Matthias Schröder has asked the question whether there is a weakest discontinuous problem in the topological version of the Weihrauch lattice. Such a problem can be considered as the weakest unsolvable problem. We introduce the discontinuity problem, and we show that it is reducible exactly to the effectively discontinuous problems, defined in a suitable way. However, in which sense this answers Schröder’s question sensitively depends on the axiomatic framework that is chosen, and it is a positive answer if we work in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with dependent choice and the axiom of determinacy $\mathsf {AD}$. On the other hand, using the full axiom of choice, one can construct problems which are discontinuous, but not effectively so. Hence, the exact situation at the bottom of the Weihrauch lattice sensitively depends on the axiomatic setting that we choose. We prove our result using a variant of Wadge games for mathematical problems. While the existence of a winning strategy for Player II characterizes continuity of the problem (as already shown by Nobrega and Pauly), the existence of a winning strategy for Player I characterizes effective discontinuity of the problem. By Weihrauch determinacy we understand the condition that every problem is either continuous or effectively discontinuous. This notion of determinacy is a fairly strong notion, as it is not only implied by the axiom of determinacy $\mathsf {AD}$, but it also implies Wadge determinacy. We close with a brief discussion of generalized notions of productivity.

In 2015, Guglielmi and Badia discussed optimal strategies in a particular type of service system with two strategic servers. In their setup, each server can be either active or inactive and an active server can be requested to transmit a sequence of packets. The servers have varying probabilities of successfully transmitting when they are active, and both servers receive a unit reward if the sequence of packets is transmitted successfully. Guglielmi and Badia provided an analysis of optimal strategies in four scenarios: where each server does not know the other’s successful transmission probability; one of the two servers is always inactive; each server knows the other’s successful transmission probability and they are willing to cooperate.

Unfortunately, the analysis by Guglielmi and Badia contained some errors. In this paper we correct these errors. We discuss three cases where both servers (I) communicate and cooperate; (II) neither communicate nor cooperate; (III) communicate but do not cooperate. In particular, we obtain the unique Nash equilibrium strategy in Case II through a Bayesian game formulation, and demonstrate that there is a region in the parameter space where there are multiple Nash equilibria in Case III. We also quantify the value of communication or cooperation by comparing the social welfare in the three cases, and propose possible regulations to make the Nash equilibrium strategy the socially optimal strategy for both Cases II and III.

In this paper we study continuous-time two-player zero-sum optimal switching games on a finite horizon. Using the theory of doubly reflected backward stochastic differential equations with interconnected barriers, we show that this game has a value and an equilibrium in the players’ switching controls.

This article presents two theorems: (1) a generalization of Löb’s Theorem that applies to formal proof systems operating with bounded computational resources, such as formal verification software or theorem provers, and (2) a theorem on the robust cooperation of agents that employ proofs about one another’s source code as unexploitable criteria for cooperation. The latter illustrates a capacity for outperforming classical Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria, attaining mutually cooperative program equilibrium in the Prisoner’s Dilemma while remaining unexploitable, i.e., sometimes achieving the outcome (Cooperate, Cooperate), and never receiving the outcome (Cooperate, Defect) as player 1.

We consider positive zero-sum stochastic games with countable state and action spaces. For each player, we provide a characterization of those strategies that are optimal in every subgame. These characterizations are used to prove two simplification results. We show that if player 2 has an optimal strategy then he/she also has a stationary optimal strategy, and prove the same for player 1 under the assumption that the state space and player 2's action space are finite.

We study the existence of continuity points for mappings $f\,:\,X\,\times \,Y\,\to \,Z$ whose $x$-sections $Y\,\backepsilon \,y\,\to \,f\left( x,y \right)\,\in \,Z$ are fragmentable and $y$-sections $X\,\backepsilon \,x\,\to \,f\left( x,y \right)\,\in \,Z$ are quasicontinuous, where $X$ is a Baire space and $Z$ is a metric space. For the factor $Y$, we consider two infinite “point-picking” games ${{G}_{1}}\,\left( y \right)$ and ${{G}_{2}}\,\left( y \right)$ defined respectively for each $y\,\in \,Y$ as follows: in the $n$-th inning, Player I gives a dense set ${{D}_{n}}\,\subset \,Y$, respectively, a dense open set ${{D}_{n}}\,\subset \,Y$. Then Player II picks a point ${{y}_{n}}\,\in \,{{D}_{n}}$; II wins if $y$ is in the closure of $\left\{ {{y}_{n}}\,:\,n\,\in \,\mathbb{N} \right\}$, otherwise I wins. It is shown that (i) $f$ is cliquish if II has a winning strategy in ${{G}_{1}}\,\left( y \right)$ for every $y\,\in \,Y$, and (ii) $f$ is quasicontinuous if the $x$-sections of $f$ are continuous and the set of $y\,\in \,Y$ such that II has a winning strategy in ${{G}_{2}}\,\left( y \right)$ is dense in $Y$. Item (i) extends substantially a result of Debs and item (ii) indicates that the problem of Talagrand on separately continuous maps has a positive answer for a wide class of “small” compact spaces.

