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Faustian bargains for minorities within group-based hierarchies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2012

C. David Navarrete
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology; Ecology, Evolutionary Biology and Behavior Program; Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824. [email protected] / [email protected]@msu.edu
Melissa M. McDonald
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology; Ecology, Evolutionary Biology and Behavior Program; Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824. [email protected] / [email protected]@msu.edu

Abstract

A dual-audience signaling problem framework provides a deeper understanding of the perpetuation of group-based inequality. We describe a model of underachievement among minority youth that posits a necessary trade-off between academic success and peer social support that creates a dilemma not typically encountered by nonminorities. Preliminary evidence consistent with the approach is discussed. Such strategic agent perspectives complement the psychological approach put forth by Dixon et al., but with minimal ancillary assumptions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012 

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