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The attack and defense games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2019

Roman M. Sheremeta Open the ORCID record for Roman M. Sheremeta [Opens in a new window]
Roman M. Sheremeta*
Affiliation:
Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106; Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866.  [email protected]://sites.google.com/site/romansheremeta/
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Abstract

The attack-and-defense game is a game in which an attacker (a group of attackers) has an incentive to revise the status quo and a defender (a group of defenders) wants to protect it. The asymmetry in objectives creates incompatible interests and results in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, this equilibrium could be heavily impacted by behavioral considerations.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e140
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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