The whitefly, Bemisia tabaci is a cryptic species complex in which one member, Middle East-Asia Minor 1 (MEAM1) has invaded globally. After invading large countries like Australia, China, and the USA, MEAM1 spread rapidly across each country. In contrast, our analysis of MEAM1 in India showed a very different pattern. Despite the detection of MEAM1 being contemporaneous with invasions in Australia, the USA, and China, MEAM1 has not spread widely and instead remains restricted to the southern regions. An assessment of Indian MEAM1 genetic diversity showed a level of diversity equivalent to that found in its presumed home range and significantly higher than that expected across the invaded range. The high level of diversity and restricted distribution raises the prospect that its home range extends into India. Similarly, while the levels of diversity in Australia and the USA conformed to that expected for the invaded range, China did not. It suggests that China may also be part of its home range. We also observed that diversity across the invaded range was primarily accounted for by a single haplotype, Hap1, which accounted for 79.8% of all records. It was only the invasion of Hap1 that enabled outbreaks to occur and MEAM1’s discovery.

Xiangranggounan is an intensively occupied settlement associated with the Kayue culture on the north-eastern Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. Excavations in 2022 and 2023 revealed five house types with clear stratigraphic relationships that help to expand current understanding of the evolution of prehistoric settlement patterns in harsh plateau environments.

Do climate change-related extreme weather events affect public concern, knowledge, and attention to climate change in China? Matching extreme weather events data from the Emergency Events Database with the 2010 Chinese General Social Survey, we first test whether people in prefectures with more extreme weather events consider climate change more damaging and have a better knowledge of it. We find no such associations. Moreover, we collect 2020 data on extreme whether events from local newspapers for five Eastern and Southeastern Chinese provinces and test whether these events increase public attention to climate change, measured by Baidu search volume index. No associations are found. Interestingly, in prefecture-days with more Covid cases, local population conducted more Baidu searches on climate change and the environment, supporting the ‘great reflection’ thesis, i.e., major shocks like the pandemic put a spotlight on fundamental challenges facing the humanity and have gotten us to reassess our priorities.

Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in China often struggle to secure loan financing. In response, the government has required banks to increase credit for MSMEs and incorporate digital technologies into traditional credit evaluation models. In 2018, the state introduced “credit easy loan” digital lending platforms under its social credit system to facilitate collateral-free loans for MSMEs in a bid to enhance financial inclusion and social trust. Meanwhile, the actual implementation of these initiatives remains understudied. Drawing on six months of ethnographic fieldwork, this paper examines how “packaging agencies” act as intermediaries in preparing and “beautifying” bank loan applications. These agencies may manipulate credit data and leverage close relationships (guanxi) to help clients obtain loans, while banks may tacitly approve their practices to fulfil their financial inclusion requirements. Through such processes and in a supposedly digitalized system, a single MSME loan multiplied into ten loans, large companies became small businesses, and one housewife became a creditworthy microentrepreneur.

This article examines China’s outward investment in the European automotive industry since the late twentieth century. By mapping and analyzing the main investment operations, we argue that private companies played a key role in the internationalization of the Chinese automotive sector. Chinese state-owned enterprises took part, especially in the initial stages of international expansion. Our contribution also analyzes the pattern of internationalization followed by Chinese companies, arguing that it differed from the one followed by well-established automotive firms in advanced economies during previous decades. The findings reveal that achieving the most advanced technology was the key driver of outward investment decisions. However, Chinese investors’ strategy was not uniform; it was flexible and varied significantly depending on the European country and the size of the company targeted. Furthermore, Chinese government industrial policies greatly influenced the international strategies of both state-owned and private companies, particularly the “Go Out” policy.

The influx of foreign capital into cities in developing countries creates new labor demands, triggering significant internal migration as workers move for opportunities. But this mobilization creates a management problem for local governments. How do local officials manage competing interests in developing their labor market while preventing governance problems from excessive demand on public resources? Using the highly institutionalized case of China, I argue that local governments encourage long-term migration of “desirable” migrants by integrating them into social services while keeping others out. Variation in locally invested FDI skill dependence drives variation in inclusivity towards internal migrants. Policies that facilitate the integration of internal migrants into local urban welfare systems correlate with investment in firms with greater dependence on high-skilled workers, especially when investment flows to firms established more than one year previously. These trends are strongest in eastern municipalities where market forces play a larger role in local development policies.

This paper investigates noncommercial slogans, one prevalent type of linguistic signs in China, examining the stances and identities emerging from these signs, and the relevant contexts from which they emerge. Du Bois’ stance triangle model is adapted and employed in the case study of Zhengzhou urban–rural slogans, combining qualitative and quantitative methods via BFSU Qualitative Coder 1.2. Results show a higher proportion of evaluative and alignment stances than positioning stance, including affective and epistemic stances, in both urban and rural areas. A notable distinction lies in the proportion of positioning stance, with a relatively lower prevalence in rural areas compared to urban areas. Second, these stances index the identities as an object-centered evaluator, a collectively intersubjectivity-centered aligner, as well as the self-local/translocal identity. Third, the analysis reveals Chinese economic, administrative, cultural, social, and political contexts related to the emergence of the identities within these signs.

