At least some ancient civilizations used various risk-management strategies to minimize price volatility. In this article, we examine one such strategy, grain storage, by means of a dataset recently made available that provides agricultural prices for Babylonia during the Late Achaemenid and Hellenistic periods (c.400–65 BCE). A comparative analysis of medieval England and Hellenistic Babylonia reveals a low level of inter-annual storage in both economies, and helps us to compare the costs and benefits in each society. Costs are largely equated with interest rates, and benefits with seasonal price changes. Unlike in England, Babylonia’s dual crop structure (barley and dates) reduced seasonality and thus the potential benefits of storage. There is no evidence, however, that storage costs – that is, interest rates – were likewise lower. This suggests that interest rates were primarily determined in the urban and commercial sectors, not the agricultural one. Consequently, measures of seasonal price changes in pre-modern economies may tell us relatively little about interest rates. While the McCloskey–Nash methodology may be helpful in analysing particular economies, it is perhaps of limited use for comparing them.

During the seventeenth century, the East India Company (EIC) was a minor power in South Asia, repeatedly defeated in battle. However, this changed rapidly, beginning in the 1750s, as the EIC started projecting power from its coastal enclaves into the interior. One after other, the indigenous powers were defeated and destroyed. This article argues that the EIC’s military success was not merely the result of importing the military institutions that emerged in western Europe: there was no military revolution in early modern South Asia. Rather, the EIC blended imported British military institutions and techniques with South Asia’s indigenous military traditions, creating a hybrid military establishment in which South Asian manpower, animals, and economic resources were crucial. The article focuses on the construction of the EIC’s military establishment by concentrating on three spheres: military technology, manpower management, and logistics.

This article examines the political and cultural contexts of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. These two League of Nations bodies were charged with fostering international understanding through the promotion of educational, scientific, and cultural exchange. Whereas previous studies have revealed the institutional and diplomatic processes that shaped these bodies, the present article considers their intellectual genealogies and trajectories. Adopting a transnational perspective, it argues that the multi-layered quest for order is central to understanding intellectual cooperation in the interwar years. This concern was reflected in the role of cultural relations within the post-war order, and in the aim of strengthening intellectuals’ position in the social order (both through legal instruments and through new tools for ‘intellectual labour’).

The United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (TAA) was the world organization’s main body for development advice throughout the 1950s. In technical assistance, the UN found a global mission at a time when its peace and security functions seemed ineffective. Technical assistance experts preached the need for less developed countries to plan and modernize. This process has been studied with regard to American modernization theory, but the important role of the UN as an autonomous diplomatic actor has been less visible. The UN was a relatively acceptable source of technical assistance for many governments. Among them was Indonesia, which welcomed UN help for its State Planning Bureau. TAA aid to the Planning Bureau advanced the interests of both organizations but both failed to institutionalize themselves enough to survive the decade. Both, however, left important legacies: the TAA for UN development thinking, and the Planning Bureau for the Indonesian developmentalist state.

Two crucial terms in discussions about racial or ethnic relations – ‘discrimination’ and ‘integration’ – first appeared in official French documents in the 1950s. They quickly became key references in the government’s pioneering efforts, in response to the Algerian revolution, to recognize the importance and fight against the effects of French racism on ‘Muslim French citizens from Algeria’. This policy was named ‘integrationism’; its premises and measures had overseas inspirations and it was bureaucrats from an international organization who made such policy models available for French adoption. All of this was possible because of transnational networks of social scientists, which included some who helped author them as well as others who studied and wrote about them. More specifically, it was projects and claims from Mexico that provided the most direct references for French integrationist policies and it was through the efforts of UNESCO that French integrationists gained detailed knowledge about them.