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Rational rationalization and System 2

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Wim De Neys Open the ORCID record for Wim De Neys [Opens in a new window]
Wim De Neys*
Affiliation:
LaPsyDE, UMR CNRS 8240 and Université de Paris, Sorbonne, 75005Paris, France. [email protected] www.wdeneys.org
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Abstract

In this commentary, I highlight the relevance of Cushman's target article for the popular dual-process framework of thinking. I point to the problematic characterization of rationalization in traditional dual-process models and suggest that in line with recent advances, Cushman's rational rationalization account offers a way out of the rationalization paradox.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e34
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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