Amid a new era of disruption spawned by looming climate threats and significant geopolitical tensions, an increasing number of countries have favored a more robust green industrial policy (GIP) to reduce carbon emissions and achieve other economic, political, and geostrategic objectives. The use of multi-purpose GIPs not only raises questions regarding the policies' compatibility with the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules but also, more broadly, profoundly implicates the interface between energy, trade, and the environment. This article selects China, the United States, and the European Union as case studies and provides a thorough analysis of the specific text and context of their GIPs to identify the new trends that deviate from past practices in order to capture the policy transformation. It highlights the disruptively adverse implications of the multi-purpose GIPs on the multilateral trading system. However, the WTO has an opportunity to mitigate such disruptions and avoid a seemingly unavoidable clash by facilitating international cooperation and coordination in the design and implementation of multi-purpose GIPs, particularly among major clean energy producer countries. In doing so, the WTO can strengthen its credibility and stability while also minimizing the misalignment of the diverse objectives and ensuring the decarbonization efforts will not undermined.

This article explores the hitherto understudied development of long-distance telephony in early 20th century China. It first explores the development of long-distance telephony before 1927 when it first appeared in China and was developed by foreign actors, the Qing government and various warlord regimes. The article then turns to the Nanjing Decade (1927-1937) and compares the efforts of the Nationalist government in building long-distance telephone infrastructure with those of the Guangdong provincial government and other regional regimes. The article uses the case of long-distance telephony to make two larger arguments about state-building in Republican China (1912-1949). First, it brings in telecommunications development as a major element of state-building of both central and regional regimes. Second, building on recent work by scholars of Chinese Republican-era state-building, it emphasizes the importance of studying state-building from the vantage point of both central and regional regimes in Republican China. Additionally, the article demonstrates the value of an infrastructural approach to the study of political competition and formation in China during the Republican era.

‘De-risking’ is the latest buzzword in the China strategy of the United States and its allies. It means limiting dependence on and engagement with China in select strategic sectors. One of such sectors concerns critical minerals (CMs) which are essential for the ongoing green economic transition. To secure access to CMs and reduce reliance on China, the US and its allies have been developing networks for ally-shoring supply chains. A major problem with the ‘de-risking’ strategy in this regard is that it treats China as the risk and hence excludes China from the discussions and collaboration on global supply chain issues. In this paper, we argue that this strategy fails to consider China's strategies and policies regarding CMs. We therefore offer a detailed analysis of China's policies which shows that they have been primarily aimed at addressing internal challenges and policy priorities in China rather than dominating, weaponizing, or causing disruptions in global supply chains. To address supply chain risks most effectively, international collaborative frameworks should engage with, rather than exclude, China. Confrontational strategies with ‘China being the risk’ at the core might themselves be a risk by undermining rational policymaking and leading to disruptive policies.

There is tension between manipulation of national identity construction and agency in the literature on ingroup identification, especially in authoritarian contexts. In China, the past is very relevant with regards to legitimacy of the Communist Party. Yet, we cannot just assume that what the state propagates is what can also be found at the bottom-up level. This article analyses social representations of history in China combining the top-down perspective of state education policies and curated historical narratives to the bottom-up perspective formed through analyzing two student surveys, collected first in 2007 and again in 2011-2012, and 11 interviews. Earlier research indicates that in most countries representations of history concentrate on negative issues and their time span is short. Chinese representations of history are divided into narratives of glory and humiliation, and respondents have a much longer perspective to national history than typical participants in international surveys. Finally, although problematic periods such as the Cultural Revolution get less coverage in political speeches and school textbooks, they are not forgotten among students. Furthermore, the view that people should have their own ideas about history and China rather than having to adopt the government promoted narrative was visible in multiple student interviews.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a Chinese infrastructure and investment project launched in 2013 that seeks to link China with over 70 countries through transport, communication, and trading networks. The BRI consists of building and construction projects including railways, ports, roads, and other vital trade infrastructure. Importantly, the BRI also includes the establishment of a new “Digital Silk Road” (DSR) enhancing digital connectivity using the latest 5G high bandwidth, low latency mobile and satellite technology. In 2019, several Western states (notably USA, Australia, Canada, and the UK) banned Chinese telecommunications technology companies, such as Huawei, from rolling out 5G networks in their respective jurisdictions. The purported basis for the bans were security concerns over the ability of the Chinese government to control and potentially intercept communications over the Huawei systems. In the MENA region, no such bans have been adopted and the DSR is proceeding to connect MENA economies to China at a rapid pace. This places MENA countries in a precarious position between strategic links with the US as the global hegemon with a strategic interest in the region, and the emerging Chinese global political and economic order. The regulation of digital communication technologies is one dimension where legal frameworks must be designed with care and discernment to balance competing geopolitical forces. This article seeks to answer the question of how best to understand the legal regulation of new technologies in the MENA region and argues that the conceptual lens of “Tech-diplomacy” helps to provide such an understanding. In addition to privacy-centric, security-centric, and growth-centric philosophical and jurisprudential approaches to understanding data regulation, the predicament of the MENA region is a case study in how geopolitics can also inform our understanding of tech regulation.