Knut Wicksell’s formulation of monetary economics as the study of the relation between aggregate supply and aggregate demand played an important role in the development of macroeconomics. Wicksell’s contributions are better understood if we consider the Walrasian roots of his approach. Wicksell pointed to two shortcomings of Léon Walras’s theory: incomplete treatment of the demand for money, and lack of a concept of capital stressing the time element. Wicksell was influenced by Walras’s notions of the tâtonnement by which markets solve the equations and of the zero-profit entrepreneur. Nevertheless, Wicksell’s interpretation of the dynamics of the credit market, with a price (interest rate) distinct from its equilibrium (“natural”) level and the implicit recognition that the latter could assume negative values, did not fit into the Walrasian tâtonnement mold. As the first to produce textbooks on both theories of value and money, Wicksell was confronted with the problem of how to establish connections between them.

Market failures, which are usually viewed as a consequence of self-interest, are also supposed to be a major justification for coercive state interventions. This was the view of, among others, Richard Musgrave and Paul Samuelson, but not of James Buchanan. The latter certainly admitted that individuals are self-interested, that markets fail to allocate resources efficiently, but did not believe in the need for coercion. In this paper, we show that, to Buchanan, coercion can be unnecessary if certain post-constitutional conditions are satisfied. We show that he believed that self-interested individuals voluntarily adopt pro-social behavior in small groups. Small groups or small numbers represent a post-constitutional alternative to the veil of ignorance.

An early post-WWII debate concerned the most desirable demand and inflationary pressures at which to run the economy. Context was provided by Keynesian theory devoid of a full employment equilibrium and containing its mainly forgotten, but still relevant, microeconomic underpinnings. A major input came with the estimates provided by the original Phillips curve. The debate seemed to be rendered obsolete by the curve’s expectations-augmented version with its natural rate of unemployment, and associated unique equilibrium GDP, as the only values consistent with stable inflation. The current behavior of economies with the successful inflation targeting is inconsistent with this natural-rate view, but is consistent with evolutionary theory in which economies have a wide range of GDP-compatible stable inflation. Now the early post-WWII debates are seen not to be as misguided as they appeared to be when economists came to accept the assumptions implicit in the expectations-augmented Phillips curve.

From 1759 to 1762, François Quesnay regularly appealed to Charles Richard de Butré (1725–1805) when he had to make numerical estimates or perform non-elementary computations (Charles and Théré 2008). Although scarcely mentioned in the secondary literature, Butré was indeed an important collaborator of Quesnay’s. The present article gives a detailed account of Butré’s contribution to Physiocracy by concentrating on the period from 1766 to 1768, when Quesnay conceived and published his last versions of the Tableau économique. We show that Butré developed a sophisticated economic model. Although his model contains significant deviations from Quesnay’s, Butré’s intent was to complement rather than criticize it.

James Mill’s account of the decision process is part of his theory of the human mind, which in turn is the cornerstone of his theory of education. Mill believed the end of education was to produce happiness, and that this happiness required action by the individual. A problem, as Mill saw it, was that intemperance might interfere with the decision process, causing individuals to take actions that do not promote their greatest happiness. This paper provides an interpretation of this process from a formal perspective, in the light of Mill’s view on intemperance.

Although James Mill considered production and education to be two objectives of global welfare, he claimed that the former was not always consistent with the latter. On the one hand, production is necessary to provide humankind with the means of subsistence; on the other hand, if individuals allocate all their time to labor to the detriment of their own education, “neither intellect, virtue nor happiness can flourish upon the earth” (Mill [1819] 1825, p. 30). Mill argued that this problem might be solved by finding what he called “the precious middle point.” This point deserves special consideration: it acknowledges that there is a way in which education and production might be distributed in society in order to promote the greatest global welfare. The aim of this paper is to explain the relation between production and education through the working of the precious middle point.

A few years after the publication of The General Theory, a number of economists began to present John Maynard Keynes’s model, identified with IS-LM, as a particular case of the Walrasian model. This view of IS-LM has often been rationalized by a basic syllogism: IS-LM was invented by John Hicks, Hicks was a Walrasian, hence IS-LM was Walrasian. But as some historians of macroeconomics have shown, this syllogism is false. Considering this confusion as an established fact, this article studies how and why IS-LM came to be considered as Walrasian. It shows that the standard view took its roots in “The Rate of Interest and the Optimum Propensity to Consume,” a paper published by Oskar Lange in 1938, and resulted from a need to clarify the foundations of Keynes’s theory.

