The debt crisis has raised serious concerns about the future of democratic governance in Latin America. The prevailing assumption is not merely that economic decline undercuts prospects for democratic consolidation; because of their vulnerability to popular political pressures, democracies—particularly new democracies—have been seen as incapable of mounting effective policy responses to critical economic challenges. A comparative study of policy outcomes in Latin America since the outbreak of the debt crisis challenges this assumption. If we control for the magnitude of the debt burden at the outbreak of the crisis, no statistically significant differences emerge between democratic and authoritarian regimes, or between new democracies and more established regimes. The findings suggest that the conventional wisdom about democracy and economic crisis exaggerates the relationship between political regime characteristics and policy choice, and fundamentally misconstrues the strengths and weaknesses of liberal democratic forms of governance.

The nature of insurgencies is an ambiguous concept. As a step toward theory about it and prudent action in regard to it, the authors argue that insurgency should be regarded as a syncretic phenomenon—a highly potent compound that combines the “spirit” of archaic peasant rebellions (their apocalyptic, millenarian passions) with modern revolutionary ideologies and organization, and the practice of guerrilla warfare. Insurgency thus supplies both the “steam” and the “piston box” that Trotsky considered an irresistible revolutionary combination. The syncretic mix of disparate elements in insurgency has stood in the way of proper conceptualization of the phenomenon, and of good theory and practice regarding it. The authors further maintain that insurgency is generally confused with the Latin American foco as well as with urban terrorism and guerrilla wars of all kinds; in fact thefoco may well foreshadow the end of insurgencies as a special type of collective political violence.

Conventional wisdom holds that the success of Gorbachev's domestic reforms would probably enhance Western security, but that there is nothing the West can do to make this outcome more likely. This conventional wisdom is right on the first count, but wrong on the second. The author supports his conclusion by three bodies of evidence: the effect of the international environment on the domestic politics of great powers in general over the past century; the history of the Soviet Union in particular; and the current constellation of political forces in Gorbachev's Russia.

The transfer of power through the use of military force is a commonplace event in world affairs. Although no two coups d'etat are alike, they all have a common denominator: poverty. We analyze political and economic data from 121 countries during the period 1950–1982 and find that the probability of a government's being overthrown by a coup is significantly influenced by the level of economic well-being. Thus, even authoritarian governments have powerful incentives to promote economic growth, not out of concern for the welfare of their citizens, but because poor economic performance may lead to their removal by force. When the simultaneity of low income and coups is accounted for, we find that the aftereffects of a coup include a heritage of political instability in the form of an increased likelihood of further coups. Although the effect of income on coups is pronounced, we find little evidence of feedback from coups to income growth.

There is no consensus among scholars on how to test hypotheses about deterrence systematically. The disputes are sometimes rooted in differences about theory or sources of data, but they are magnified by methodological confusion, especially over concepts and operational definitions that produce perverse empirical results. Serious theoretical errors include inadequate appreciation of the role of uncertainty in deterrence as well as selection biases that undermine empirical tests. Rigorous examination of our previous work in light of recent criticism discloses very robust findings on the conditions for deterrence success and failure.

This essay makes four points: (1) despite the assertions of some of their proponents, static game-theoretic and optimal-tariff arguments suggest that states should not undertake hegemonic responsibilities to maintain an open trading system; (2) hegemonic states have, in fact, cooperated with others, despite risks to themselves; (3) Japan, the hegemonic successor or condominial associate of the United States in the years to come, is also likely to cooperate to prevent the collapse of the international trading system. This means (4) that hegemonic or near-hegemonic powers have either acted irrationally or that their calculations have rested upon a different and more dynamic rational foundation. Specifically, systemic as well as domestic considerations have influenced their thinking and determined their policies. A major creditor power like Japan must find means of allowing others to earn surpluses in its own market or of providing assistance on concessional terms.

