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Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social Change in Post-Mao China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Cheng Li  and
David Bachman
Cheng Li
Affiliation:
Princeton University
David Bachman
Affiliation:
Princeton University
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Abstract

This essay discusses the social background and career experiences of a previously unstudied group of Chinese elites: the mayors of Chinese cities. The data are compared with available information on basic-level leaders and higher-ranking cadres. China's mayors are relatively young, have not been in their posts very long, are college graduates (usually majoring in engineering), and quite often are mayors in cities in their native provinces. This last finding is counter to all Chinese bureaucratic practice dating back to the early empires. The authors relate these characteristics to broader developments in the Chinese political system. In particular, localism and elitism are reinforced by China's new mayoral elite; furthermore, the patterns identified appear to contribute to growing political immobilism in China.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 42 , Issue 1 , October 1989 , pp. 64 - 94
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1989

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References

1 Tsou, Tang, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), xxivGoogle Scholar and passim.

2 For some exceptions, see Cheng, Li and White, Lynn, “The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizers to Managers,” Asian Survey 28 (April 1988), 371–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lee, Hong Yung, “China's 12th Central Committee: Rehabilitated Cadres and Technocrats,” Asian Survey 23 (June 1983), 673–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mills, William deB., “Generational Change in China,” Problems of Communism 32 (November-December 1983), 16–35.Google Scholar

3 See Renmin ribao, Beijing (Overseas edition), October 28, 1988, p. 1, and Wang, Ting, “An Analysis of the P.R.C.'s Future Elite: The Third Echelon,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 4 (Summer 1985), 19–37.Google Scholar

4 For the data on ministers, governors, and provincial secretaries, see China aktuell (Hamburg), November 1987, 23–24. Three leaders were appointed before 1982: Wang Bingqian (Minister of Finance) and Yang Rudai (first party secretary of Sichuan province) in 1980; Mao Zhiyong (first party secretary of Hunan province), who was appointed in 1977, was recently transferred to Jiangxi. For the data on the new central committee of the CCP, see China News Analysis (Hong Kong), No. 1347, November 15, 1987, p. 3.

5 Hu Qili and Li Ruihuan served as mayors of Tianjin; Jiang Zemin served as mayor of Shanghai; and Wan Li served as vice mayor of Beijing.

6 In our list, for example, Wu Guanzheng, mayor of Wuhan, was recently promoted to governor of Jiangxi; Zhang Renxia, mayor of Tonglin, Anhui province, was recently promoted to vice governor of Anhui; and Ren Qixing, mayor of Shezhuishan, Ningxia, was recently appointed vice governor of Ningxia.

7 One provocative interpretation in this vein is Xizhe, Wang, “Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution,” in Chan, Anita, Rosen, Stanley, and Unger, Jonathan, eds., On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal System (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), 177–259.Google Scholar

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9 The number and population of cities are found in Statistical Yearbook of China, 1986 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 74Google Scholar; for rural population under urban control, see p. 58.

10 Qualitative studies of local leaders and studies of elites in individual cities and provinces have been undertaken, but no analysis of broad sub-provincial elites has been done. See Michel Oksenberg, “Local Leaders in Rural China, 1962–1965: Individual Attributes, Bureaucratic Positions, and Political Recruitment,” and K., Ying-mao, “The Urban Bureaucratic Elite in Communist China: A Case Study of Wuhan, 1949–1965,” both in Barnett, A. Doak, ed., Communist Chinese Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 155–215Google Scholar and 216–67, respectively; Victor C. Falkenheim, “Provincial Leadership in Fukien: 1949–1966,” and White, Lynn T. III, “Leadership in Shanghai, 1955–69,” both in Scalapino, Robert A., ed., Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 199–244Google Scholar and 302–377, respectively; Teiwes, Frederick C., Provincial Party Personnel in Mainland China, 1956–1966 (New York: Occasional Paper of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1967)Google Scholar.