In a two-person red-and-black game, each player holds an integral amount of chips. At each stage of the game, each player can bet any integral amount in his possession, winning the chips of his opponent with a probability which is a function of the ratio of his bet to the sum of both players' bets and is called a win probability function. Both players seek to maximize the probability of winning the entire fortune of his opponent. In this paper we propose two new models. In the first model, at each stage, there is a positive probability that two players exchange their bets. In the second model, the win probability functions are stage dependent. In both models, we obtain suitable conditions on the win probability functions such that it is a Nash equilibrium for the subfair player to play boldly and for the superfair player to play timidly.

The lying oracle problem is a problem of finding the optimal strategies in a two-person game where an oracle predicts the outcomes of coin flips and a player bets on the outcomes. The oracle announces whether the coin will land heads or tails, but may at times lie. We analyze the variant of the game which uses a biased coin, where the probability p that the coin lands heads is common knowledge. We determine optimal strategies for both the oracle and player, and we give an explicit expression for the expected payoff to the player when the coin is flipped n times and the oracle may lie at most k times.

In this paper we investigate a class of N-person nonconstant sum red-and-black games with bet-dependent win probability functions. We assume that N players and a gambling house are engaged in a game played in stages, where the player's probability of winning at each stage is a function f of the ratio of his bet to the sum of all the players' bets. However, at each stage of the game there is a positive probability that all the players lose and the gambling house wins their bets. We prove that if the win probability function is super-additive and it satisfies f(s)f(t)≤f(st), then a bold strategy is optimal for all players.

Christ and Avi-Itzhak (2002) analyzed a queueing system with two competing servers who determine their service rates so as to optimize their individual utilities. The system is formulated as a two-person game; Christ and Avi-Itzhak proved the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium which is symmetric. In this paper, we explore globally optimal solutions. We prove that the unique Nash equilibrium is generally strictly inferior to a globally optimal solution and that optimal solutions are symmetric and require the servers to adopt service rates that are smaller than those occurring in equilibrium. Furthermore, given a symmetric globally optimal solution, we show how to impose linear penalties on the service rates so that the given optimal solution becomes a unique Nash equilibrium. When service rates are not observable, we show how the same effect is achieved by imposing linear penalties on a corresponding signal.

In this paper a two-person red-and-black game is investigated. We suppose that, at every stage of the game, player I's win probability, f, is a function of the ratio of his bet to the sum of both players' bets. Two results are given: (i) if f is convex then a bold strategy is optimal for player I when player II plays timidly; and (ii) if f satisfies f(s)f(t) ≤ f(st) then a timid strategy is optimal for player II when player I plays boldly. These two results extend two formulations of red-and-black games proposed by Pontiggia (2005), and also provide a sufficient condition to ensure that the profile (bold, timid) is the unique Nash equilibrium for players I and II. Finally, we give a counterexample to Pontiggia's conjecture about a proportional N-person red-and-black game.

For two-person zero-sum games, where the probability of each player winning is a continuous function of time and is known to both players, the mutually optimal strategy for proposing and accepting a doubling of the game value is known. We present an algorithm for deriving the optimal doubling strategy of a player who is aware of the suboptimal strategy followed by the opponent. We also present numerical results about the magnitude of the benefits; the results support the claim that repeated application of the algorithm by both players leads to the mutually optimal strategy.

We present two variations of a two-person, noncooperative stochastic game, inspired by the famous red-and-black gambling problem presented by Dubins and Savage. Two players each hold an integer amount of money and they each aim to win the other player's fortune. At every stage of the game they simultaneously bid an integer portion of their current fortune, and their probabilities of winning depend on these bids. We describe two different laws of motion specifying this dependency. In one version of the game, the players' probabilities of winning are proportional to their bets. In the other version, the probabilities of winning depend on the size of their bets and a weight parameter w. For each version we give a Nash equilibrium, in which the player for which the game is subfair (w ≤ ½) plays boldly and the player for which the game is superfair (w ≥ ½) plays timidly.

We show that the advantage that can accrue to the server in tennis does not necessarily imply that serving first changes the probability of winning the match. We demonstrate that the outcome of tie-breaks, sets and matches can be independent of who serves first. These are corollaries of a more general invariance result that we prove for n-point win-by-2 games. Our proofs are non-algebraic and self-contained.