This chapters traces the evolution of the Nova Holanda gang’s governance practices from the mid-1990s until the occupation of Maré by the Brazilian Military in April 2014 through the analysis of newspaper archives, oral histories with residents and gang members, and a dataset of anonymous gang denunciations. Following its integration into the Comando Vermelho faction, CVNH maintained a benevolent dictator regime, combining high levels of coercion with responsive benefits, until several years of warfare with their primary rival led to the use of extreme forms of coercion against residents as disorder prevailed. By 2004, the war between CVNH and Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) had ended though enforcement continued to be active and frequent, leading to a social bandit regime, in which the gang offered significant benefits and engaged in low levels of coercion. Then, following the resurgence of TCP in 2009 until the arrival of the Brazilian military, CVNH can be considered a benevolent dictator gang once again. They ramped up their coercive behavior in response to TCP’s more aggressive posture while providing significant benefits to avoid frequent police enforcement efforts.

This chapter develops the concept of criminalized governance, defining it as the structures and practices through which criminalized groups control territory and manage relations with local populations. It distinguishes between two primary dimensions: coercion and the provision of benefits. The chapter then provides detailed descriptions of the various activities and behaviors included within each of these dimensions. A typology of criminalized governance regimes is then presented, which contains five ideal types: disorder, benevolent dictator, tyrant, social bandit, and laissez-faire. Finally, existing explanations from the literature on criminalized governance in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas are addressed.

Taking a rationalist approach to institutions as equilibria, I develop a critical perspective on whether and when intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) promote peaceful change. I challenge the standard view that cooperation through IGOs is necessarily “peaceful” by tightening the definition of peaceful change to include not only being nonviolent and voluntary but also being noncoercive. Whether voluntary cooperation is peaceful now depends not only on the means used and end point of change but also on its starting point. Whenever prevailing institutions overly favor (previously) powerful states, seemingly cooperative change within IGOs entails implicit elements of coercion. This is especially true of formal IGOs (FIGOs) whose rules and agency are tightly tied to the interests of the powerful. By contrast, the greater flexibility of informal IGOs (IIGOs) enables them to promote change that is more inclusive of the interests of all concerned. Their greater operational capacity may give FIGOs a comparative advantage for adapting international order – and thus for peaceful change when the international order is just. But IIGOs are more effective for promoting peaceful change when larger transformational change of the international order is needed.

This chapter explores the potential of Construction Grammar for analyzing literary texts. First, it investigates typical features of literary language from a constructional point of view. Fairy tales, for example, are characterized by their opening lines like “Once upon a time …,” analyzed as a concrete, complex construction. Similarly, many authors, styles, and genres are characterized by particular constructions, or the use of particular words and phrases. The second section deals with creative, innovative, and seemingly ‘rule-breaking’ language in a constructional framework, suggesting that Construction Grammar as a usage-based and cognitively plausible model offers the perfect toolkit to analyze seemingly unruly linguistic behavior. The third part deals with literary genres as linguistic units beyond the sentence, arguing that literary texts are also learned form–meaning pairings and can be treated as constructions. Genres as constructions may change dynamically over time and be subject to prototypeeffects. Drawing on numerous examples, this chapter thus demonstrates that literary language and texts can be productively analyzed using concepts and methods of Construction Grammar.

This chapter examines a class of grammatical patterns called functional amalgams, for example, That’s the real issue is that you never really know and I have a friend in the Bay Area is a painter. Distinct from syntactic blends, functional amalgams are innovative constructions that combine otherwise incompatible subparts of other constructions. These combinations are not licensed by the canonical phrase-structure rules of the language and may appear illogical or redundant. However, unlike speech errors, functional amalgams are purposeful productions and serve to distribute across constituents units of meaning that would otherwise coalesce in a single constituent sign of a complex linguistic expression. We examine the properties that distinguish functional amalgams from syntactic amalgams, and explore the syntactic, semantic, and discourse-pragmatic features of functional amalgams, using an array of English sentence patterns as illustrations and showing why amalgams qualify as constructions in the sense of Construction Grammar. Finally, we extend this conception of functional amalgams to complex words, asking how selection properties of derivational endings may lead to coerced meanings.