11 On top national leaders, see Li and White (fn. 2); for a sample survey of grass-roots cadres, see Guansan, Yang, Bin, Lin, Hansheng, Wang, and Quhui, Wu, “Dangqian woguo qiye ganbu suzhi de diaocha yu chubu fenxi” [Survey and preliminary analysis of enterprise Cadres of China], in Research Group of Chinese Economic System Reform Research Institute (comp. and ed.), Gaige: women mianlin de tiaochan yu xuanze [Reform: challenges and choices before us] (Beijing: Chinese Economy Press, 1986), 270–305Google Scholar; for an English abridgement, see Guansan, Yang et al. , “Enterprise Cadres and Reform,” in Reynolds, Bruce, ed., Reform in China: Challenges and Choices (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), 74–85.Google Scholar

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13 There were 324 Chinese cities in 1986, but the almanac provides information on only 247 persons. All but two of them are full mayors: Diwangker is vice mayor of Xilinhaote, Neimenggu autonomous region, and Ding Shaomin is acting mayor of Wushun, Liaoning province. Data on Chinese mayors in earlier periods are not yet available; we were therefore unable to analyze changes over time.

14 The data are scrutinized by means of a Microsoft file system, which could not be reprinted with this essay for technical reasons. It is available from the authors on request.

15 See Li and White (fn. 2), 375, and Yang et al. (fn. 11), 271.

16 For a further discussion of “political generation,” see Garza, Rodolfo and Vaughan, David, “The Political Socialization of Chicano Elites: A Generational Approach,” Social Science Quarterly 65 (June 1984), 290–307;Google ScholarRintala, Marvin, The Constitution of Silence (West-port, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979)Google Scholar; Ting (fn. 3).

17 See Li and White (fn. 2), 376; Yang et al. (fn. 11), 271.

18 For earlier discussions of the origins of the CCP elites, see Houn, Franklin W., “The Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: A Study of an Eiile,” American Political Science Review 51 (June 1957), 396CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Domes, Jürgen, “The Ninth CCP Central Committee in Statistical Perspective,” Current Scene (Hong Kong) 9, No. 2 (1969), 7Google Scholar; Wong, Paul, China's Higher Leadership in the Socialist Transition (New York: The Free Press, 1976), 190–203Google Scholar; Scalapino (fn. 10).

19 Kau (fn. 10), 226.

20 The formula used for the calculation of the median tenure is:

This formula appears in Lyman Ott, Mendenhall, William, and Larson, Richard F., Statistics: A Tool for the Social Sciences, 2nd ed. (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1978), 97.Google Scholar

21 Our use of Gamma coefficients is based on Ott et al., ibid., 361–70. The formula of association Gamma is:

Ns, is the number of concordant pairs; Nr, is the number of discordant pairs.

22 We derive the concepts of “highest rank” and “fastest runner” from “highest office” and “fast runner”—two analytical tools used by Peter Smith and Ying-mao Kau respectively; our methodology is different from theirs, however. See Smith, , Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979), 106Google Scholar; Kau (fh. 10), 246.

23 Mayors of cities that have over 3 million population or are provincial capitals are ranked highest; mayors of cities with a population between 500,000 and 3 million are ranked in the middle; and mayors of cities with a population below 500,000 are ranked lowest.

24 Our method of ranking their positions on the fastest runner can be illustrated as follows:

25 This discussion is based on Smith (fn. 22), 107–8.

26 Ibid., 132. The terms small and middle cities do not have clear numerical referents.

27 Teiwes (fn. 10) documents the stability of provincial personnel between 1956 and 1966.

28 For further discussion, see Parris Chang, “Provincial Party Leaders' Strategies for Survival During the Cultural Revolution,” and Richard Baum, “Elite Behavior under Conditions of Stress: The Lessons of the ‘Tang-ch'uan P'ai’ in the Cultural Revolution,” both in Scalapino (fn. 10), 502–39 and 540–74, respectively; Goodman, David S. G., “Li Jingquan and the South-West Region, 1958–1966: The Life and ‘Crimes’ of a ‘Local Emperor,'” China Quarterly 81 (March 1981), 66–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moody, Peter R., “Policy and Power: The Career of T'ao Chu 1956–1966,” China Quarterly 54 (April-June 1973), 267–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 For further discussion, see Sung, George C. S., China's Regional Politics: A Biographical Approach (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, No. P5272, August 1974), 12Google Scholar; Bennett, Gordon, “Military Regions and Provincial Party Secretaries: One Outcome of China's Cultural Revolution,” China Quarterly 54 (April-June 1973), 294–357CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Teiwes, Frederick C., Provincial Leadership in China: The Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University East Asia Papers, No. 4, 1974)Google Scholar.

