Property has a ubiquitous presence in international practice, but its implications for theorizing world order are not adequately explored. I remedy this by showing how property constitutes the core concepts of anarchy and sovereignty in international relations (IR) as overlapping spaces of right-based governance. I develop my account of a property-based world order in relation to the work of John Locke. Locke is generally overlooked as a core IR thinker, with the unfortunate consequence that anarchy and sovereignty are conceptualized as polar opposites under the enduring shadow of Hobbes. Even prominent critics of Hobbesian anarchy rely on Hobbesian notions of sovereignty, resulting in minimalist conceptions of international society and international ethics. To counter these Hobbesian legacies, I turn to Locke's limited, plural, and fluid accounts of anarchy and sovereignty and show how they are grounded in a normative notion of property that mutually constitutes them. This provides an alternative to the Hobbesian absolutist conceptions of anarchy and sovereignty that many IR theorists still operate with. The result is a distinctly normative vision for IR that condemns the twin evils of conquest and tyranny.

International agreements save the costs of war, but complying with their terms can be costly. We analyse a model of interstate crisis bargaining in which one state may be unwilling or unable to make a costly investment that guarantees its subjects’ compliance. In equilibrium, peace is assured when the domestic government is militarily strong enough to demand terms that its subjects tolerate. When the domestic government is militarily weaker, peace requires that the foreign state compensate it for either the costs of enforcement or its subjects’ violations, and these prospective costs of peace may also lead the foreign state to solve the enforcement problem with war because peace is relatively costly. We also show that war due to enforcement problems is more common in militarily weak states and that equilibria at which the foreign state subsidizes enforcement are more common when the costs of violation fall disproportionately on the domestic state. The American invasion of Mexico in 1916 and the Red Army's peaceful withdrawal from East Germany in 1989 demonstrate the model's usefulness.

This paper presents a set of theoretical models that links a two-phase sequence of cooperative political integration and conflict to explore the reciprocal relationship between war and state formation. It compares equilibria rates of state formation and conflict using a Monte Carlo that generates comparative statics by altering the systemic distribution of ideology, population, tax rates, and war costs across polities. This approach supports three core findings. First, war-induced political integration is at least 2.5 times as likely to occur as integration to realize economic gains. Second, we identify mechanisms linking endogenous organizations to the likelihood of conflict in the system. For example, a greater domestic willingness to support public goods production facilitates the creation of buffer states that reduce the likelihood of a unique class of trilateral wars. These results suggest that the development of the modern administrative state has helped to foster peace. Third, we explore how modelling assumptions setting the number of actors in a strategic context can shape conclusions about war and state formation. We find that dyadic modelling restrictions tend to underestimate the likelihood of cooperative political integration and overestimate the likelihood of war relative to a triadic modelling context.

Moral responsibility is a prominent concept used in political discourses and theoretical debates. Yet disagreement remains on how it could work in practice. When attempting to address global challenges such as global poverty, combating atrocities, or artificial intelligence, approaches often revert to retrospective accounts of responsibility that focus on non-compliance with regulatory frameworks. As a result, cases where prospective responsibility would be required often go unaddressed. In this article, we introduce an analytical conceptualization of responsibility that should help to guide the application of moral responsibility in such situations. In the first step, we develop a typology that distinguishes between four types of responsibility: ‘obligatory’, ‘structural’, ‘prescribed’, and ‘discursive’. Second, we identify responsibility gaps for each responsibility type. Third, we introduce different ethical principles from political theory that help to identify potential responsibility relations. We illustrate the utility of this framework with the example of climate change, where ethical principles beyond the contribution principle have already been applied. The paper facilitates new perspectives in political debates about how to allocate responsibility in light of global challenges and enhances theoretical debates in International Relations scholarship.

From climate change to disruptive technologies, policymakers constantly face new problems calling for unprecedented institutional solutions. Yet, we still poorly understand the inventive process leading to the emergence of new institutional forms. Existing theories argue that exogenous changes provide incentives and opportunities for institutional invention. However, they fail to explain how the inventive process endogenously structures their emergence. Drawing from complexity theory and Brian Arthur's work on technological inventions, we develop a structural theory recasting the process of inventing new institutions as the combination of pre-existing institutions. Building on three assumptions related to this combinatorial process, we argue that the distance between institutions shapes the emergence of new institutional forms and their regime's trajectory. Following the initial take-off in the number of institutional inventions at the creation of a regime, we expect the rate of institutional inventions over replications will slow down as nearby institutions are combined and accelerate as distant ones are combined. We illustrate these expectations by looking at three regimes: data privacy, climate governance, and investment protection. Together, they showcase how our combinatorial theory can help make sense of the emergence of unprecedented institutions and, more generally, the pace of unfolding complexity in various international regimes.

