A treaty-level analysis of 319 PTAs over the period 1960–2015 lends strong and robust support to most of the hypothesized relationships. By integrating theoretical frameworks across international political economy literatures with that from law and economics scholarship, this study demonstrates the utility of political science thinking to the real-world international law-making.
Why do people's preferences towards trade liberalization fluctuate? And why do we observe the eventual return of public support towards free trade? The traditional literature in international political economy has typically calculated individuals' preferences based on their comparative advantage as income-earners, which arises from their specific or general skill level or employment status. What needs to be taken into account, however, is that their economic preferences are constructed based upon their intertwined identities as both income-earners and consumers. We designed and conducted an experiment in Japan (2015) that would impartially elicit answers regarding respondents' daily consumption patterns or (and) employment concerns rather than deliberately or artificially informing them of the potential benefits or harms of trade liberalization. The results display that consumer priming offsets negative impacts arising from employment priming. The consumer effect reduces individuals' concerns on income level or employment when they are exposed to consumer and employment primings simultaneously. Furthermore, our subgroup analyses reveal that the consumer effect remains even among those experiencing economic fragility such as low income or job insecurity. This suggests that potential losers have incentives to support free trade by appreciating consumer benefits.
The 1980s and 1990s saw a policy revolution in developing countries in which many highly protected (if not closed) economies were opened to world trade. These reforms were largely undertaken unilaterally, but international economic institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization supported these efforts. This paper examines the ways in which these institutions promoted, or failed to promote, trade policy reform during this pivotal period.
This chapter shows how labor repression played a crucial role in the history of free trade in many democratic developing countries. While the regression analyses in the previous chapter show that my argument is robust to alternative explanations and generalizable across more than 100 developing countries, this chapter begins to fill in the missing pieces - the causal mechanisms - that link democracy, labor repression, and trade liberalization.
Argentina transitioned from military dictatorship to democracy in 1983 and elected Raul Alfonsin as President. Alfonsin attempted to lower Argentin's tariffs and pass other neoliberal policies, but his economic reforms were blocked by a series of thirteen general strikes launched by the CGT, the labor union confederation led by Saul Ubaldini. When Alfonsin left office in 1989, Argentina's average tariffs still stood at 25 percent, only three percentage points lower than they had been in 1982, the last year of the military regime. By 1991, however, Alfonsin's successor, President Carlos Menem, was able to low tariffs to just 12 percent. This chapter tells the story of how Menem used labor repression to overcome union opposition and quickly open Argentina's economy.
In the mid-1980s, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi attempted to lower India's tariffs and open the country's economy to global competition. Gandhi's trade policy proposals led India's protectionist labor unions to launch a series of general strikes that helped to block these reforms; Gandhi left office in 1989 with India's average tariff still above 80 percent. This chapter continues this story into the 1990s, when Prime Minister Narasimha Rao launched a new attempt at trade liberalization. By 1996, Rao managed to lower India’s average tariffs to 37 percent - a major success compared to Gandhi's efforts, but relatively gradual liberalization compared to many other democratic developing countries. This chapter draws on archival research to illustrate how Rao used labor repression to weaken union opposition to his economic reforms.
This article challenges exclusively rationalist accounts of and offers a complementary explanation for the emergence of liberal trade policy in the Kennedy administration. I draw on recent insights in constructivist institutionalism to emphasize the need to take agency seriously in institutionalist research. Using archival records, I analyze the decisive role Kennedy's advisers played as carriers of ideas in advocating for liberal trade policy by ‘constructing the national interest’, thus convincing a reticent president to support attempts aimed at achieving closer economic integration, culminating in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Insights from their role as advisers can help in specifying the role of agency in the ideas and institutional change literature, through strategic action which shaped a political leader's belief and put political issues on the agenda. By grasping agency in terms of making ideas actionable, an important step is taken in advancing endogenous approaches of institutional change.
While the firm-level distributional consequences of market liberalization are well understood, previous studies have paid only limited attention to how variations in domestic institutions across countries affect the winners and losers from opening up to trade. We argue that the presence of coordinated wage-bargaining institutions, which impose a ceiling on wage increases, and state-subsidized vocational training, which creates a large supply of highly skilled workers, generate labor market frictions. Upward wage rigidity, in particular, helps smaller firms weather the rising competition and increasing labor costs triggered by trade liberalization. We test this hypothesis using a firm-level data set of European Union countries, which includes more than 800,000 manufacturing firms between 2003 and 2014. We find that, for productive firms, gains from trade are 20 percent larger in countries with liberal market economies than they are in coordinated market economies. Symmetrically, less productive firms in coordinated market economies experience significantly smaller revenue losses compared to liberal market economies. We show that both the presence of an institutionalized wage ceiling and the availability of subsidized vocational training are key mechanisms for reducing the reallocation of revenue from unproductive to productive firms in coordinated market economies compared to liberal market economies. In line with our theory, we find that wages and employment in liberalized industries increase differentially across both types of labor markets. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that trade liberalization triggers a differential demand for redistribution at the individual level across different labor markets, which is in line with our firm-level analysis.
