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More stereotypes, please! The limits of ‘theory of mind’ and the need for further studies on the complexity of real world social interactions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 March 2017

Kristin Andrews*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto, M6H3N8, Canada. [email protected]://kristin-andrews.weebly.com/

Abstract

I suggest that the Stereotype Rationality Hypothesis (Jussim 2012) is only partially right. I agree it is rational to rely on stereotypes, but in the complexity of real world social interactions, most of our individuating information invokes additional stereotypes. Despite assumptions to the contrary, there is reason to think theory of mind is not accurate, and social psychology's denial of stereotype accuracy led us toward mindreading/theory of mind – a less accurate account of how we understand other people.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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References

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