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The problem with brain GUTs: Conflation of different senses of “prediction” threatens metaphysical disaster

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 May 2013

Michael L. Anderson  and
Tony Chemero
Michael L. Anderson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Franklin & Marshall College, Lancaster, PA 17604-3003. [email protected]://www.agcognition.org
Tony Chemero
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Franklin & Marshall College, Lancaster, PA 17604-3003. [email protected]://www.agcognition.org Departments of Philosophy and Psychology, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221. [email protected]://edisk.fandm.edu/tony.chemero
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Abstract

Clark appears to be moving toward epistemic internalism, which he once rightly rejected. This results from a double over-interpretation of predictive coding's significance. First, Clark argues that predictive coding offers a Grand Unified Theory (GUT) of brain function. Second, he over-reads its epistemic import, perhaps even conflating causal and epistemic mediators. We argue instead for a plurality of neurofunctional principles.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , June 2013 , pp. 204 - 205
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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