The ratification of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) marked a landmark event in the quest to achieve intra-African free trade. AfCFTA is poised to represent the largest free trade area outside the World Trade Organization. Although AfCFTA aspires to liberalize intra-African trade in goods and services to foster socio-economic development, there are concerns that capacity constraints may stultify the underlying goals. AfCFTA is expected to build on the considerable successes already achieved by Africa's regional economic communities. However, it fails to clarify how the overlapping regimes will be reconciled and harmonized. Nevertheless, the agreement is laudable for its quest to facilitate intra-African trade, foster regional value chains that can facilitate integration into the global economy, and energize industrialization, competitiveness and innovation. This article examines the celebrated AfCFTA to understand its potential amid local realities and the possible implications for the multilateral trading system.
This article provides an economic investigation into the underlying causes of industrial wastewater emissions. We examine the direct and the structural break-induced effect of national environmental regulation on industrial wastewater emissions. The results show that strict environmental regulation can partially offset the energy-induced effects imposed by the scale effects of foreign direct inflows and cause positive behavioral responses by either limiting coal usage or improving upon coal usage technology and shift towards clean energy sources. We find the absence of scale economies in the provision of environmental services in the industrial sector due to the poor nature of the technical processes of industries. We further highlight the importance of raising the investment in environmental treatment and embracing trade liberalization in the improvement of industrial wastewater management.
This article asks whether economic liberalization, under certain institutional conditions, is indirectly related to drug violence. Focusing on Mexico’s drug trade, where violence was historically limited by politicoinstitutional arrangements, this study examines how trade liberalization shapes social exclusion in key trafficking regions and, in turn, shapes the industry. It argues that the change in development strategy has increased the flow of workers into the drug trade by reconfiguring the agricultural sector in regions where drugs are produced while failing to absorb surplus labor in manufacturing centers containing key smuggling routes. Through both mechanisms, workers enter an illicit market with new institutional settings that allow for fierce competition and the use of violence. Using panel data on drug violence from 2007 to 2011, the study finds that exposure to trade is associated with violence in both drug-producing and -smuggling regions, but with a more sizable effect in the former.
The paper examines U.S. citizens' attitudes toward the concept of multifunctional agriculture and their perceptions about its various attributes. While the concept has emerged as a major narrative shaping agricultural policies and WTO trade rules, there are considerable disagreements among researchers and policy-makers about what should be considered legitimate attributes of multifunctional agriculture, preventing WTO negotiations from moving forward. Results show that U.S. citizens rated national food security and environmental services as the most important multifunctional roles of U.S. agriculture, and national food security makes the largest contribution to explaining U.S. citizens' attitudes toward multifunctional agriculture.
The effects of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement on the forest sectors and resources of member countries are investigated. A model of wood supply within the spatial partial-equilibrium Global Forest Products Model is developed to link international trade and deforestation. The direct effects of tariff changes and the indirect effects of income changes induced by trade liberalization are considered. The FTAA has a small positive impact on the region's forest resources. Higher harvests of industrial roundwood in most countries are offset by increased afforestation due to the income effect of trade liberalization (captured by the environmental Kuznets curve).
We examine how changes in yield variability affect the welfare of cereal grain and oilseed buyers and producers around the world. We simulate trade patterns and welfare for 21 countries with a Ricardian trade model that incorporates bilateral trade costs and crop yield distributions. The model shows that world trade volumes would need to increase substantially if crop yield variability were to rise. Net welfare effects, however, are moderate so long as countries do not resort to policies that inhibit trade, such as export restrictions or measures to promote self-sufficiency in crops. Low-income countries suffer the most from increases in yield variability, due to higher bilateral trade costs and lower-than-average productivity.
The case of reduction in ad valorem tariffs as a trade liberalization policy is considered in this article. It is shown that the reduction leads to a higher quality of imports, ceteris paribus. This hypothesis was tested on the case of Japanese beef imports from the United States and Australia. U. S. beef, according to the results of Gallup surveys, is considered by Japanese consumers to be a high quality product, while Australian beef is considered to be a low quality product. Empirical results support the hypothesis. Moreover, the recent domination of U. S. beef in the Japanese market is further explained by increasingly more efficient U. S. beef production relative to Australian production and a strong income effect, where an increase in per capita income leads to more demand for higher quality products.
Unilateral liberalization of U.S. peanut policy was evaluated using a model of U.S. and world peanut supply and demand. Under the proposed policy, world peanut price would rise slightly to $.20 per pound at the U.S. farm level. U.S. production would decline by 578 million pounds per year and would be offset by imports of 582 million pounds. U.S. net farm income would fall by $405 million per year. Lost income per farm would be $21,000 per year while the average outlay of consumers would decrease by $.84 per person at farm level price. Government expenditures would be virtually unchanged because of the market orientation of current policy.
Complete agricultural trade liberalization between the United States and the European Union is examined with respect to the agricultural sector. A static, partial equilibrium model, distinguishing among the European Union, the United States, and a politically passive rest of the world, is used to simulate agricultural free trade. The results of this research reveal how European Union and United States adoption of free trade affects domestic and world prices, production, consumption, self-sufficiency, and welfare.
This article appraises the effects of trade liberalization between two industries that have different endowments of skilled labor. Skilled labor is necessary for the production of higher-quality variants of a vertically differentiated good. Skilled labor endowments, therefore, determine the patternof specialization of industries as well as their market structure, both in the final goods market and in the labor market. We analyze how market integration benefits or harms the agents in the industries by delving into the linkages between labor and product markets, and show that bilateral losses from trade can emerge at equilibrium.
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