We use a comprehensive new dataset of asset-class returns in 38 developed countries to examine a popular class of retirement spending rules that prescribe annual withdrawals as a constant percentage of the retirement account balance. A 65-year-old couple willing to bear a 5 percent chance of financial ruin can withdraw just 2.31 percent per year, a rate materially lower than conventional advice (e.g., the 4% rule). Our estimates of failure rates under conventional withdrawal policies have important implications for individuals (e.g., savings rates, retirement timing, and retirement consumption), public policy (e.g., participation rates in means-tested programs), and society (e.g., elderly poverty rates).

We replicate Meissner (Exp Econ 19:281–298, 2016), where debt aversion was reported for the first time in an intertemporal consumption and saving problem. While Meissner (2016) uses a German sample, our participants are US undergraduate students. All of the original study’s main findings replicate with similar effect sizes. Additionally, we extend the original analysis by introducing a new individual index of debt aversion, which we use to compare debt aversion across countries. Interestingly, we find no significant differences in debt aversion between the original German and the new US sample. We then test whether debt aversion correlates with individual characteristics such as gender, cognitive reflection ability, and risk aversion. Overall, this paper confirms the importance of debt aversion in intertemporal consumption and saving problems and validates the approach of Meissner (2016).

We use the 529 college savings plan setting to investigate whether and why households make suboptimal choices to invest in local assets. We estimate that 67% of open accounts between 2010 and 2020 were located suboptimally due to the plans’ tax inefficiencies and high expenses. Over the accounts’ projected lifetimes, such investments yielded expected losses of 8% on average or $15.6 billion in 2020 alone. We then investigate why suboptimal investment is so prevalent. Consistent with households’ lack of understanding of state-level tax benefits, we find that a meaningful proportion of households does not account for the potential tax benefits and costs of local versus nonlocal 529 investment. Household financial literacy and plan disclosure complexity appear to explain suboptimal investment patterns, which further supports the role of information-processing frictions. Our study presents novel evidence on individuals’ preferences for local assets and how information-processing frictions shape their investment decisions, reducing their financial well-being.

We study how Spanish equity investors assessed firms’ exposure to political risk during the regime change of the 1930s. We show that shifts in political uncertainty regularly predicted a general deterioration of future investment opportunities in the stock market. However, we also find that firms differed in their sensitivity to uncertainty, reflecting important differences in their perceived exposures to political risk. The negative impact of uncertainty was significantly milder for firms with political connections to republican parties. The price of some stocks increased in periods of heightened uncertainty, thus allowing investors to hedge against reinvestment risk. In the case of firms that became targets of hostile political actions, we observe that investors frequently adjusted their assessment of individual stocks to changes in firm-specific political circumstances. Over the whole period of the Second Republic, investors' systematic preference for safer equity hedges led to a continuous decline in the price of stocks perceived as more exposed to political risk.

We analyze the disclosures of sustainable investing by Dutch pension funds in their annual reports by introducing a novel textual analysis approach using state-of-the-art natural language processing techniques to measure the awareness and implementation of sustainable investing. We find that a pension fund's size increases both the awareness and implementation of sustainable investing. Moreover, we analyze the role of signing a sustainable investment initiative. Although signing this initiative increases the specificity of pension fund statements about sustainable investing, we do not find an effect on the implementation of sustainable investing.

This paper investigates the relationship between growth and quality of pension funds. It measures growth in terms of changes in the number of participants and cash flow transfers and appreciates the quality of the funds through the set of information on past results and costs published in the official prospectuses. The results show that growth rewards the best performing funds in the long term, while annual performance and costs have no relevance. Nevertheless, other factors, such as market power and commercial pressure, appear to be more powerful. The existence of conditions of market power capable of attracting investors beyond the actual quality of pension products is undesirable as it harms future pensioners. These results have implications for the Authority, as mandatory information should be suitable to induce investors to identify the best products and direct individual choices toward the public objective of a more efficient market.

The decision about when and how much to annuitize is an important element of the retirement planning of most individuals. Optimal annuitization strategies depend on the individual’s exposure to annuity risk, meaning the possibility of meeting unfavorable personal and market conditions at the time of the annuitization decision. This article studies optimal annuitization strategies within a life-cycle consumption and portfolio choice model, focusing on stochastic interest rates as an important source of annuity risk. Closing a gap in the existing literature, our numerical results across different model variants reveal several typical structural effects of interest rate risk on the annuitization decision, which may however vary depending on preference specifications and alternative investment opportunities: When allowing for gradual annuitization, annuity risk is temporally diversified by spreading annuity purchases over the whole pre-retirement period, with annuity market participation starting earlier in the life cycle and becoming more extensive with increasing interest rate risk. Ruling out this temporal diversification possibility, as embedded in many institutional settings, incurs significant welfare losses, which are increasing with higher interest rate risk, together with larger overall demand for annuitization.

