This compliance proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU concerned measures taken by the United States to implement the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in US–Tuna II (Mexico). In US–Tuna II (Mexico), the DSB found that certain US measures concerning the importation, marketing, and sale of tuna products (taken together, the Original Tuna Measure) were inconsistent with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the TBT Agreement). The Original Tuna Measure, inter alia, contained conditions under which tuna products could be labelled ‘dolphin safe’. The United States' measure taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB consisted of an amendment to the Original Tuna Measure (the 2013 Final Rule). The Appellate Body generally referred to the Original Tuna Measure, together with the 2013 Final Rule, as the Amended Tuna Measure. The Amended Tuna Measure was the focus of this compliance proceeding.

This study examines how US discretionary practices developed in the past decade have affected antidumping duty rates against exporters. Using the most recent data on dumping margin calculations, we find that the US Department of Commerce (DOC) has developed discretionary practices in a more nuanced manner to inflate dumping margins, which have primarily targeted market economy exporters. Our case studies document that practices known as targeted dumping and particular market situations appear to serve as trade protectionism for market economy exporters, especially those who could otherwise have received a negative determination without such practices. Furthermore, the DOC has brought an apparent change in its application of discretionary practices after the Trade Extension Preferences Act of 2015, leading to much higher dumping margins for the market economy. Along with empirical and case analyses, we further examine the World Trade Organization (WTO) jurisprudence concerning the extent to which the discretion of an investigating authority in anti-dumping proceedings can be condoned in the WTO.

This paper examines how to make inferences from econometric models prepared for antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard investigations. Analysis of these models has typically entailed drawing inferences from point estimates that are significantly different from zero at a fixed level of confidence. This paper suggests a more flexible approach of drawing inferences using confidence intervals at various significance levels and reporting p-values for the relevant test of injury. Use of confidence intervals and p-values to identify insights and data patterns would have more impact on USITC trade remedy determinations than definitive conclusions about injury based on whether estimates are statistically significant.

The dispute concerns an anti-dumping duty, imposed in 2011 by the European Union, on imports of certain fatty alcohols and their blends originating in India, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Fatty alcohols are mainly used in the production of detergents and surfactants. They are also components of cosmetics, foods, and as industrial solvents. With respect to Indonesia, the anti-dumping duties were imposed primarily on two investigated companies, Ecogreen and Musim Mas. After the initial application of the anti-dumping duty, the Commission revised the determination in the light of an intervening judgment of the European Court of Justice that had addressed an issue of significance to an issue raised during the fatty alcohols investigation. As a result of that revision, the Commission removed a cost adjustment for one of the companies (Ecogreen), but not the other company (Musim Mas). The measure ultimately expired in the fall of 2016, at the very end of the WTO panel proceedings.

Indonesia challenged two measures of the United States' (US): first, the imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties (CVDs) on certain coated paper from Indonesia. In particular, Indonesia challenged certain aspects of the US States Department of Commerce (USDOC) final determination ‘as applied’ in its CVD investigation on certain coated paper from Indonesia, and the US International Trade Commission's (USCIT) final threat of injury determination regarding subsidized and dumped imports from Indonesia and China. Second, Indonesia challenged ‘as such’ Section 711(11)(B) of the US Tariff Act. In particular, Indonesia challenged the use of this provision in affirmative threat of injury determinations.

As an integral part of the WTO trading regime and in line with the international trend of antitrust control, TRIPS harmonized intellectual property protection with competition in mind. However, diverse national FRAND enforcement practices that take either a contractual or an antitrust approach challenge TRIPS integrity. While personal property recognition for SEPs lends constitutional support to the contractual approach to FRAND enforcement, private property's in-built limitation warrants a balance with the antitrust approach for needs from others. A critical examination of the TRIPS conclusion and the analytical structure of TRIPS provisions reveal that TRIPS obligation against anticompetitive practices is imperative. The imbalance of harmonized TRIPS with un-harmonized FRAND practices reflects TRIPS birth defect and challenges TRIPS integrity. To improve balance of rights and obligations in international trade and to ensure innovation and technology dissemination that is conducive to social and economic welfare, the paper calls for a contract–antitrust balanced approach to FRAND enforcement and the resumption of WTO's competition negotiations.

