Political elites in East Asia have opted for a set of democratic institutions with a strong majoritarian bias that privilege efficiency and accountability over representativeness. Some have labeled these democracies “democratic developmental states.” Because the political architects of East Asia's democratic developmental states have met at least some of their objectives, it is time to ask, What has been the impact of the shift to majoritarianism on growth? I answer this question empirically by demonstrating that the contribution to growth from majoritarian democratic institutions in East Asia is as large as that from the region's developmentally oriented authoritarian governments.

In this article, we propose a causal relationship between a region's communist revolutionary legacy before 1949 and the variation in private sector development after 1949. In the case of Zhejiang, the pre-1949 revolutionary experience led to the power struggle between two elite groups, the guerrilla cadre group and the southbound cadre group, in the province after 1949. As the weak side, guerrilla cadres were willing to protect local economic interests in exchange for local popular support, which improved their odds of political survival. As a result, in contrast with counties where the guerrilla forces were historically weak, counties with strong guerrilla forces before 1949 saw significantly more robust private sector development throughout much of the Mao and post-Mao periods. In this article we provide preliminary historical and statistical evidence to support this hypothesis.

Long understudied by mainstream international relations (IR) scholars, the East Asian historical experience provides an enormous wealth of patterns and findings, which promise to enrich our IR theoretical literature largely derived from and knowledgeable about the Western experience. The intellectual contributions of this emerging scholarship have the potential to influence some of the most central questions in international relations: the nature of the state, the formation of state preferences, and the interplay between material and ideational factors. Researching historical East Asia provides an opportunity to seek out genuine comparisons of international systems and their foundational components. This introduction surveys the field and sets out to frame debate and the intellectual terms of inquiry to assess progress and guide future research. Theoretically, the essays in this issue provide insights on the emerging literature on hierarchy in international relations, and move beyond simplistic assertions that power “matters” to explore the interplay of material and ideational causal factors. Methodologically, scholars are no longer treating all East Asian history as simply one case, while also becoming more careful to avoid selection bias by avoiding choosing selective evidence from the rich historical record. Collectively, the empirical cases discussed in this volume span centuries of history, include a wide variety of political actors across East Asia, and represent an exciting wave of new scholarship.

In this article I remedy the popular misconception that the East Asian international system was hierarchical and non-egalitarian in history. I argue that the tribute system is mainly a function of power. Backed by power, Confucian norms and rules became the rules of the game in the system. Power asymmetry gave rise to hierarchy in foreign relations while power symmetry led to diplomatic equality between great powers. East Asia during the tenth to the thirteenth centuries was a multistate system without a regional hegemon. In the Song-Liao international system (960–1125), due to power symmetry, the two great powers conducted their foreign policy on the basis of formal equality. In the Song-Jin international system (1127–1234), the weaker Song China became a Jin vassal state and acknowledged its inferior status in the Jin-derived hierarchy. In studying historical East Asia, Confucian rhetoric needs to be examined against power reality. Only by taking power seriously can we get a better understanding of the East Asian international system.

Although party polarization is one of the most significant focal points in the study of contemporary US politics, a limited number of studies have examined its theoretical implications for other countries. In addition, a great deal of effort has been made in the study of the changes in voting bases (i.e., constituencies or interest groups). However, little attention has been given to the features of party organization. In this study we look at the process of polarization between two major parties in Japan in recent years and analyze the way Japanese parties took an alternative path to polarization. We argue that party polarization can be caused by the strategic position-taking of the party executive in addition to the centralization of the party organization.

A commonly proffered theory to explain the use of elections in authoritarian regimes is that they help identify talented young leaders who can be groomed for leadership positions. Unfortunately, due to the difficulties of obtaining data in authoritarian settings, this hypothesis has not been tested satisfactorily. We examine candidate-level data from the 2007 Vietnamese National Assembly (VNA) election and subsequent selection of candidates for top positions within the VNA and for top ministry positions. We find no evidence that vote share is associated with promotion to leadership positions in the VNA and only limited evidence for vote share association with ministerial posts. Instead, the results indicate that leadership selection takes place within the party rather than through elections. Furthermore, behavior within the assembly suggests that those who were chosen may have been selected based on their loyalty or at least pliancy to the party elites.

