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Differences in autonomy of humans and ultrasocial insects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2016

Marek Vranka  and
Štěpán Bahník
Marek Vranka
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Charles University in Prague, 116 38 Prague, Czech Republic. [email protected]/en
Štěpán Bahník
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Würzburg, D-97070 Würzburg, Germany. [email protected]
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Abstract

The target article is built on an analogy between humans and ultrasocial insects. We argue that there are many important limitations to the analogy that make any possible inferences from the analogy questionable. We demonstrate the issue using an example of the difference between a loss of autonomy in humans and in social insects.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e116
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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