Matching pennies games as asymmetric models of conflict

Michał Wiktor Krawczyk

doi:10.1017/S0140525X19000864

Matching pennies games as asymmetric models of conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 August 2019

Michał Wiktor Krawczyk

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Michał Wiktor Krawczyk*: Affiliation:
Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw, 00-241 Warsaw, Poland. [email protected] http://coin.wne.uw.edu.pl/mkrawczyk/

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Abstract

De Dreu and Gross (D&G) seem to have disregarded some relevant experimental literature on games of conflict, most notably variations on “matching pennies” games. While in such games, “attacker” and “defender” are typically not explicitly labelled, players’ differentiated roles yield naturally to such notions. These studies partly validate some of D&G's findings and interpretations.

Type: Open Peer Commentary
Information: Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e128

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19000864 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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