This paper offers a bibliographic survey of the literature in the history of economic thought (HET) in eight major economics journals, using the JEL classification to retrieve and analyze the relevant literature. Our study shows that, though contributions to HET are still found in top economics journals, the rate of publication of such papers has become increasingly uneven, and the methods and narrative styles they adopt are remote from those used by historians of economics. We show that the widespread idea that historians should address current economists by using their (mostly mathematical) tools and techniques is hardly present in mainstream journals, and discuss the role of editors and editorial boards of the different journals we survey in shaping these changes over time. We conclude that historians should focus on doing good work on their own, rather than try to figure out what the economists’ preferences are, and undertake research accordingly.

In this contribution, we provide an interpretation of Friedrich von Wieser’s contribution to economics that pays tribute to the originality of his work and particularly to his view of how institutions interfere with individual behavior. This interaction takes place within a disequilibrium framework where social influences such as power or social class, and psychological factors such as force of habit or herd behavior, are the product of human action but also constitute constraints on further action. Section II stresses the institutionalist background of Wieser’s economics. We concentrate on Wieser’s general method—which we assimilate to an example of Joseph Agassi’s (1975) institutional individualism—and his analysis of the emergence and evolution of institutions via the dynamics of leaders and masses. In section III, we reinforce and illustrate the institutionalist stamp of Wieser’s economics by focusing on his work on monetary economics (Wieser 1904, 1909a, 1909b, 1927b) and his analysis of the emergence of money, based on our reading of Wieser’s Social Economics ([1927a] 1967) and The Law of Power ([1926] 1983).

Keynes abandoned the theoretical approach used in the Treatise on Money, the fundamental equations approach, very soon after publishing the Treatise. One reason why he may have done so is discussed in this paper. Twice in 1931 someone pointed out to Keynes a third fundamental equation, one for the price of investment goods, an equation Keynes had not developed in the Treatise. This third fundamental equation may have shown Keynes that his fundamental equation approach may not be promising or fruitful.

Historians of economics have acknowledged the significant role François Quesnay and the Physiocrats played in the early development of mathematical economics. It is, however, important to note that although the Tableau économique could well be translated into algebra, Quesnay never did it. As part of our research on Charles Richard de Butré, an obscure collaborator of François Quesnay, we have uncovered documents that show that he was one Physiocrat who did use algebra to explain his theoretical conceptions. In two texts written at the end of 1766 and the beginning of 1767, Butré systematically used algebra as an aid for economic reasoning. Our argument is that these texts provide very interesting insights into the development of early mathematical economics.

This paper focuses on the teachings and admonitions regarding wisdom found in the sixth edition of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). Following a mind-path marked by the seminal contributions of Glenn Morrow (1923), Donald Winch (1978), and Laurence Dickey (1986), the paper offers an interpretation of the higher moral standard (superior prudence) introduced by Smith in the last edition of TMS, as his response to the socio-economic and cultural changes that took place in Great Britain in the second half of the eighteenth century. Between the first and last editions of TMS the taste for luxury and conspicuous consumption became widespread and contagious both geographically and across ranks. Prudence and other-approbation, sufficient gatekeepers of moral conduct and character in the previous editions of TMS, became progressively less effective in keeping society away from moral deception and in regulating reputation and the distinction of ranks. The paper examines the introduction of superior prudence in the last edition of TMS as Smith’s vision of a dialectical process between external and internal approbation that is capable of transforming individual dependence on social praise into a dialogue between materialistic and moral concerns, which would lead to a progressively wiser, although conflictual, existence.

This paper explores John Commons’s views toward Jews in order to assess whether his published writings contain assertions that today would be stigmatized as anti-Semitic. The evidence we provide shows that Commons’s racial characterization of Jews was framed within a broad and indiscriminate xenophobic framework. With other leading Progressive Era social scientists, in fact, Commons shared the idea that the new immigration from eastern and southern Europe would increase competition in the labor market, drive down wages, and lead Anglo-Saxon men and women to have fewer children, since they would not want them to compete with those who survive on less. Within this general xenophobic context, Commons developed assertions regarding immigrant Jews that show traces of explicit anti-Semitic accusations.

