Background: The meta-cognitive model of rumination is a theoretical model regarding the relationship between rumination and depression. Although meta-cognitive therapy for rumination was established based on this model, insufficient longitudinal studies addressing this model have been conducted. Moreover, the uncontrollability of rumination, suggested to be driven by negative meta-beliefs about rumination, has not been examined using this meta-cognitive model. Aims: We longitudinally examined the meta-cognitive model and its relationship with uncontrollability of rumination and depressive symptoms. Method: Undergraduate students (n = 117) were asked to complete two measurements (with a 6-month gap between them) of positive and negative meta-beliefs about rumination, causal analysis, understanding, uncontrollability of rumination and depression. Results: Cross-lagged effect modelling revealed that positive meta-beliefs predicted high causal analytic rumination. However, the results did not support the causal analytic and understanding aspects of how rumination predicted negative meta-beliefs. Negative meta-beliefs predicted high depressive symptoms, and depressive symptoms predicted high negative meta-beliefs. Negative meta-beliefs predicted high uncontrollability of rumination, whereas uncontrollability of rumination did not predict depressive symptoms. Conclusions: The results partially supported the meta-cognitive model. The prediction of depressive symptoms on negative meta-beliefs suggests that depression-related cognition might be involved in increasing negative meta-beliefs, rather than the repetitive causal analytic and understanding aspects of rumination. In line with meta-cognitive therapy, negative meta-beliefs could be a target for treating depression.

The relationship between subjective memory complaints (SM) and objective memory (OM) performance in aging has been variably characterized in a substantial literature, to date. In particular, cross-sectional studies often observe weak or no associations. We investigated whether subjective memory complaints and objectively measured cognition influence each other over time, and if so, which is the stronger pathway of change—objective to subjective, or subjective to objective—or whether they are both important. Using bivariate latent change score modeling in data from a population study (N=1980) over 5 annual assessment cycles, we tested four corresponding hypotheses: (1) no coupling between SM and OM over time; (2) SM as leading indicator of change in OM; (3) OM as leading indicator of change in SM; (4) dual coupling over time, with both SM and OM leading subsequent change in the other. We also extended objective cognition to two other domains, language and executive functions. The dual-coupling models best fit the data for all three objective cognitive domains. The SM–OM temporal dynamics differ qualitatively compared to other domains, potentially reflecting changes in insight and self-awareness specific to memory impairment. Subjective memory and objective cognition reciprocally influence each other over time. The temporal dynamics between subjective and objective cognition in aging are nuanced, and must be carefully disentangled to shed light on the underlying processes. (JINS, 2015, 21, 732–742)

The Meta-cognitions Questionnaire 30 (MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) has been used to assess individual differences in metacognitive beliefs considered to be central in the metacognitive theory of generalized anxiety disorder (Wells, 2005). In the present study, the psychometric properties, reliability, and validity of a Spanish adaptation of the MCQ-30 were tested in a broad sample of participants (N = 768) of Spanish nationality aged 16–81 years (31.1% males, 68.9% females). Confirmatory factor analysis showed the expected five-factor structure, which was found to be invariant across gender. Internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the subscales were adequate, and the expected relationships to theoretically related variables such as pathological worry, meta-worry, thought suppression and trait anxiety were obtained. Convergent validity with other measures of beliefs about worry was also found. Taken together, these findings suggest that the Spanish version of the MCQ-30 is a valid instrument for evaluating metacognitive beliefs in the Spanish-speaking population.

Background: The perceived control of intrusive thoughts is important in our understanding of a variety of psychological disorders, but particularly in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Little research has explored thought control strategies in younger populations, despite the frequent onset of OCD in childhood. Aims: This study examined thought control strategies and meta-cognitive beliefs in relation to Obsessive Compulsive (OC) interference scores in an adolescent sample. Method: A non-referred sample of 151 adolescents aged 13–16 completed the Thought Control Questionnaire, the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire – Adolescent version, and the Leyton Obsessional Inventory – Child Version. Results: Adolescents reported using distraction and worry as thought control strategies as much as adults, but social control and reappraisal less frequently, with adolescent males also reporting less use of punishment as a strategy. The strategies of worry and punishment, and positive beliefs about worry, uncontrollability and danger beliefs (UCD) and superstition punishment and responsibility beliefs (SPR) predicted OC interference scores. Furthermore, these meta-cognitive beliefs mediated the relationships between punishment and worry and OC interference scores. Conclusions: Given the similarities between our results and those from research exploring these variables in adults, it is proposed that cognitive behavioural models of OCD that have been developed in adult populations may be relevant to adolescents, but that meta-cognitive beliefs about superstition, punishment and responsibility may be important in adolescence.

Proceeding from the assumptions that specific frontal regions control discrete functions and that very basic cognitive processes can be systematically manipulated to reveal those functions, recent reports have demonstrated consistent anatomical/functional relationships: dorsomedial for energization, left dorsolateral for task setting, and right dorsolateral for monitoring. There is no central executive. There are, instead, numerous domain general processes discretely distributed across several frontal regions that act in concert to accomplish control. Beyond these functions, there are two additional “frontal” anatomical/functional relationships: ventral–medial/orbital for emotional and behavioral regulation, and frontopolar for integrative—even meta-cognitive—functions. (JINS, 2011, 17, 759–765)

The relation between self-reported cognitive dysfunction and neuropsychological performance over 24 weeks was assessed in a sample of 53 multiple sclerosis patients. Subjects were assessed at Weeks Zero and 24 as part of a clinical trial to enhance cognition. At baseline, subjects had at least mild cognitive impairment on the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test and an absence of depression. Neuropsychological performance was assessed with a modification of the well standardized Brief Repeatable Battery. The 5-item Perceived Deficits Questionnaire and a 2-item memory and attention/concentration questionnaire assessed self-perceived cognitive impairment. Self-assessed cognition did not correlate with neuropsychological performance at either baseline or 24 weeks. However, changes in the self-assessment measures did correlate with changes in neuropsychological performance. Patients accurately perceived some changes in their level of cognitive dysfunction, though they were insensitive to the degree of their current dysfunction. Possible explanations of this pattern of results are discussed. (JINS, 2005, 11, 614–619.)

Meta-cognitive observation is a kind of cognitive activity that may serve to interrupt worry, rumination, and other kinds of sleep-interfering cognitive processes. In a pilot study, 40 individuals recorded their sleep on a sleep diary during one week (the baseline week) and were then administered a meta-cognitive observation task to use at bed-time during a second week (“the treatment week”). Consistent with the hypothesis, the participants showed a decreased sleep latency during the treatment week compared to the baseline week, and also an increased total sleep time and an improved sleep efficiency. The lack of a control group (i.e., a group who kept a sleep diary for both weeks, without any meta-cognitive observation task), however, precludes any definite conclusion with regard to the effects of the meta-cognitive observation task. It is suggested that meta-cognitive observation tasks should be tested in controlled studies.