Argued December 4, 2006.Decided June 28, 2007.

Justice Charles LAWRENCE delivered the opinion of the Court.1

Plaintiffs Parents Involved in Community Schools (“Plaintiffs”) brought suit against Seattle School District No. 1 (“Defendant”); challenging an assignment plan that relied in part on racial “tiebreakers” to assign slots in oversubscribed high schools. In a separate action, McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools, parent and student plaintiffs challenged a school district’s race-conscious student assignment plan. In the Seattle case, the District Court granted the school district summary judgment, finding, inter alia, that its plan survived strict scrutiny on the federal constitutional claim because it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. In the Jefferson County case, the District Court found that the school district had asserted a compelling interest in maintaining racially diverse schools, and that its plan was, in all relevant respects, narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Dec. 1, 1981.

Argued October 12, 1977.Decided June 28, 1978.

Mr. Justice HARRIS announced the judgment of the Court.1

This case presents a challenge by the Respondent, Allan Bakke, to the Task Force Program of the Petitioner, the Medical School of the University of California at Davis (Davis). The Task Force Program was designed to open the admissions process to students of color who throughout its history the Medical School had largely excluded. The Superior Court of California, California’s trial court, sustained Bakke’s challenge, holding that Davis’ program had violated the California Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It enjoined Davis from considering Bakke’s race or the race of any other applicant.

Argued December 14, 1970.Decided March 8, 1971.

Justices Angela ONWUACHI-WILLIG and David SIMSON delivered the opinion of the Court.1

This case presents the first opportunity for this Court to interpret the provisions of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in the context of race discrimination. As the Act grew out of, and was meant to help resolve, a period of massive contestation over the possibility, and terms, of racial progress in the United States – a contestation that continues – our task is of the utmost importance. In this case, a group of black employees argues that the practice of their employer, respondent Duke Power Company (“Duke” or “the company”), to require a high school education or satisfactory scores on two standardized general ability tests as a prerequisite for transfer and promotion discriminates against them on the basis of race in violation of Title VII.

Shortly after the adoption of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 governing public spending, universities adopted affirmative action admissions policies. These policies potentially conflicted with the guarantees of Title VI and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Democratic and Republican parties adopted evolving views of these legal texts, potentially bringing them into conflict with the judges they had previously appointed. Instead, I demonstrate that aligned judges on the US Supreme Court worked in a deliberative fashion with their aligned elected counterparts to develop novel interpretations of Title VI and the Fourteenth Amendment. In some instances, however, novel judicial efforts went beyond the wishes of partisans in the elected branches, causing judges to retreat in ways that would be expected by the deliberative partnership thesis.

Shortly after its adoption, progressive reformers recognized substantial shortcomings of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 governing employment discrimination. To overcome these limitation, members of the Democratic Party worked with aligned justices on the Supreme Court to develop evolving understandings of Title VII to support racial minorities seeking to access the federal judiciary and to reduce the evidentiary burdens necessary to prevail at trail. These progressives also supported willing employers' efforts by protecting affirmative action. Conservatives on the bench and in the elected branches aligned with the Republican Party worked in a deliberative fashion to counter these efforts. But, as is true for both coalitions, when justices introduced novel positions that went beyond the interests of their elected counterparts, they relinquished their novel doctrinal positions, which is consistent with the deliberative partnership thesis.