Having in the General Theory quoted a passage from John Stuart Mill’s Principles as representative of ancient confusion, John Maynard Keynes has been accused of misinterpreting that passage and thus mistakenly identifying Mill as an upholder of the “classical” proposition that “supply creates its own demand.” Certain critics, seizing on Keynes’s misunderstanding, draw the conclusion that little was actually wrong with Mill’s analysis and that Keynes’s attack on Mill was therefore without justification.

Our contention, however, is that, despite his error with respect, so to say, to the “letter” of Mill’s exposition, Keynes was right about the essential “substance” of Mill’s thesis. Mill’s thinking, we suggest, was deeply in thrall to the ideas of his father and Jean-Baptiste Say. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Mill did indeed stand for a “classical” position, albeit qualified, but nevertheless vulnerable to Keynes’s critique as developed in the General Theory.

The emergence of railroads in France in the nineteenth century raised new debates on analytical issues. The issue lies in the fact that they are natural monopolies. In this paper, I focus on Jules Dupuit’s work on the operations of the railroads. Curiously, he seemed to have defended two contrasting positions: on the one hand, he claimed that unlimited competition is the most efficient way to operate in the railroads; on the other, he stated that State management was the best way to run them. I aim to restore the consistency of Dupuit’s positions. I show that, for him, unlimited competition is not possible in the railroads and that it is not necessarily good for the welfare of society. Therefore, the State should regulate this sector. Then, I specify the conditions under which Dupuit believed the State should manage the railroads instead of offering concessions to private companies.

This paper agrees with Friedrich August Hayek’s assertion in his 1945 Dublin lecture that the importance of Dutch physician Bernard Mandeville’s role in the history of economics had been overlooked and with his 1966 London lecture’s assertion that Mandeville’s important contribution qualified him as a master mind. Paul Sakmann’s and Albert Schatz’s studies of Mandeville’s eighteenth-century allegorical Fable of the Bees satire were acknowledged by Hayek as having influenced his formulation and development of the theory of spontaneous order extended from Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. Each of these two writers’ contribution to Mandeville and spontaneous order theory is considered as well as proposing a new source for the term “spontaneous order”—Schatz’s 1907‘le principe d’ordre spontané.’

The economics of education gradually became institutionalized in the period following the Second World War. Human capital theory was the central pillar in this process. Nevertheless, it did not go unchallenged. The first challenges came from within the mainstream itself, but economists affiliated to other paradigms also called human capital theory into question. This applied in particular to the work of the radical economists. The aim of this article is to document this critical episode in the history of ideas in the economics of education. To that end, the nature of the radical economists’ critique is examined and it is shown how it connects to human capital theory.

The aim of this paper is twofold: first, we show that some theoretical continuities exist between the approaches of Bernard Mandeville, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith to the division of labor and the contemporary analyses of technical change and economic dynamics, which consider innovation as a process of technological creation. We thus offer a further exploration of the origins of evolutionary ideas in the history of evolutionary economics. Second, despite the existence of these theoretical continuities, we highlight the differences between the Scottish Enlightenment authors and the modern evolutionary economists on the issue of temporality and the place of history in their reflections.

Tjalling C. Koopmans, research director of the Cowles Foundation of Research in Economics, was the first US economist after World War II who, in the summer of 1965, travelled to the Soviet Union for an official visit to the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Koopmans left hoping to learn from the Soviet economists’ experience with applying linear programming to economic planning. Would his own theories, as discovered independently by Leonid V. Kantorovich, help increase allocative efficiency in a socialist economy? Inspired by a vague notion of universal reason spanning the iron curtain, Koopmans may have even envisioned a research community that transcends the political divide. Yet, he came home having discovered that learning about Soviet mathematical economists might be more interesting than learning from them. On top of that, he found the Soviet scene caught in the same deplorable situation he knew all too well from home: that mathematicians are the better economists. Reconstructing Koopmans’s voyage from a first-person perspective puts the spirit of universal economic knowledge at Cowles to test: Is it capable of establishing a dialogue across the political divide of the Cold War or is it limited to the Western academic cocoon?