We study the effects on performance of incentives framed as gains or losses, as well as the effort channels through which individuals increase performance. We also explore potential spill-over effects on a non-incentivised activity. Subjects participated in a medically framed real-effort task under one of the three contracts, varying the type of performance incentive received: (1) no incentive; (2) incentive framed as a gain; or (3) incentive framed as a loss. We find that performance improved similarly with incentives framed as losses or gains. However, individuals increase performance differently under the two frames: potential losses increase participants’ performance through a greater attention (fewer mistakes), while bonuses increase the time spent on the rewarded activity. There is no spill-over effect, either negative or positive, on the non-incentivised activity. We discuss the meaning and implications of our results for the design of performance contracts.

Prior to the No Surprises Act (NSA), numerous states passed laws protecting patients from surprise medical bills from out-of-network (OON) hospital-based physicians supporting elective treatment in in-network hospitals. Even in non-emergency situations, patients have little ability to choose physicians such as anaesthesiologists, pathologists or radiologists. Using a comprehensive, multi-payer claims database, we estimated the effect of these laws on hospital-based physician reimbursement, charges, network participation and potential surprise billing episodes. Overall, the state laws were associated with a reduction in anaesthesiology prices and charges, but an increase in pathology and radiology prices. The price effects for each state exhibit substantial heterogeneity. California and New Jersey experienced increases in network participation by anaesthesiologists and pathologists and reductions in potential surprise billing episodes, but, overall, we find little evidence of changes in network participation across all of the states implementing surprise billing laws. Our results suggest that the effects of the NSA may vary across states.

Using data envelopment analysis, we examine the efficiency of Canada's universal health care system by considering a set of labour (physicians) and capital (beds) inputs, which produce a level of care (measured in terms of health quality and quantity) in a given region. Data from 2013–2015 were collected from the Canadian Institute for Health Information regarding inputs and from the Canadian Community Health Survey and Statistics Canada regarding our output variables, health utility (quality) and life expectancy (quantity). We posit that variation in efficiency scores across Canada is the result of regional heterogeneity regarding socioeconomic and demographic disparities. Regressing efficiency scores on such covariates suggests that regional unemployment and an older population are quite impactful and associated with less efficient health care production. Moreover, regional variation indicates the Atlantic provinces (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick) are quite inefficient, have poorer economic prospects, and tend to have an older population than the rest of Canada. Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions suggest that the latter two factors explain about one-third of this efficiency gap. Based on our two-stage semi-parametric analysis, we recommend Canada adjust their transfer payments to reflect these disparities, thereby potentially reducing inequality in regional efficiency.

Using virtual reality (VR) in an experimental setting, we analyse how communicating more openly about a medical incident influences patients' feelings and behavioural intentions. Using VR headsets, participants were immersed in an actual hospital room where they were told by a physician that a medical incident had occurred. In a given scenario, half of the participants were confronted by a physician who communicated openly about the medical incident, while the other half were confronted with the exact same scenario except that the physician employed a very defensive communication strategy. The employed technology allowed us to keep everything else in the environment constant. Participants exposed to open disclosure were significantly more likely to take further steps (such as contacting a lawyer to discuss options and filing a complaint against the hospital) and express more feelings of blame against the physician. At the same time, these participants rated the physician's communication skills and general impression more highly than those who were confronted with a defensive physician. Nevertheless, communicating openly about the medical incident does not affect trust in the physician and his competence, perceived incident severity and likelihood of changing physician and filing suit.

The purpose of this commentary article is to explain the causes and effects of the economic migration of health care workers from Poland to Western countries, and to analyse the impact of the migration of doctors and nurses on the functioning of the public health system. We use data from the National Central Statistical Office, our own preliminary research, social surveys and the Watch Health Care database. Domestic data are analysed and compared with trends in Western Europe as described in Eurostat and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development reports. The decreasing number of active physicians remaining in the health care system results in long waits for specialist appointments. The demand for doctors from Central and Eastern Europe will continue to grow. Consequently, there will be a further outflow of medical staff from Poland and other countries in the region and the current problems with access to health care will continue.