Critiques of international economic law have attacked the tendency of transnational legal processes, including investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), to undermine states' sovereignty. In response to these criticisms, many states have limited the power of investment tribunals by reasserting their sovereignty. There are reasons, however, to be critical of endorsing sovereignty, particularly in the context of global distributive inequalities. This is because assertions of sovereignty are normatively ambivalent in their effects: they can be used to entrench and naturalize the unequal assets held by each state, rather than to empower states to exercise their right to regulate. These potential tensions can be resolved if sovereignty is understood as a term that is used in many different ways. Critics of ISDS often conflate two distinct meanings of sovereignty: sovereignty understood as the right to be free from external influence, and sovereignty understood as states' right to regulate. Because states are constrained by differences in resources and capacity, withdrawing from ISDS cannot always secure the conditions for effective domestic regulation. Sovereignty understood as the right to be free from interference may even stand in the way of states' ability to regulate, by allowing states to gatekeep resources that were accumulated through historical injustice

Ronald Dworkin maintains that a system of coercive government is a genuinely legal one if and only if it exhibits fidelity to a conception of the rule of law as valuable for the constitutive contribution it makes to the treatment of all its individual human subjects with equal concern and respect. This requires a particular type of institutional structure, namely one that satisfies the criteria that constitute government according to the rule of law, and a particular political culture or ethos on the part of both rulers and ruled that Dworkin labels law as integrity. The existing practice of global coercive government may well satisfy neither of these conditions. If so, then given Dworkin's account of law, international law is not really law. Importantly, this is a practical claim, not a descriptive/explanatory one. Specifically, it entails that international officials are sometimes morally permitted to tell noble lies regarding what the ‘law’ is, to refuse to pronounce on questions of ‘law’, and to refrain from applying and enforcing actors' ‘legal’ rights and duties.

Recent scholarship in law and society has engaged in novel ways with maritime spaces, articulating how they inform legal theory more broadly. This essay builds on such scholarship, and on a broad-brushed survey of maritime history, to make two basic arguments. First, a look at political and legal processes regarding maritime spaces reveals that law is transnational ‘all the way down’. Legal theorists often assume that transnational legal processes are an added layer beyond domestic and international law. But the maritime perspective reveals that transnationalism comes first, both analytically and historically, as a constant negotiation of the relationship between what is ‘inside’ and what is ‘outside’ a polity. Second, the maritime space begins, at least in dominant legal traditions, as an absolute exteriority – imagined as outside or beyond polities and jurisdictions. But with the climate crisis and the emergence of the Anthropocene we may observe an inversion, the sea now appears as a record of harmful human activity; a mirror showing a troublesome collective portrait of humanity. The inversion from a maritime exteriority to the intimacy of ubiquitous environmental harm defines the parameters of law and politics today. The essay concludes with reflections on how the maritime perspective may best be engaged today in responding to that image through political action. It conceptualizes what I call the ‘commonist lifeboat’ – a model of bottom-up universalism for tumultuous times.

Michael Walzer's use of John Stuart Mill's A Few Words on Non-Intervention (1859) helped to inaugurate it as a canonical text of international theory. However, Walzer's use of the text was highly selective because he viewed the first half as a historically parochial discussion of British foreign policy, and his interest in the second was restricted to the passages in which Mill proposes principles of international morality to govern foreign military interventions to protect third parties. As a result, theorists tend to see those canonized passages as if through a glass darkly. Attention to the detail and context of Mill's first-half critique of Lord Palmerston's opposition to the Suez Canal project reveals that his discussion of purely protective intervention is embedded in a broader exploration of the limits of self-defence, including the moral permissibility of preventive military force and the use of protective interventions for defensive purposes. Moreover, reading the text holistically facilitates a refutation of some objections directed at it by Michael Doyle to the effect that Mill's conception of self-defence incorporates elements of aggression which makes it extremely dangerous when adapted for application to the contemporary world.

From Trump's America to Putin's Russia, from climate change denial to corona denial, so-called post-truth politics are experiencing a global rise. How can we understand and explain this phenomenon? In the attempt to answer this question, this article advances two core claims. First, it suggests that post-truth politics is (despite its name) marked not only by the denial of claims to objective truth, but also by the naturalization of one specific truth claim: namely, the cynical belief that self-interests are behind all public discourse. Second, it locates the social sources of this dogmatic cynicism in the global expansion of neoliberal competition.

The traditional Laing–Giddens paradigm views ontological insecurity as an unusual mental state triggered by critical situations and characterized by feelings of anxiety, disorientation and paralysis. However, theories inspired by Lacan suggest a different perspective, stating that ontological insecurity is not an exception but rather a regular state of mind. Similarly, ontological security is a fantasy stemming from the desire to fill the primordial lack, thus fuelling agency. While these Lacanian interpretations have introduced a fresh viewpoint into Ontological Security Studies (OSS), they have not fully incorporated one of the key concepts from Lacanian psychoanalysis – the object-cause of desire (French: objet petit a) – into international relations theory. In this article, we present a framework of how to conceptualize and empirically study the objects-cause of desire in world politics. Our arguments are exemplified in a case study of Serbia's resistance to Kosovo's UNESCO membership in 2015.