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Selfish goals must compete for the common currency of reward1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2014

George Ainslie*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch 7701, South Africa. http://www.picoeconomics.org Department of Veterans Affairs, Coatesville, PA 19320. [email protected]

Abstract

Selfish Goal Theory is compatible with a behaviorally based theory that recognizes mental processes as behaviors. Both envision choices as made by the competition of purposive processes, which are autonomous in that they are not coordinated by an agentic “self.” However, the survival of mental processes – termed “goals” or “interests,” respectively – depends on a well-documented active mechanism: reward.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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Footnotes

1.

© George Ainslie 2014. This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.

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