Climate change is humanity’s greatest challenge for the XXIst century. Its effects will be felt for generations to come. In light of the enormity of the challenge, bank regulators are moving, yet reforms are neither homogeneous nor comprehensive. The EU is clearly more committed to the effort than any other player, and even within the EU, attitudes are cautious towards Pillar 1 (prudential requirements) and macroprudential measures, and bolder towards Pillar 3 (market discipline through disclosures) and Pillar 2 (supervisory review), though more uneven on the latter. This does not follow a scientific logic (due to the high uncertainty of climate risk) but a policy logic, since legislators and regulators tend to follow a path of minimum resistance, and undertake first the reforms that require them a lower epistemic burden.

Chapter 1 places the institution of belligerent reprisals in relation with the two conceptual frameworks of reciprocity and enforcement. First, it sketches the trajectories by which international law has approached the phenomenon of belligerent reprisals, identifying extant prohibitions and clarifying the requirements for their lawful adoption. After recalling outstanding questions in the international regulation of the mechanism, it describes the two paradigms that legal theory could draw from to conceptualize belligerent reprisals. On the one hand stands reciprocity, as embodied chiefly in the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach; on the other, the paradigm of enforcement as manifested in countermeasures. Having described their main tenets, the chapter shows how these two blueprints, despite co-existing in the early theories on belligerent reprisals, have come to be seen as mutually exclusive, thereby offering two clearly distinct alternatives for the following formalization of the purpose and function of the mechanism.

Chapter 2 explains how belligerent reprisals have come to be interpreted as tools to induce compliance with the laws of armed conflict. It does so by highlighting three cumulative processes. First, it looks at the role that post–World War II tribunals, the ICTY and the ICRC have played in stressing the procedural elements of belligerent reprisals, emphasizing the highly formalized set of steps to be taken before the adoption of the measure while downplaying the retaliatory act itself. Then, it claims that the main thrust of this proceduralization lies in the creation of a regulatory framework that attributes a specific legal meaning to the retaliatory conduct and, by so doing, allows for an assimilation of belligerent reprisals with the notion of countermeasures. In turn, this analogy leads to the attribution to belligerent reprisals of a sanctioning character that protects the primary norm from the risk of persistent non-compliance. The outcome of these three processes is the attribution to belligerent reprisals of a chiefly coercive purpose, interested in inducing compliance with the laws of armed conflict and markedly influenced by the enforcement paradigm.

This chapter starts from the premise that secondary sanctions are invariably adopted to exert pressure upon foreign economic or financial actors operating in third states, with the intention to modify their conduct in alignment with the primary sanctions already imposed by the sanctioning state against the target state. As follows, due to their extraterritorial scope and their exceptional capacity to encroach upon the sovereignty of other countries, the legal status of secondary sanctions under international law is controversial. This contribution seeks to elucidate if secondary sanctions may amount to economic coercion and whether as a result these measures could constitute a breach to the principle of non-intervention. The chapter closes by exploring the potential avenues for regime interaction between the rules governing the exercise of jurisdiction by states and the principle of non-intervention in the context of secondary sanctions.

The growing range and changing nature of unilateral sanctions have seen the emergence of a new label of so-called ‘secondary’ sanctions, as opposed to the more traditional ‘primary’ sanctions. While there is no accepted legal definition of secondary sanctions, in essence, secondary sanctions restrict economic transactions between third countries which may be entirely lawful under the law of these countries. Their extraterritorial character gives secondary sanctions their distinctive and particularly controversial character. Secondary sanctions create inter-State tension and may possibly violate a number of public international law regimes. They may harm the politico-economic interests of third States and cause headaches for private economic operators, whose potential exposure to secondary sanctions complicates the already complex web of multi-jurisdictional norms governing their international business transactions.