30 On the emergence of economic localism, see Naughton, Barry, “The Decline of Central Control over Investment in Post-Mao China,” in Lampton, David, ed., Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 51–80Google Scholar; Wong, Christine, “Material Allocation and Decentralization: The Impact of the Local Sector on Industrial Reform,” in Perry, Elizabeth J. and Wong, Christine, eds., The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China (Cambridge: Harvard Contemporary China Series, No. 2, 1985)Google Scholar; Lyons, Thomas P., Economic Integration and Planning in Maoist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)Google Scholar.

31 See Salem, Ellen, “Things Fall Apart, the Centre Cannot Hold,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 27, 1988Google Scholar, pp. 38–40.

31 Quoted from Zhonggong wenti ziliao zhoukan (Taipei) No. 339, November 7, 1988, p. 11; also see New York Times, December 11, 1988, p. 1.

33 Ziyang, Zhao, “Report to the Third Plenary Session of the 13th CCP Central Committee,” Beijing Review 31 (November 14–20, 1988)Google Scholar, p. III.

34 For Li Pan's detailed analysis of the problems caused by decentralization and localism, see Zhonggong wenti ziliao zhoukan (fn. 32), 11. Under the decentralization policy, local governments have the potential for both gain and loss. For example, according to the contract between the central government and the municipal government of Shanghai, the city is supposed to hand over a specific lump sum (10.5 billion yuan) to the central treasury annually; the city may retain any surplus. (Quoted from China News Analysis, no. 1363, July 1, 1988, p. 5.) This probably liberates Shanghai from burdens it has carried for decades. On the other hand, Shanghai also suffers from the rise of localism. For example, certain inland provinces were obliged under the national plan to sell 2,000 tons of raw materials to Shanghai in 1988 for processing, but the city actually only received 13 tons because the provinces kept the rest for their own factories. (See The New York, Times, December 16, 1988, p. A4.)

35 Salem (fn. 31), 39.

36 Kau (fn. 10), 229–30. For further discussion on the formation of imperial elites, see Ching-chien, Chang, Zhongguo wenguan zhidu shi [The history of the Chinese civil service system] (Taipei: Chinese Cultural Press, 1955)Google Scholar; and Tung-tsu, Chu, Local Government in China under the Ch'ing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962)Google Scholar.

37 Kau (fn. 10), 227.

38 Burns, John F., “China's Nomenklatura System,” Problems of Communism 36 (September October 1987), 36–51Google Scholar; Manion, Melanie, “The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao China,” China Quarterly 102 (June 1985), 203–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 Burns (fn. 38), 37–38 and 40–41.

40 Martin, Roberta, Party Recruitment in China: Patterns and Prospects (New York: Occasional Paper of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1981)Google Scholar.

41 See Statistical Yearbook of China, 1986 (fn. 9), 89.

42 For the original citation, see Xuesen, Qian, “On the World Fourth Industrial Revolution,” Shije jingji daobao, October 10, 1983, p. 2.Google Scholar

43 Yang et al. (fn. 11), 2.

44 A detailed discussion on the technocratic views of these new leaders and the origin of Chinese technocracy is in Li Cheng and Lynn White, “Elite Transformation and Social Transition in Mainland China and Taiwan: An Empirical Analysis of the Theory of Technocracy” (forthcoming).

45 See Tsou (fn. 1), 159. For a detailed study of the diversification of intellectuals in the post-Mao era, see Lynn White with Li Cheng, “Do Open Doors Open Minds? Reform and Intellectuals,” paper presented at the Seventeenth Sino-American Conference on Mainland China (Taipei, June 5–11, 1988); the revised version is titled “Diversification Among Chinese Intellectuals” (collection of the conference papers, forthcoming from Westview Press).

46 According to the PRC's 1982 census, only 4% of CCP members had a college degree. Most (52%) had received only a primary-school education or were illiterate.

47 Sternheimer, Stephen, “Modernizing Administrative Elites: The Making of Managers for Soviet Cities,” Comparative Politics 11 (July 1979), 405CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Blackwell, Robert E. Jr., “Elite Recruitment and Functional Change: An Analysis of the Soviet Obkom Elite 1950–1968,” Journal of Politics 34 (February 1972), 148.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

48 For further discussion of these phases, see Oommen, T. B., Prom Mobilization to Institutionalization (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1985)Google Scholar.

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52 The finest discussion of organizational structure and individual behavior in China (albeit in factory settings) is Walder, Andrew G., Communist Neotraditionalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

53 Chinese leaders are becoming increasingly concerned with localism. Hainan province recently promulgated regulations barring leading city and county officials from governing their native places. See Renmin Ribao (overseas ed.), May 10, 1989, p. 1.