Empirical analyses of deterrence have paid insufficient attention to the validity and reliability of the data used to test the central propositions of theories of deterrence. This article examines two prominent studies of immediate extended deterrence that do not deal adequately with the problems inherent in constructing a valid data set for quantitative analysis. The problems are particularly acute in the testing of theories of deterrence because of the difficulties in identifying cases of deterrence success and of inferring the intentions of would-be challengers. Our analysis explores these problems and suggests ways of testing theories of deterrence that can reduce the threats to valid inference.

“New thinking” in Soviet foreign policy may change Soviet understanding of the nature of conflict in the third world, Soviet interests in those conflicts, and therefore Soviet conflict behavior. While these shifts are widespread and significant, they are being resisted by military analysts, which indicates that Soviet policy may not be so easily or directly altered. Many military writers accept that escalation risks are extreme and threaten Soviet security, and others discuss local, nonclass, and intractable features of third-world conflicts. However, military analysts do not accept revisionist, class-transcendent definitions of Soviet internationalist duty. It is on this point that new thinking is most likely to founder in Gorbachev's attempts to change Soviet third-world policy and behavior. With the changes in Soviet domestic politics, military participation in security and foreign policy debates may be effective in restraining the more radical innovations implied in civilian analyses.

The author examines the hypothesis that U.S. Soviet policy is largely driven by electoral considerations rather than by the shifting nature of the Soviet challenge. He combines historical and quantitative analysis to probe the forces that shape these electoral calculations as well as the manner in which they manifest themselves at various stages of the electoral cycle. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the domestic determinants of America's Soviet policy for the USSR's own foreign policy behavior.

Recent writing on the rapid growth of the East Asian newly industrializing countries—Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—has been dominated by an institutionalist perspective that focuses on the “strength” of the state vis-à-vis societal actors. A study of Korea's stabilization efforts in the 1980s underlines the importance of organizational factors in explaining policy outcomes, but also suggests important limits on institutionalist arguments. These include the absence of unique institutional solutions for political problems and the indeterminacy of institutional configuration with respect to the economic efficiency of policy. A focus on characteristics of the state alone can overlook the organizational resources of societal actors and the interest of politicians in building bases of support even in “strong” states.

This essay discusses the social background and career experiences of a previously unstudied group of Chinese elites: the mayors of Chinese cities. The data are compared with available information on basic-level leaders and higher-ranking cadres. China's mayors are relatively young, have not been in their posts very long, are college graduates (usually majoring in engineering), and quite often are mayors in cities in their native provinces. This last finding is counter to all Chinese bureaucratic practice dating back to the early empires. The authors relate these characteristics to broader developments in the Chinese political system. In particular, localism and elitism are reinforced by China's new mayoral elite; furthermore, the patterns identified appear to contribute to growing political immobilism in China.

Soviet-American disarmament negotiations of the mid-1950s provide a critical case for evaluating theories of cooperation such as Tit-for-Tat and GRIT. Although both sides were close to agreement on the main terms of a treaty by May 1955, the negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful. On the basis of declassified U.S. documents, it now appears that the U.S. did not favor an agreement at the time: thus the game was not Prisoners' Dilemma, but Deadlock. The case reinforces the criticism of Tit-for-Tat that its unitary actor assumption ignores domestic second-image pressures for arming, and it also calls into question “first-image” explanations, such as GRIT, that focus on individual cognitive barriers to cooperation. The importance of understanding the links between internal political coalitions and external bargaining strategies is emphasized.

The literature on international political economy explains foreign economic policies by integrating systemic, state, and societal features. Theoretical approaches to national security, however, have tended to extract the state from its societal context. An adequate conceptualization of security policy must integrate both systemic forces and the domestic political economy.

One way of integrating these concerns is by examining the state's strategies for mobilizing those financial, productive, and human resources considered necessary for national security.

This article examines the political economy of the state's mobilization of resources for national security, called “war preparation,” and proposes a framework for investigation that consists of three elements: (i) the objectives of state managers, (2) the constraints on the state, and (3) the policies of the state for mobilizing its required resources. Based upon these considerations, some tendencies in the government's war preparation strategies are suggested. The utility of this framework is explored through an empirical examination of Israel between 1967 and 1977. The study demonstrates how Israel's war preparation strategies were shaped by the state's domestic and security objectives, the domestic political economy, and systemic constraints and opportunities.

