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Rationalization is irrational and self-serving, but useful

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Jake Quilty-Dunn*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom, OX2 6GG; Department of Philosophy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO63105. [email protected]/site/jakequiltydunn/

Abstract

Rationalization through reduction of cognitive dissonance does not have the function of representational exchange. Instead, cognitive dissonance is part of the “psychological immune system” (Gilbert 2006; Mandelbaum 2019) and functions to protect the self-concept against evidence of incompetence, immorality, and instability. The irrational forms of attitude change that protect the self-concept in dissonance reduction are useful primarily for maintaining motivation.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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