Observers and practitioners of Sino-Korean relations in both the pre- and post-nineteenth century have utilized powerful “comforting fictions” to describe and justify power asymmetry. In the pre-nineteenth-century period, the idea of the “tribute system” put a veneer of Confucian benevolence on what a closer examination reveals to have been unequal and coercive relations. Western proponents of the Westphalian system of sovereign equality saw the new norms of international relations as potentially liberating to Korea, a way to free Korea from the Chinese yoke. However, Westphalian equality, too, was a comforting fiction that masked the reality of imperialism—both formal and informal. The Qing empire played a heretofore neglected role in both types of unequal coercive relations between Korea and the outside world.

Village elections are a democratic institution in one of the most resilient authoritarian regimes in the world. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has promoted village elections over the past twenty years, but not elections at higher levels. I present a game-theoretic model in which candidates would engage in vote buying when competing in a small electorate but not when competing in a larger electorate. The model's equilibrium outcome implies that the logic of China's introduction of village elections inherently limits this democratic reform to the grassroots level. Elections for higher levels of government would be dangerous to the regime because they would lead candidates to create substantive policy platforms and political organizations. Thus, rather than being an experiment that has failed to lead to further reforms, village democracy is self-limiting by design.

Apart from a short period in the 1980s, the People's Republic of China has been almost completely excluded from access to military and sensitive dual-use civilian-military technologies from the United States and its allies. But in an era of globalization and convergence in the civilian and military technological domains, this compartmentalization of the economic and security arenas has become increasingly difficult to maintain and justify. Major trading countries are caught in the dilemma of balancing restrictions on high technology and other sensitive trade and investment with China against the benefits of deeper ties with the world's second-largest economy. In examining the trade-offs between economics and national security for the United States, the European Union, Israel, and Japan, it becomes clear that China's rise and growing economic and strategic influence introduce new complexities and challenges for controlling militarily relevant technology and knowledge transfers.

Premodern Sino-Vietnamese relations may be described by three systems of engagement that I have labeled Strong China/Weak Vietnam, Weak China/Strong Vietnam, and Strong China/Strong Vietnam. These three states of interaction appear at various points, beginning with Vietnamese encounters with the Qin empire (221–206 b.c.e.) through the early modern era. Brantly Womack has already described the historical Sino-Vietnamese relationship as politically “asymmetrical” with China playing the strongman role, and the three relational equilibriums described here do not contradict Womack's thesis. Instead, I explore how the generally asymmetrical states of affairs were molded by historical context and the specific ambitions of elite in the frontier region. While the general conditions of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship were asymmetrical, the choices available to Chinese and Vietnamese leaders in different periods varied widely.

Broader structural developments in Japan in the past two decades—decline of clientelist practices, partisan de-alignment, and decentralization—have dissolved traditionally close ties between national and local party systems, creating an environment conducive to the emergence of local parties. In this context, popular chief executives in four regions launched new parties. I trace how these parties emerged and how national parties reacted to them, from the appearance of the new-party leaders to the 2011 local elections. In comparing the four cases, two factors appear to shape their trajectories: the urbanness of their electoral environments and the responses of the two national parties at the local and the national level. In dealing with the new challengers, both the Liberal Democratic Party and Democratic Party of Japan experienced considerable intraparty conflict and defections, indicating a process of delinking between national and local party systems.

China has largely been cut off from direct transfers of military systems and technologies since the announcement of the EU arms embargo in 1989. Nevertheless, the EU and its member states remain a major source of high technologies for China, namely, by means of trade, investment, and scientific cooperation. This is mainly because the EU-China relationship continues to be dominated by the economic interests of individual member states, both in trade and increasingly in investments. Furthermore, due to a lack of direct security interests in the Asia-Pacific, Europeans do not generally see China as a security threat or a strategic competitor. Therefore, the EU has so far failed to develop a strategic approach toward the potential security implications of transfers of European militarily sensitive technologies that goes beyond the existing arms embargo and currently lacks effective mechanisms to control the flow of such technologies to China.

I examine a relatively underexplored aspect of Japan's early postwar history and seek to explain why attempts to establish a Japanese-style central intelligence agency (JCIA) in the 1950s were unsuccessful. I evaluate three competing explanations drawn from the level of international politics, focusing on US power resources and influence as well as liberal and constructivist styles of analysis—alliance politics, sectionalism, and the norm of antimilitarism—in order to shed light on the historical origins of Japan's intelligence apparatus, which is relatively underdeveloped and underfunded compared to other middle powers. It highlights the primacy of domestic factors over structural causes in explaining the decision not to establish a JCIA. In particular, I argue that the JCIA proposal failed primarily because of attacks on important proponents that, while sometimes driven by seemingly rational organizational interests, were nevertheless legitimated by growing antimilitaristic sentiments shared by elites from the political center to the left of the ideological spectrum. The newly emerging norm of antimilitarism was predicated largely on a fear of constraints on recently acquired civil and political liberties. These fears, manifested most prominently in vocal Diet and media opposition, were compounded by the norm of secrecy—an important element of intelligence activities—which served to heighten further speculation about the malign intent of postwar Japan's reconstituted intelligence system.

