In legislative bargaining, the proposer is often able to extract a greater proportion of the surplus. However, a higher likelihood of being selected as the proposer can backfire, as it may reduce the probability that the agent is included in a winning coalition. We experimentally test the theoretical prediction of potentially negative returns to recognition probability in two-period legislative bargaining noted in Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We find that higher recognition probability benefits subjects in all treatments, except one in which we automate the second period. It is because proposers often favor the member with the greater recognition probability as a coalition partner, and such tendency varies depending on the proposer’s recognition probability, counter to the theoretical prediction. In all treatments, a vast majority of subjects exhibit a strict preference for higher recognition probability.

We study changes in educational homogamy in the US and four European countries over the decade covering the Great Recession. The marital preferences identified point to the widening of the social gap between different educational groups since these preferences have increased the inclination of the individuals to match with others of similar educational traits in all five countries. We obtain this finding with an aggregate measure characterizing revealed preferences of individuals in relationship. We apply a novel approach for validating our finding: we compare our aggregate measure with dating data informative about the reservation points not only of those people who will be in a couple, but also those who will remain single. Finally, we challenge a commonly held view: we argue that marital preferences should not be blamed for the documented increase of the social gap since preferences are not exogenous, but are shaped by changes in the employment prospects of the potential partners.

The farm-gate price of raw milk in Iran is determined annually in negotiations among representatives of dairy processors, milk producers, and government officials. This study estimates the average bargaining power of dairy farmers and processors, through applying the generalized axiomatic Nash approach in a bilateral bargaining model. We employ annual data from 1990 to 2013 to estimate econometric representation of a bilateral bargaining model using a Monte Carlo expectation maximization algorithm. Results imply a higher bargaining power of 0.69 for processors, compared with 0.31 for farmers. This asymmetry of bargaining power causes unequal allocation of gains in the milk market.

For a two-period screening model of strikes it is shown that joint bargaining instead of enterprise negotiations lowers wages and implies more strikes. These results hold irrespective of the party possessing private information. The sensitivity of strike models to procedural assumptions thus seems less problematic than it may be conjectured.