The aim of our study is to investigate how innovation is taking place through different research and development (R&D) activities and to establish a link between innovation and business sustainability in the context of Indian pharmaceutical companies. Our study is based on the secondary data. Sample data of 37 Indian pharmaceutical companies listed on the National Stock Exchange have been used based on the stratified sampling technique. For empirical analysis we have performed descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, and panel regression analysis as statistical techniques with the help of STATA 12.0 statistical package. R2 value can predict 100 and 98.20% variability in return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) in model 1 and model 2, respectively. In model 1, the value of c2 is 1.48 and its corresponding p value is 0.00 (<0.05) which means that the model is a good fit for interpretation. R&D intensity is having a positive effect on ROA and the effect is statistically significant at 1% level. Advertising and marketing intensity, capital intensity, leverage ratio and operating expenditure to the total assets ratio are having positive effect on ROA but the effect is not statistically significant. In model 2, the value of F statistics is 8025.62 and its corresponding p value is 0.00 which is <0.05. It means that the model is a good fit for study. R&D intensity is having a positive effect on ROE and the effect is statistically significant at 1% level. Advertising and marketing intensity, capital intensity and operating expenditure to the total assets ratio have positive effect on ROE and the effect is statistically significant at 1% level. Leverage ratio is having a negative effect on ROE but the effect is statically significant at 10% level.

We draw on uniquely detailed micro-level data from a Belgian professional medical liability insurer to examine how different procedural and legal events that take place during the unfolding of a medical malpractice claim influence the timing of its settlement. Utilizing the competing risks regression framework, we find that settlement hazard is all else equal statistically significantly positively associated with the completion of those procedural and legal events that most effectively reveal factual information about the underlying medical malpractice case. Consistent with theory, settlement hazard is either unassociated or even negatively associated with the completion of other procedural and legal events. Our analysis, therefore, provides policy insights into which aspects of the resolution process could be emphasized, and which de-emphasized, in order to reduce the often excessive duration of medical malpractice claims and its adverse effects on the healthcare system.

In the Dutch health care system, health insurers negotiate with hospitals about the pricing of hospital products in a managed competition framework. In this paper, we study these contract prices that became for the first time publicly available in 2016. The data show substantive price variation between hospitals for the same products, and within a hospital for the same product across insurers. About 27% of the contract prices for a hospital product are at least 20% higher or lower than the average contract price in the market. For about half of the products, the highest and the lowest contract prices across hospitals differ by a factor of three or more. Moreover, hospital product prices do not follow a consistent ranking across hospitals, suggesting substantial cross-subsidization between hospital products. Potential explanations for the large and seemingly random price variation are: (i) different cost pricing methods used by hospitals, (ii) uncertainty due to frequent changes in the hospital payment system, (iii) price adjustments related to negotiated lumpsum payments and (iv) differences in hospital and insurer market power. Several policy options are discussed to reduce variation and increase transparency of hospital prices.

All consumer groups with specific preferences must feel free to easily switch insurer in order to discipline insurers to be responsive to consumers’ heterogeneous preferences. This paper provides insight into the switching behaviour of low-risks (i.e. young or healthy consumers) and high-risks (i.e. elderly or unhealthy consumers) in the Netherlands in the period 2009–2012. We analysed: (1) administrative data with objective health status information (i.e. medically diagnosed diseases and pharmaceutical use) and information on health care expenses of nearly the entire Dutch population (n=15.3 million individuals) and (2) three-year sample data (n=1152 individuals). Our findings indicate that switching rates strongly decrease with age. For example, in 2009, consumers aged 25–44 switched 10 times more than consumers aged 75 or older. Another finding is that switching rates decrease as the predicted health care expenses increase. Although healthy consumers switch twice as much as unhealthy consumers, this difference becomes much smaller after adjusting for age. We conclude that our findings can be explained by higher perceived switching costs by elderly consumers than by young consumers. Consequently, insurers have low incentives to act as quality-conscious purchasers of care for the elderly consumers. Therefore, strategies should be developed to increase the choice of insurer of elderly consumers.

This paper considers methods to measure output and productivity in the delivery of health services, with an application to NHS hospital sector. It first develops a theoretical framework for measuring quality adjusted outputs and then considers how this might be implemented given available data. Measures of input use are discussed and productivity growth estimates are presented for the period 1998/9-2003/4. The paper concludes that available data are unlikely fully to capture quality improvements.