Any American hard hat or British miner would understand. Solidarity is the name of their union game. Alone each worker is nothing; together, over the decades, the unions have forced a redistribution of wealth, have shaken governments. The nations of Africa are new at the game. On the broader, world field they too recognize the power of unity. They too would redistribute wealth—on a world scale. But can economic solidarity, a “trade union” of African nations, inject cement into the shifting sands of their dubious political unity? That is the big question hanging over the continent.

Seoul: The methods of torture employed in the headquarters of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency or the rival National Security Command may be among the most varied, if not original, in Asia. There is, for instance, what is known as “putting a man on an airplane”—tying the victim by his hands and feet, dangling him by a rope from a propeller-like blade attached to the ceiling, and setting the contraption to spinning wildly. Then there is the “Genghis Khan treatment”—the trick of placing the accused over a fire or stove until he screams out his confession. “Or sometimes they lock the man in a glass room, with the floor, ceilings, and walls made of glass, and turn on bright electric lights from all sides,” says a young informant. “The man goes crazy from the light.”

On June 9, 1968, the New York Times Magazine published an article by Dr. Michael Halberstam that raised and examined the question, “Are You Guilty of Murdering Martin Luther King?” The question was addressed to all white Americans, and it presupposed a concept of collective or corporate white guilt. It was prompted by a. particular event, but its application was not limited to that event. As the question itself implied and Halberstam's argument made clear, the question applied to problems of white guilt and white racism as collective phenomena in the whole history of black-white relationships.

The question was not unique at that time, for collective guilt had emerged as a fairly common aspect of social protest.

The significance of the Egyptian-Israeli interim agreement of 1975 is less in its specifications than in its implications, and these, as matters stand, are by no means clear. If the disengagement generates momentum toward further, more substantial agreements and toward a general settlement, Dr. Kissinger's diplomacy will be vindicated as successful and farsighted. If, on the other hand, the agreement becomes an excuse for Israeli intransigence, extremism on the part of one or more of the Arab parties, and a holiday from statesmanship during the forthcoming American political season, the Sinai accord will stand—depending upon events—as something between a futile exercise and an outright disaster.