The papers in this 20th Anniversary Special Issue reflect to a large extent how the fields of pension economics and pension finance have developed in the past two decades, although there remain very clear connections to the research published in the Journal's first issue. While there has been great progress in research on pensions and retirement economics over the last 20 years, there remain important outstanding questions for future study.

We investigate whether a benchmark and non-constant risk aversion affect the probability density distribution of optimal wealth at retirement. We maximize the expected utility of the ratio of pension wealth at retirement to an inflation-indexed benchmark. Together with a threshold and a lower bound, we are able to generate closed-form solutions. We find that this non-constant risk aversion type of utility could shift the probability density distribution of optimal wealth more towards the benchmark, and that the probability of achieving a certain percentage of the desired benchmark could be increased. The probability density distribution generated under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) risk preference is more widely spread along the benchmark.

This article questions the drivers behind the distribution of savings in different capital markets in Portugal between 1550 and 1800. A novel dataset of credit transactions, interest rates and debt service documents a shift in the lenders' investment behaviour. By 1712, one of the leading institutional creditors—the Misericórdias—had ceased to allocate funds to the sovereign debt market. Data reveal that this disinvestment was neither related to the poor performance of debt service nor to the lure of potentially higher returns on private credit. We argue that changes in the rationales for issuing debt justify the drop in the number of institutional investors in the public credit market, and this correlates with the heavy allocation of funds into private lending.

We consider the holder of an individual tontine retirement account, with maximum and minimum withdrawal amounts (per year) specified. The tontine account holder initiates the account at age 65 and earns mortality credits while alive, but forfeits all wealth in the account upon death. The holder wants to maximize total withdrawals and minimize expected shortfall at the end of the retirement horizon of 30 years (i.e., it is assumed that the holder survives to age 95). The holder controls the amount withdrawn each year and the fraction of the retirement portfolio invested in stocks and bonds. The optimal controls are determined based on a parametric model fitted to almost a century of market data. The optimal control algorithm is based on dynamic programming and the solution of a partial integro differential equation (PIDE) using Fourier methods. The optimal strategy (based on the parametric model) is tested out of sample using stationary block bootstrap resampling of the historical data. In terms of an expected total withdrawal, expected shortfall (EW-ES) efficient frontier, the tontine overlay dramatically outperforms an optimal strategy (without the tontine overlay), which in turn outperforms a constant weight strategy with withdrawals based on the ubiquitous four per cent rule.

We study the optimal investment-reinsurance problem in the context of equity-linked insurance products. Such products often have a capital guarantee, which can motivate insurers to purchase reinsurance. Since a reinsurance contract implies an interaction between the insurer and the reinsurer, we model the optimization problem as a Stackelberg game. The reinsurer is the leader in the game and maximizes its expected utility by selecting its optimal investment strategy and a safety loading in the reinsurance contract it offers to the insurer. The reinsurer can assess how the insurer will rationally react on each action of the reinsurer. The insurance company is the follower and maximizes its expected utility by choosing its investment strategy and the amount of reinsurance the company purchases at the price offered by the reinsurer. In this game, we derive the Stackelberg equilibrium for general utility functions. For power utility functions, we calculate the equilibrium explicitly and find that the reinsurer selects the largest reinsurance premium such that the insurer may still buy the maximal amount of reinsurance. Since in the equilibrium the insurer is indifferent in the amount of reinsurance, in practice, the reinsurer should consider charging a smaller reinsurance premium than the equilibrium one. Therefore, we propose several criteria for choosing such a discount rate and investigate its wealth-equivalent impact on the expected utility of each party.

A comparison of the performances of pension products that ignores long-term trends might significantly overestimate the long-term impact of volatility risks while underestimating the impact of persistent, low-frequency trends. This paper proposes a comparison making use of projection models based on the long-term risk–return tradeoff proposed by Campbell and Viceira (2005) to explicitly take into account slow-moving economic trends. In order to illustrate the approach and its implications, we discuss the capital protection provided by life-cycle target-date fund strategies and minimum guarantee strategies.

The “Fear of Missing Out” or FoMO has become an accepted motivator of behaviours extending from the purchase of limited-edition sneaker brands to social media use and cryptocurrency investment. As a motivator of individual financial behaviours, such as cryptocurrency and stock investment, it is unclear how FoMO relates to consumer financial literacy and other consumer traits, including risk tolerance and personality. We propose, and assess, a model of reported investment behaviour and investment behaviour intention. We find a larger association between FoMO and crypto ownership, both current and intended, compared with stocks. FoMO has a small association with current stock ownership, relative to the association of financial literacy and risk tolerance. Context matters when measuring FoMO with the more context-specific measures having the largest associations with investment behaviour and investment intentions. Finally, our results suggest financial literacy is an antecedent of FoMO, more so for stocks.