The arrival of Westphalian sovereignty principles in nineteenth-century East Asia was not a uniformly transformative “shock” as commonly assumed. The Sino-centric order did not suddenly disappear; rather it lingered and evolved in a gradual and contested process of change. I argue that enduring domestic understandings of sovereign autonomy affected how Westphalian sovereignty was interpreted in Japan and Korea. Even as the regional structure shifted from regional hierarchy under China to a Western-led international state system, the lens of hierarchy—the long-standing sense of vulnerability and the need to attain autonomous status in a world of great powers—remained unchanged. In addition, each ruling regime in East Asia attempted to reconcile Westphalian sovereignty with existing diplomatic practices to protect its own interests within the Sino-centric order, which resulted in a new hybrid system of interstate relations encompassing notions of both equality and civilizational hierarchy. Within each country, contestation on sovereignty occurred in multiple stages, driven by existing security relationships and changing domestic politics debating the competing standards of civilization in the region.

While Japanese business interests support the export of high-technology items and the transfer of technology from Japan to China, these economically motivated actions may have direct and indirect impacts on Japan's national security. First, the transfer of dual-use technology to China may directly help China's military buildup. Second, high-tech exports and technology transfers may have an indirect effect by eroding Japan's technological advantages vis-à-vis China. In this article I place these concerns into a historical context and analyze the current challenges to Japan's export control policies. I offer an overview of the Japan-China trade relationship, with a special focus on high-tech trade. I then discuss changes in Japan's export controls regarding China, based on heightened security concerns. Evidence indicates that the Japanese government is ill equipped to deal with “technology leakage,” which is accelerating the erosion of Japan's technological supremacy and is not covered by its current export control regime.

What explains Korea's success in surviving as an independent state for over 2,000 years, not annexed to China, when it shares a border with this powerful imperial neighbor? I argue that diplomatic ritual can be conducive to managing asymmetric power relations and that the Korean state and the Chinese state prior to the nineteenth century used the diplomatic ritual of investiture in a strategic manner as a signaling mechanism to manage the expectations of each side. Drawing insights from ritual studies, I offer three specific mechanisms: (1) regularity and precision, (2) strategic ambiguity, and (3) the manipulation of symbols, through which the ritualization of power relations reduces the tension arising from the disparity in power. The empirical evidence comes from an investigation of a total of sixteen investiture cases between Chosòn Korea and Ming China between 1392 and 1644. It shows that the granting and seeking of investiture on both sides was not only a way of signaling their commitment to the status quo, but also a medium of negative soft power through which the stronger side could change the status quo relations to its favor using the symbolic power embedded in the investiture ritual.

Technological ties between Israel and China have always been a central and constant element of their relationship. Defense contracts played a leading role here but were also responsible for the severe crisis that erupted between the countries in the early 2000s after Israel, capitulating to US pressure, backed off from its commitment to provide China with military technologies. This not only forced Israel to sever its defense relations with China but also made US-Israel relations a principal factor in the Sino-Israeli connection and imposed tight constraints on Israel's technology transfers to China generally. For Israel, this placed the dilemma of commercial versus political and national security interests at the forefront, since technology connections allowed it to promote its economic, political, and strategic causes through China. Indeed, while technology ties between the states have not stopped entirely—they have shifted to the civilian sphere—technology transfers to China are subject to heavy limitations, and Israel's export control mechanism faces greater challenges to screen them. As China's economic and political influence is ever increasing, Israel's cautious approach to technology transfers to China may be expected to come under mounting pressure.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Chosòn Korea government designed and utilized hierarchical tribute systems for managing interactions, in particular, trade, with Japanese and Jurchen elites. Korean officials separated maritime and overland contacts, divided the contacts further into carefully delineated reception grades and diplomatic statuses, and designed detailed procedures for interaction. More specifically, diplomatic status determined the regulations by which the court provided reception and then trade to a contact.