Variation in the passage of time is perceived against the backdrop of standard temporal units. Under certain conditions, we perceive time to be passing slowly. In other settings, our subjective temporal experience is roughly synchronized with the objective time of clocks or calendars. And given different circumstances, we perceive time to have passed quickly. Drawing from 740 narratives that depict distortion in the perceived passage of time, I formulate a theory that accounts for the full range of variation in temporal experience. This theory can be represented by an S-shaped figure. According to this theory, variation in the perceived passage of time reflects variation in the density of experience per standard temporal unit. In turn, the density of experience per standard temporal unit is conditioned by the dynamics of social interaction. In its original form, however, this theory assumes that one’s circumstances shape one’s temporal experience in deterministic fashion. Consequently, based upon interviews with 406 disparate people, I conceptualize time work (or temporal agency) as one’s efforts to control, manipulate, or customize one’s own temporal experience or that of others. I conclude with some directions for future research.

I discuss the perspectival nature of temporality in discourse and argue that the human concept of time can no more be dissociated from the perspectival thought than the concept of the self can. The corollary of this observation is that perspectival temporality can no more be excluded from the semantic representation than the notion of the self can: neither can be reduced to the bare referent for the purpose of semantic representation if the latter is to retain cognitive plausibility. I present such a semantic qua conceptual approach to temporal reference developed within my theory of Default Semantics. I build upon my theory of time as epistemic modality according to which, on the level of conceptual qua semantic building blocks, temporality reduces to degrees of detachment from the certainty of the here and the now. I also address the questions of temporal asymmetry between the past and the future, and the relation between metaphysical time (timeM), psychological time (timeE, where ‘E’ marks the domain of epistemological enquiry), and time in natural language (timeL), concluding that the perspective-infused timeE and timeL are compatible with timeM of mathematical models of spacetime: all are definable through possibility and perspectivity.

Oral language in individuals with nonverbal learning disabilities (NLD) has been described as empty of meaning, despite apparently average word knowledge. The present study explored the hypothesis that depth but not breadth of semantic representations would be reduced in NLD, and that depth but not breadth would be related to nonverbal gestalt perception. A cross-sectional design compared breadth and depth of vocabulary in 50 adults with or without a diagnosis of NLD. Vocabulary results were also compared with a visual closure test. Participants with NLD had reduced vocabulary depth in comparison with controls. The NLD group also had lower scores for gestalt perception, the ability to perceive a meaningful whole from unrelated parts. Across the sample, this measure predicted scores for vocabulary depth, but not breadth. The NLD group was also less able than the Control group to estimate the size of unknown, physical features of everyday objects. Results supported clinical observations that semantic representations are unconventional and imprecise in individuals with NLD, and suggested specific cognitive underpinnings for such difficulties. Results were also compatible with separate theories of embodied and lateralized semantics. A proposal uniting these theories in a designation over elaboration model is presented.

Spoken testimonials on Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) constitute the data for this study, which considers contrastive construal as evoked by conditional constructions (if, unless, what if) and antonymous uses of lexical items (bad–good, guilt–innocence). Unlike conditional language use for the expression of hypothetical scenarios, doubt, and catastrophizing, antonyms have not been a focus of OCD research. In the data, antonymous lexical items establish experiential dichotomies (e.g., good–bad, guilt–innocence, cause–prevent) that reinforce and specify the nature of evoked contrast. Meaning making in the data, it is proposed, evokes contrastive construal according to bundles of integrated quality dimensions such as modality, morality, and emotion that make up incompatible conceptions of reality. Tied to contrast in the data is also the notion of balance, and contrast is considered alongside force-dynamic actions that are experienced as effecting balance. While the overriding concerns for the study are linguistic–conceptual, the study’s findings can have implications for research on OCD and a cognitive semantic perspective can potentially complement both content- and process-oriented psychological approaches to this disorder.

Human language offers rich ways to track, compare, and engage the attentional and epistemic states of interlocutors. While this task is central to everyday communication, our knowledge of the cross-linguistic grammatical means that target such intersubjective coordination has remained basic. In two serialised papers, we introduce the term ‘engagement’ to refer to grammaticalised means for encoding the relative mental directedness of speaker and addressee towards an entity or state of affairs, and describe examples of engagement systems from around the world. Engagement systems express the speaker’s assumptions about the degree to which their attention or knowledge is shared (or not shared) by the addressee. Engagement categories can operate at the level of entities in the here-and-now (deixis), in the unfolding discourse (definiteness vs indefiniteness), entire event-depicting propositions (through markers with clausal scope), and even metapropositions (potentially scoping over evidential values). In this first paper, we introduce engagement and situate it with respect to existing work on intersubjectivity in language. We then explore the key role of deixis in coordinating attention and expressing engagement, moving through increasingly intercognitive deictic systems from those that focus on the the location of the speaker, to those that encode the attentional state of the addressee.

Engagement systems encode the relative accessibility of an entity or state of affairs to the speaker and addressee, and are thus underpinned by our social cognitive capacities. In our first foray into engagement (Part 1), we focused on specialised semantic contrasts as found in entity-level deictic systems, tailored to the primal scenario for establishing joint attention. This second paper broadens out to an exploration of engagement at the level of events and even metapropositions, and comments on how such systems may evolve. The languages Andoke and Kogi demonstrate what a canonical system of engagement with clausal scope looks like, symmetrically assigning ‘knowing’ and ‘unknowing’ values to speaker and addressee. Engagement is also found cross-cutting other epistemic categories such as evidentiality, for example where a complex assessment of relative speaker and addressee awareness concerns the source of information rather than the proposition itself. Data from the language Abui reveal that one way in which engagement systems can develop is by upscoping demonstratives, which normally denote entities, to apply at the level of events. We conclude by stressing the need for studies that focus on what difference it makes, in terms of communicative behaviour, for intersubjective coordination to be managed by engagement systems as opposed to other, non-grammaticalised means.