Quantifying tail dependence is an important issue in insurance and risk management. The prevalent tail dependence coefficient (TDC), however, is known to underestimate the degree of tail dependence and it does not capture non-exchangeable tail dependence since it evaluates the limiting tail probability only along the main diagonal. To overcome these issues, two novel tail dependence measures called the maximal tail concordance measure (MTCM) and the average tail concordance measure (ATCM) are proposed. Both measures are constructed based on tail copulas and possess clear probabilistic interpretations in that the MTCM evaluates the largest limiting probability among all comparable rectangles in the tail, and the ATCM is a normalized average of these limiting probabilities. In contrast to the TDC, the proposed measures can capture non-exchangeable tail dependence. Analytical forms of the proposed measures are also derived for various copulas. A real data analysis reveals striking tail dependence and tail non-exchangeability of the return series of stock indices, particularly in periods of financial distress.

As the market for fine-wine investing matures, basic questions of portfolio strategy remain unexplored. I evaluate how adding fine wine from the superstar châteaux of Bordeaux's Right Bank might complement the traditional focus on the five first-growths of Bordeaux's Left Bank. Fundamentals for the Right Bank's superstars are attractive: they produce roughly an order of magnitude less, face different production conditions, and receive equally impressive critical reviews. However, they receive far less attention than their Left Bank counterparts. To examine returns over the long run, I hand-collected 10,885 prices for eight wines from an archive of 391 Sherry-Lehmann catalogs, a New York City retailer, which began at the end of Prohibition. Using these historical price records, I compare the real returns from investing in the five Premier Cru to a portfolio that adds three superstar châteaux from the Right Bank: Ausone, Cheval Blanc, and Petrus. I find the geometric-average annual return was 6.78% in real terms from 1938 to 2017 for the joint portfolio, less than 0.01% different, but with better risk-reward as measured by the Sharpe ratio. Additionally, I find the life cycle of aging is substantially different across the two Banks, which could provide further diversification benefits for the strategic investor.

We investigate the cause of the increase in mortgage investments by pension funds after the financial crisis. We show that, after the introduction of the new financial assessment framework in 2015, funds that experienced larger reductions in the funding ratio during the 2008–2012 crisis invested more in mortgages. We test the hypothesis that a past recovery mode has motivated pension funds to invest more in mortgages after the crisis. Funds that seek to further hedge their interest rate risks aim for a different risk/return investment profile. Mortgages could contribute to a less risky portfolio, as they have become even safer since the introduction of several new regulations in 2013. Recovery modes after the crisis combined with the new framework are a cause of the recent surge in mortgage holding by pension funds; we find that this led to a 39% increase in their mortgage investments, despite the fact that these are still low relative to the overall investments of pension funds.

Wine investment returns can come from overall market trends or price increases with age. Because of the short wine price histories available, market and maturation effects are difficult to separate. Consequently, researchers often obtain dramatically different estimates of investment returns. We find that data sample bias may be the hidden cause of the disparate estimates. In wine auction data, the sample bias refers to a shift in the distribution of which wines are traded as a function of their age. Such sample bias in panel data sampled across many different wine labels can distort the estimation of price increases versus age and consequently impact the estimation of market trends. This analysis shows that segmenting the analysis such that the data panels contain wine labels with similar trading characteristics can lead to a more stable estimation.

The analysis here looks at data from Bordeaux, Italy, Australia, and California. An Age-Period-Cohort (APC) analysis is applied to data panels from each region. Then the data in each region is segmented by a measure of popularity in order to reduce sampling bias. Data thus segmented is then re-analyzed to demonstrate the difference in estimating price appreciation lifecycles and market trends.

We study individuals' incentives to make investment decisions. Using data from a large pension system in Chile we find that individuals who are active in managing their investments have, on average, poor performance. We provide robust evidence suggesting that learning plays an important part in this phenomenon. Indeed, individuals who have made successful investment decisions in the past go on to trade more frequently. However, this result holds when using a naive definition for successful decisions. Also, average performance is negatively related to the number of investment decisions, casting doubt on the existence of market timing skills.

We study whether pension fund board governance relates to asset allocation. Pension funds with well-governed boards have greater international diversification, lower cash holdings, and, when pension funds are small, invest more in risky assets. In particular, pension fund boards that establish comprehensive investment policies invest more in equities, in foreign assets, and hold less cash. We argue that a comprehensive investment policy is likely to serve as a proxy for the financial expertise available to the fund while it provides the set up to facilitate decision making. Finally, we further show that the presence of external financial experts is also associated with lower cash holdings.