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Polygenic scores and social science
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 September 2023
Abstract
It is a hotly contested issue whether polygenic scores should play a major role in the social sciences. Here, we defend a methodologically pluralist stance in which sociogenomics should abandon its hype and recognize that it suffers from all the methodological difficulties of the social sciences, yet nevertheless maintain an optimistic stance toward a more cautious use.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Challenging the utility of polygenic scores for social science: Environmental confounding, downward causation, and unknown biology
Related commentaries (24)
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Polygenic scores and social science
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Author response
Polygenic scores for social science: Clarification, consensus, and controversy