This paper develops the concept of transience of (in)formality to refer to the intersection of formal and informal negotiating procedures in the WTO decision-making system. It argues that both formal and informal negotiating processes are essential for delivering negotiating outcomes in the WTO. Particularly, the article assesses how informal negotiating practices emerge within the WTO formal framework and align with it. The analysis highlights how negotiating practices (re)shape existing norms, both formal and informal, adapting the WTO to overcome challenges and meet current needs. It also disputes legal formalistic perspectives that permeate trade literature and offer limited accounts of Members' agency in the WTO. The paper uses the Joint Initiatives as a case study to illustrate the convergence between formality and informality and a possible way ahead for the WTO negotiations. By broadening the understanding of law-making, it contributes to the discussion on WTO reform. It provides alternatives that reflect the reality of WTO negotiations and underlines the institution's relevance.

The EU has introduced a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which extends its carbon prices to imported products in some sectors. Increasingly considered by other countries, such border carbon adjustments (BCAs) are facing a global backlash against the lack of consideration of the adverse impacts on developing countries and particularly, least developed countries (LDCs). This article first argues that small overall import volumes support the conclusion that exempting or lessening BCA requirements from LDCs would not undermine developed countries' climate-related objectives in practical terms. An economic analysis of EU and UK trade in relation to a CBAM supports this assertion. However, legally, such an exemption or development-based preferential treatment is difficult under existing multilateral trade rules and jurisprudence, owing to the legal characterization and objectives of BCAs; their interaction with existing special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions; and complexity of available policy options. We thus highlight the gap between normative aims of SDT provisions to support development, and current WTO law and jurisprudence which expose WTO members providing preferential treatment to allegations of discrimination. With increasing unilateral climate action, an inability to integrate SDT more meaningfully into WTO non-discrimination frameworks risks further weakening of international cooperation on climate and trade.

The TPP Agreement – now CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement) – is, by any measure, a central part of the emerging global trade policy framework. To the author's surprise, it survived the decision of the United States to withdraw after USTR Mike Froman had signed the Agreement in Auckland 2015 on behalf of the US. Today, it incorporates 12 economies including leading G20 economies such as Japan, Mexico, Canada, Australia, and the UK, its most recent entrant. Six other economies, including most importantly, China, the world's second largest economy, are now applying for membership. What began between Singapore and New Zealand – a conscious strategic decision on their part to try to incentivize precisely this process of Asia-Pacific regional integration in 1999 – is now clearly a major part of the global geopolitical chessboard.