Did the threat of war trigger the extraction-coercion cycle? In this chapter I use a panel of Latin America from 1830 to 1913 to test the effects of looming international threats on domestic taxation and internal conflict. It is believed that due to the availability of foreign loans and taxable imports, states in the region did not have to engage in extraction from the local population, nor did they have to coerce individuals to comply with such policies. I summarize this argument in the form of testable hypotheses and point to factors—naval blockades and sovereign debt defaults—that might have hindered access to such external resources. I then focus on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and how they affected revenues, tariff levels, foreign loans, civil wars, coups, etc. My analyses show MIDs had a negative effect on tariffs and revenue and diminished the likelihood of a new loan—all results that contest the established conventional wisdom. Conversely, MIDs are associated to currency depreciation—a domestic-oriented inflationary tax—and domestic conflict—in particular, civil wars and coups. The chapter shows war did trigger the extraction-coercion cycle.

Chapter 6 develops an integrated framework of leader–subordinate dynamics in Chinese SOEs. How do leaders interact with subordinates to execute their agendas, and how do subordinates respond? Grounded in reward, coercion, and legitimate bases of power, the chapter identifies SOE leader tactics such as leveraging position authority, conducting personnel ploys, emphasizing material and status gains, invoking external threats, underscoring superiors’ directives and policies, and appealing to subordinates’ personal duty and morality. Subordinates may react by praising and supporting the leader or by expressing alternative views, delaying or subverting implementation, shirking, engaging in critical expression, or quitting. Leader–subordinate interactions are iterative and evolve over time.

Humans have the ability to recognize that when they perform actions, they produce effects in the external world. Even though humans are not the only animalsl with this mental capacity, their ability to perform actions is accompanied by a feeling of authorship, a feeling that “I” am the one who did it. This is what academics have called the sense of agency. When individuals claim reduced responsibility because they were “only obeying orders”, this defense is often viewed with skepticism, because the defendant has a clear motive of avoiding punishment. However, scientific methods can now be used to investigate the experience of receiving orders and how it influences how the brain processes information. As this chapter shows, obeying orders impacts the sense of agency and the feeling of responsibility at the brain level. Further, working and living in some highly hierarchical and sometimes coercive social structures, such as the military, can also impact the sense of agency when people make decisions. It thus appears that hierarchies provide a powerful ground to obtain a reduced feeling of responsibility and agency in individuals.

When we witness another person experiencing pain, be it emotional or physical, we have an empathic reaction. And even if we commit a harmful action against another person, we most of the time experience guilt in the aftermath, which prevents us from performing the same action in the future. Guilt and empathy are critical moral emotions that together usually prevent us from harming others. However, as this chapter shows, systematic processes of classification and dehumanization at play before a genocide can alter moral emotions towards another part of the population. Activity in empathy-related brain regions is generally reduced towards individuals that we consider as outgroup or towards dehumanized individuals. Neuroscience studies have further shown that when obeying orders to hurt another person, neural activity in empathy- and guilt-related brain regions is reduced compared to acting freely. Such results show how obeying orders diminishes our aversion to harming others.

In this chapter, I discuss in what sense and to what extent institutions have political authority. I take institutions with legitimate authority to be justified in wielding political power, where this political power is backed by the threat of coercion. Against the position that international institutions are not coercive, I claim that applying an adequate conception of coercion – which takes the concept of enforcement as paradigmatic for coercion, rather than the concept of pressure – enables us to understand some international institutions as coercive. It also lays open the assumption that a single conception of authority applied to all international institutions misconceives the diversity in aims and purposes of international institutions. Institutions that coordinate morally mandatory aims and institutions that coordinate mutual advantage can both be plausibly understood as coercive, even though their authority differs in scope and in what standards they must satisfy. Finally, I discuss whether the standard of state consent is appropriate for international institutions: while it is plausible for institutions that coordinate mutual advantage, it is implausible as a standard of legitimacy for institutions that coordinate morally mandatory aims – such as institutions of international criminal justice.