This article explores the parameters of choice available to small developing countries within the constraints imposed by the international economic system. Its thesis is that, since the 1930s, world economic recessions have helped accelerate waves of social discontent, political instability, and repression within the Central American nations. It concludes that international economic crisis was a necessary but not sufficient condition to exacerbate political instability in all countries. The thesis was supported in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama (which entered the 1930s with traditional authoritarian regimes) and rejected for Costa Rica (which began with a democratic regime). The article also discusses the dynamics of leadership transfer in the region and makes policy recommendations about how to minimize the negative impact of world economic cycles on small countries.

This essay explores the relationship between deterrence theory and two distinct notions of rationality associated with it. The author argues that the concept of procedural irrationality, which is the basis of many critiques of contemporary deterrence theory, is not necessarily inconsistent with the instrumental definition of rationality implicit in many models of deterrence. He also argues that some recent rational choice models of deterrence are, nonetheless, deficient in their application of the rationality postulate. Finally, he provides an outline of a possible resolution of the paradox of deterrence.

Under the banner of “1992,” the European Communities aim to remove all barriers to the movement of persons, capital, and goods among the member countries. The 1992 movement comprises a set of bargains among European elites. Structural change (relative U.S. decline and Japanese ascent) provoked a rethinking of European roles and interests. The 1992 project emerged as a response because of: (1) the policy leadership exercised by the Commission of the European Communities, with support from a transnational business coalition; and (2) a changed domestic political context in several key countries—specifically, the failure of previous national economic strategies and the transformation of the left. The changes under way will alter regional business competition and politics and will affect the world economic system.

The historical clustering of the transitions to democracy of Spain, Portugal, and Greece—all having taken place in the mid-1970s—encourages scholars to search for common causes, patterns, and paths of development. But important differences remain between the cases. Analytical distinctions include the difference between state and regime, and the contrast between regime crises of failure and crises of historical obsolescence. These distinctions make it possible to delineate divergent causes, actors, trajectories, and outcomes for the three cases of redemocratization.

The party-state apparatus's structure, which makes it incapable of implementing systemic reforms, is a principal source of resistance to Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of radical reconstruction (perestroika) in the USSR. This apparatus took form in the struggle to subdue the peasantry in the 1930s. Its basic means for managing agricultural production (and, to some extent, industrial production as well), is the mobilizational campaign. But campaigns are by nature intermittent and thus ineffective at eliciting subtle, long-term changes in organizational or individual behavior. For perestroika to succeed, alternative instruments for policy implementation which offer effective political and economic incentives for increased production must be developed. Despite its pervasiveness and intrusiveness, the Soviet state is incapable of effectively implementing many kinds of change in society. In that sense, it is a “weak state.”

This article examines three models—moral economy, rational choice, and class structure—that have been applied to rebellions and revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia. All three are found lacking in various ways and unable to provide convincing explanations for the growth and continuing strength of the contemporary revolutionary movement in the Philippines. The Aquino government is challenged by a movement that has a mass base of roughly ten million and fields a fighting force of twenty thousand to twenty-five thousand men and women. It is active in virtually every province and city of the nation. Based on the present case study, suggestions are made both for ways in which the insights of extant theories can be synthesized and ways in which these theories must be revised if they are to be made more generally applicable to today's revolutions.

The immediate causes of the current crisis in socialism are the highly authoritarian and extremely hierarchical political and economic structures created by Leninism. Yet the collapse of state socialism also appears to be part of a more general crisis of socialism, a crisis that includes even its potentially more democratic variants. At the core of this broader crisis lies the diminishing appeal of the publicly owned enterprise, an institution that has always been central to the very definition of socialism, but whose economic advantages are called into question by the recent and rapid development of global markets in factors of production and especially in assets. Consequently, communism's demise by no means signifies a victory for either democratic socialism or even social democracy.