Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 March 2017
I suggest that the Stereotype Rationality Hypothesis (Jussim 2012) is only partially right. I agree it is rational to rely on stereotypes, but in the complexity of real world social interactions, most of our individuating information invokes additional stereotypes. Despite assumptions to the contrary, there is reason to think theory of mind is not accurate, and social psychology's denial of stereotype accuracy led us toward mindreading/theory of mind – a less accurate account of how we understand other people.
Target article
Précis of Social Perception and Social Reality: Why accuracy dominates bias and self-fulfilling prophecy
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Author response
Accuracy, bias, self-fulfilling prophecies, and scientific self-correction