In Chapter 3, the overarching question of this book starts to be answered: how do advocacy groups intervene in policymaking processes to represent intersectionally marginalized populations? Here, work is presented that examines how advocacy groups representing intersectionally-marginalized groups have participated in this policymaking process. Analyses of the testimony and statements from advocacy groups during Congressional hearings over the reauthorization of VAWA from the past 25 years is provided to show that select organizations were successfully advocating for linkages between policies and issues that reflected the experiences of intersectionally marginalized groups. These linkages were between VAWA and policies on welfare, immigration, and tribal rights. In this chapter, “intersectional advocacy,” is identified to explain how advocacy groups in this setting engaged in it to change VAWA policy over time. The chapter shows that VAWA changes in remarkable ways that better represent and serve intersectionally marginalized groups.

The author explores how consent functions as commitment, content, and constitution for international agreements. He argues that consent constructs all forms of international commitment. Consent elucidates an agreement’s contents – what the agreement ‘is’ in terms of scope and substance. Consent can also function as a constitution – delimiting not only ‘primary’ rules encapsulated by an agreement’s existence and contents, but ‘secondary rules’ determining who can make agreements, how they must do so, and ways to recognize, adjust, and end them. For all these functions, consent remains an under-examined and undifferentiated concept. Today, almost any of consent’s functions can be established by almost any formal or informal means. Alongside existing proposals (presumptions/defaults and content-based criteria), this chapter proposes that international law should pursue more – and different – formalities for consent. Having different forms of consent follow its different functions may, according to the author, improve the efficacy of consent and with it the efficacy of international agreements overall.

The author examines the interplay between the individual and collective dimensions of treaty-based law-making and standard-setting processes in the United Nations climate regime. The reason why the author attempts to do so is that multilateral treaties have been the main anchors for international environmental law-making. In this context, State consent not only has individual effects, but also feeds into a collective process. The chapter begins by exploring the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. It then turns to the Paris Agreement and the shift to what has been described as a ‘bottom-up’ approach. The perhaps most striking feature of this approach is its reliance on non-binding, ‘nationally determined contributions’ (hereafter NDCs). From the vantage point of State consent, the most significant consequence of the Paris Agreement’s NDC approach is a shift away from the anchoring of consent to climate action in treaty-based processes, and hence from the linkages that adoption and entry-into-force requirements establish between multiple parties’ individual expressions of consent.

[2.1] Contemporary statutory interpretation law involves, broadly, consideration of the statutory text, taking account of its full context and having regard to its purpose. These three concepts have loosely existed in statutory interpretation law for centuries, providing the basis for determining the legislative intent of a statute to varying degrees. This chapter considers the relatively recent history of these key concepts, starting at the beginning of the 20th century. Having some basic knowledge and understanding of this recent history enhances understanding of contemporary concepts and provides historical context to the current law and older cases. Following federation in 1901, Australia continued to be bound, and influenced, by English law. The English approach to interpretation placed considerable emphasis on the grammatical meaning of text, with limited regard to context and purpose.

[12.1] An Act is passed when the final stage of the enactment process is completed. It may not come into operation for some time after it is passed. It may come into operation wholly at the one time or in stages over a period.

Chapter 7 analyses a range of practical issues that the ICC can expect to encounter in prosecuting the crime of aggression, including implications for judicial elections and the staffing of the Court; the identification of the ‘victims’ of the crime for the purposes of victims’ participation and reparation; and how the obligation of States Parties to cooperate with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of Rome Statute crimes will work in relation to aggression. The chapter next considers the issues likely to arise in the context of domestic prosecutions, including the bases of criminal jurisdiction that may be relied upon, and challenges that will arise, including those relating to immunities, securing the presence of the accused and the necessary evidence, as well as the taint of victor’s justice and the risk associated with non-expert judges interpreting the definition of the crime of aggression. The chapter also canvasses the contemplated review of the amendments and suggests proposals for reform. Finally, the chapter concludes with an assessment of the geopolitical impact of the crime of aggression amendments.

This chapter discusses the ways in which States and IOs need to continue engaging with the treaty throughout its life. It illustrates continuing engagement at the domestic or internal level and on the international plane, and how these processes interact with each other. It focuses on issues arising from engagement with treaty institutions such as Conference of Parties, reporting requirements in treaties, the role of treaty secretariats and compliance mechanisms. It also looks at continuing engagement with treaty acts, in particular the handling of amendments, reservations and declarations by other parties, and interpretation and application of treaties by domestic courts.

Calls for a return to a traditional method of lawmaking known as “regular order” have proliferated as unorthodox lawmaking has grown more dominant in Congress. Proponents claim regular order enhances deliberation on legislation. This chapter examines deliberation under one form of regular order: open rules permitting unlimited amending in the House of Representatives. We find evidence of substantial minority influence on the inputs and outputs of the appropriations process. Regular order gives the minority party members the opportunity to present and win adoption of their policy proposals. Our evidence also shows that ideological extremists play an outsized role in debate. They offer more amendments than other members, and their amendments tend to win less support and face defeat more often than moderates. The paradox of regular order is that it simultaneously offers the opportunity for bipartisan deliberation over legislation while exposing the majority party to problems that may make its management of the floor more difficult.

Calls for a return to a traditional method of lawmaking known as “regular order” have proliferated as unorthodox lawmaking has grown more dominant in Congress. Proponents claim regular order enhances deliberation on legislation. This chapter examines deliberation under one form of regular order: open rules permitting unlimited amending in the House of Representatives. We find evidence of substantial minority influence on the inputs and outputs of the appropriations process. Regular order gives the minority party members the opportunity to present and win adoption of their policy proposals. Our evidence also shows that ideological extremists play an outsized role in debate. They offer more amendments than other members, and their amendments tend to win less support and face defeat more often than moderates. The paradox of regular order is that it simultaneously offers the opportunity for bipartisan deliberation over legislation while exposing the majority party to problems that may make its management of the floor more difficult.