These compliance proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU concerned measures adopted by the United States to comply with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) recommendations and rulings in US – COOL. In US – COOL, the DSB found that a certain US country-of-origin labelling (COOL) measure regarding muscle cuts of meat (the Original COOL Measure), and the administration of that measure, were inconsistent with certain aspects of the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994. The United States' measure taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB consisted of an amendment to the Original COOL Measure (the 2013 Final Rule). In these compliance proceedings, the Panel and Appellate Body referred to the 2013 Final Rule, together with the Original COOL Measure, as the Amended COOL Measure. The Amended COOL Measure was the focus of these compliance proceedings.

Ranging from the denial of direct effect to WTO law by the Court of Justice to a WTO-friendly legislative culture currently booming in the EU's political institutions, different approaches towards WTO law have been adopted within the EU. This article classifies the different approaches into reactive, coactive, and proactive by drawing on their common characteristics. The principal aim is to explore the considerations shaping the development of the different approaches and to argue that these stem from the interaction between the judiciary and the legislature. In doing so, this article purports to provide a comprehensive view of the application of WTO law within the Community legal order.

Using econometric methods, this analysis develops quantity impacts of impediments to trade in voice telephone services, focusing on the perspective of negotiated agreements. These impacts, estimated on the basis of market, demographic, and policy variables, establish a baseline from which the achievements of future trade rounds, including the Doha Round, could be compared. In a departure from previous literature in this area, this article draws on documents appended or pertaining to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to identify barriers to trade in voice telephone services, and to estimate quantity impacts on this basis. The article finds that market access and national treatment commitments scheduled by WTO members under the GATS, when complemented by commitments to pro-competitive regulatory disciplines, may be formulated into meaningful policy variables. These policy variables are found to be statistically significant in explaining market penetration in voice telephone services, as are variables for income and private sector ownership.

On 16 March 2017, an International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal chaired by Professor Albert Jan van den Berg, with co-arbitrators Gary Born (Claimant's appointee) and Sir Daniel Bethlehem (Respondent's appointee), issued its award in Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada (Award). The Award dismissed all of Eli Lilly's claims and ordered it to pay the arbitration costs and 75% of Canada's legal costs and expenses.

This dispute concerned two measures of the European Union (EU): (i) the anti-dumping measure imposed by the EU on imports of biodiesel originating in Argentina; and (ii) the second subparagraph of Article 2(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (Basic Regulation). Argentina challenged various aspects of the anti-dumping measure on an ‘as applied’ basis, and challenged the second subparagraph of Article 2(5) of the Basic Regulation on an ‘as such’ basis.

The dispute concerns certain market price support measures by China to domestic agricultural producers of wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn, which the United States (US) claimed were inconsistent with China's obligations under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Specifically, the US considered that China utilized market price measures in the period 2012–2015 to support farmer incomes and increase production of the said agricultural products, but that this support was in excess of China's WTO commitments. At the outset, the Panel found that the support measures for Chinese corn producers had expired, and that there were no factors weighing in favor of making findings on this expired measure. So, no findings were made with respect to this claim.

The commonplace narrative regarding China's participation in the WTO is that the original expectations have not been matched in subsequent experience. China has not behaved in accordance with the spirit (and sometimes the letter) of its commitments. Reactions by trading partners have been from critical to hostile, and some have even called for a WTO without China, ignoring the boost to international trade that China's accession has provoked. Yet, China's participation in the WTO cannot remain un-addressed. The US almost brought the WTO to its knees largely because of China, and the EU has enacted laws to counteract China's trade expansion. In this short paper, we argue that the solution to the China-issue passes through an addition and re-invigoration of the multilateral trade rules.