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Norms, not moral norms: The boundaries of morality do not matter

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2018

Taylor Davis  and
Daniel Kelly
Taylor Davis
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47906-2098. [email protected]@purdue.eduhttp://www.taylordavisphilosophy.comhttp://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/
Daniel Kelly
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47906-2098. [email protected]@purdue.eduhttp://www.taylordavisphilosophy.comhttp://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/
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Abstract

We endorse Stanford's project, which calls attention to features of human psychology that exhibit a “puzzling combination of objective and subjective elements,” and that are central to cooperation. However, we disagree with his delineation of the explanatory target. What he calls “externalization or objectification” conflates two separate properties, neither of which can serve as the mark of the moral.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e101
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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