Commentary on creativity and curiosity

Abstract

The target article covers a large amount of ground and offers a provocative perspective. This commentary focuses on (a) assumptions, namely that there are discrete stages in the creative process and that novelty and usefulness are inextricable, (b) hidden variables in the creativity–curiosity relationship, and (c) the difference between an explanation of creativity versus a description of influence on it.

Science advances as data are collected and theories built. Meaningful data are empirically reliable. Useful theories are consistent with data, coherent, and comprehensive. Ivancovsky et al. cite empirical findings on tolerance, novelty, openness, cognitive control, attention, and more, as they build a theory to explain the relationship of creativity with curiosity (C&C). The theory is consistent with data and is comprehensive. There are, however, several assumptions. They may be safe assumptions, but those assumptions should be recognized for what they are, namely, claims with some support but also some uncertainty.

Consider in this regard the idea that the usefulness of an idea or solution is only found after novelty. Following Wallas (1926), the creative process has almost always been described as sequential (with stages). Thus the assumption made by Ivancovsky et al. is neither surprising nor risky. Still, care must be taken when extricating what is involved in creativity. Even if stages can be isolated, that may not be the way creativity actually operates in the natural environment. Consider the claim, “problem solvers must also find a way to manage usefulness after establishing novelty” (target article, sect. 5.1, para. 4). This implies clear separation. In reality the process may be iterative (Runco, 1994).

To their credit Ivancovsky et al. “hope that the theoretical framework proposed here may apply to curiosity and creativity ‘in the wild’” (target article, sect. 1, para. 2). They are thus aware of controlled research versus the natural environment (which is what I assume they mean by “in the wild”). Perhaps this is why one of the citations ostensibly supporting the novelty-usefulness separation (Berg, 2014) is a book about “Commerce and creativity in eighteenth-century Birmingham.” Litchfield's (2008) study of brainstorming is also cited as support for the claim that usefulness follows novelty. Yet quite a bit of evidence suggests that brainstorming is not entirely successful (Rickards & deCock, 2003). This may be because of the difficulty people have when postponing evaluation (which usually focuses on whether or not an idea is useful) while working in groups. Very likely, the creativity that occurs in the natural environment involves iteration, whereby the individual thinks of an idea, and then evaluates it, and uses that evaluation to find a second idea, and then evaluates it, and so on.

There is even a possibility that originality and usefulness are simultaneous and depend on one process (i.e., the creativity process)! Ivancovsky et al. believe that novelty and usefulness “require different abilities” (target article, sect. 5.1, para. 4), but it is not farfetched to think that ideas are produced only if they are somehow relevant to the task at hand. The human mind may very well generate ideas that are simultaneously rather than sequentially original and useful (Runco, 2010). Most models view them as sequential (e.g., Campbell, 1960; Simonton, 2023) but the simultaneous possibility has not been ruled out.

Novelty (or originality) and usefulness are required by the standard definition of creativity (Runco & Jaeger, 2012). Originality presumably results from idea generation and usefulness from evaluation. The assumption here is that “usefulness refers to the practical qualities, acceptance by other people, and adherence to cultural norms” (target article, sect. 5.1, para. 4). That is not accurate. Creativity is often personal (Runco, 2019), and when it is, usefulness is independent of acceptance by other people. The same holds for most of everyday creativity (Richards, 2007). Further, usefulness varies from domain to domain. In the arts, it is often an aesthetic usefulness and unrelated to practical function or norms.

It would help if the explanations uniquely explained C&C. Supposedly C&C “act similarly across multiple domains, reflecting their proposed connection” (target article, sect. 2, para. 1), but there are other things that act similarly across domains (e.g., persistence, openness). Then there are “the same brain regions [which] are involved in both curiosity and creativity” (target article, abstract). This assumes localization, so the authors quickly acknowledge “an interplay” involving the default, salience, and executive control networks, but those too are not uniquely devoted to C&C. This also does little to support their interdependency.

These illustrations imply a parallel with correlational research where X and Y are related to one another but only because they are both dependent on Z. Ivancovsky et al. are quite close to this situation when they discuss the reward regions in the brain, and closer still with “curiosity and creativity rely on shared attentional mechanisms” (target article, sect. 2.3, para. 1). The word “rely” implies that attention is vital, but what of the creative breakthroughs found when the individual incubates and attends to something other than the problem? Even if both C&C rely on attention, in the case of creativity, attention is probably like motivation (Amabile, 1990; de Jesus, Rus, Lens, & Imaginário, 2013): It is involved up front and no unique to creativity.

Ivancovsky et al. also assume that creativity is dependent on knowledge. This too not a bad assumption. It is in line with various theories, and there are supporting data. There are, however, alternative possibilities which have not been entirely refuted. Emergence, nonlinear thinking, and assimilation may each provide new insights without relying on the recombination of existing knowledge (Runco, 2023). Sure, they are difficult to test (Schaeffer, Miranda, & Koyejo, 2023). It may not be an either/or situation, given that knowledge is retained in memory, and memory can itself be constructive, meaning that new elements may be introduced. Episodic memory sometimes adds new material to memory, for instance, filling in the gaps between bits of actual experiences. Fabrication is not uncommon.

Is this theory of curiosity more compelling than models of intrinsic motivation (Amabile, 1990; de Jesus et al., 2013)? Either way, all we have is a partial explanation. Curious individuals may be persistent and direct efforts toward novelty and the other things required for creativity, but to say that people are creative because they are curious does not explain how the mind creates. It probably creates using divergent thinking, insight, and perhaps nonlinear or emergent processes. These are brought to bear on problems because of the curiosity or intrinsic motivation, but there are other requirements. This is why creativity is described as a complex (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988) or syndrome (MacKinnon, 1965). Curiosity at most tells us why, not how.