In the already vast, and rapidly expanding, literature of political modernization, it is rather surprising that little use has been made of the concept of growth, while development, with all its ambiguities, has become a fixture. This perhaps reflects the selective methodological influence of economics, where development is a fairly well-defined research field concerned with problems of countries with low per capita income. What needs to be underscored, however, is that in economic usage development is intimately related to growth. In this paper I propose to discuss the distinction between growth and development in economics and then attempt to draw a similar distinction for politics, emphasizing throughout the implications of the historical sequence and timing of these processes for modernization.

This article proposes a political economy approach to decolonization. Focusing on the industrial organization of agriculture, it argues that competition between colonial and metropolitan producers creates demands for decolonization from within the metropole when colonies have broad export profiles and when export industries are controlled by colonial, as opposed to metropolitan, interests. The author applies this framework to the United States in the early 1900s, showing that different structures of the colonial sugar industries in the Philippines, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico–diverse exports with dispersed local ownership versus monocrop economies dominated by large US firms–explain why protectionist continental-agriculture interests agitated so effectively for independence for the Philippines, but not for Hawaii or Puerto Rico. A comparative historical analysis of the three colonial economies and the Philippine independence debates complemented by a statistical analysis of roll call votes in the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act supports the argument. In providing a new perspective on economic relations in the late-colonial era, the argument highlights issues of trade and empire in US history that span the subfields of American political development, comparative politics, and international political economy.

Traditional theory of international politics maintains that, other things being equal, a multipolar balance-of-power system. Arms-control theory, on the other hand, generally contends that an increase in independent nuclear powers is a direct threat to the stability of the international system. is more stable than a bipolar system. A bipolar nuclear deterrent relationship is believed to be inherently more stable than one in which equilibrium is maintained among several nuclear powers in independent or alliance relationships. Though the relatively greater stability of a bipolar system may be preferred, its stability is, nevertheless, contingent. Maintaining the stability of mutual nuclear deterrence while restraining aggression is the primary goal of arms control.

One of the major questions about foreign policy concerns the level of effort: How much should the state extract from the internal political system in order to pursue its external objectives? As posed, the issue involves the control of resources, and although the resources it deals with usually include material resources, the limiting factors are political. It should not be stretching the meaning of political things (although it would be changing the frame of reference) to identify the issue as one of allocating political “assets” among several (in this case, two major) sectors to deal with political risks or threats. It is easy enough to identify this allocative function as a requirement of independent governments and quite another to establish what is required to achieve it.

The following reflections have been occasioned by the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. Their purpose is to try to grasp the nature and to gauge the extent of the change between the Russia of today and that of Stalin's time. Naturally, no more can be done within the scope of a brief paper than to indicate some of the areas that may be relevant in this connection and to arrive at some provisional conclusions. In looking for those areas, various curiosities and incongruities of the Moscow Congress may serve as guiding beacons.

Aretrospective assessment at mid-century might have suggested that the course of Chinese history between 1900 and 1950 recorded only two events of enduring political significance: the first, the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty in October 1911 and, with it, destruction of the imperial system which had lasted for two millennia; the second, the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 and, through it, commitment to accelerated modernization and forced industrialization along lines similar to those plotted earlier by the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, assessment of the future might well have concluded, with prescience born of objectivity, that the effect of the Chinese Communist explosion on both Chinese and world politics would merit a major effort on the part of American social science research.

Undoubtedly David Floyd is correct in his statement that “by far the most important and original of the sections [within the Romanian Workers' Party April, 1964, Statement] for the communist world as a whole was the one dealing with political relations between the communist countries, though it was the statement on Comecon which attracted most attention at the time.” Among the major points the Romanians made in this Statement was that the formal basis of relations enunciated by Khrushchev in 1955 was to become the real basis of relations among socialist nations. Relations were to be based on “the principles of national independence and sovereignty, equal rights, mutual advantage, comradely assistance, noninterference in internal affairs, observance of territorial integrity, [and] the principles of socialist internationalism.” The Romanians spelled this out in underscored print and followed it with the statement that “the strict observance of the basic principles of the new type relations among the socialist countries is the primary prerequisite of the unity and cohesion of these countries and of the world socialist system performing its decisive role in the development of mankind.”

It seems obvious that agreements to cut tariffs will raise trade between their signatories. But recent studies show that some agreements widely considered to be landmarks in economic history had either a remarkably small impact on trade or none at all. Among those agreements are the Cobden-Chevalier Treaties and the long series of tariff accords concluded under the auspices of the GATT/WTO. Both sets of agreements cut import duties on many goods that applied to all trading partners entitled to most-favored-nation treatment, but neither increased aggregate trade between their members. This article examines the agreements concluded by the United States under the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA). The authors use an original data set that records changes in tariffs and US imports at the product-line level for each of the twenty-seven bilateral agreements. No comparable data exist either for the nineteenth-century trade network or for the postwar trade regime. The results show that the RTAA treaties failed to raise aggregate US imports from its treaty partners. They also show that these agreements did lead to a large and significant rise in US imports of specific products from specific countries. Because the same bargaining protocol that produced the RTAA agreements also governed the European treaty network and the GATT/WTO, the argument advanced in this article can also help to explain why neither treaty exerted a significant impact on aggregate trade between their signatories.

H. G. Wells exercised an almost unique influence on the o generation which reached maturity during the decade 1910–20. Only Bernard Shaw among men of letters and Wood-row Wilson among men in public life approached Wells in capturing the imagination of that generation and winning it to a particular point of view. There was a flippancy and irresponsibility about Shaw, however, which debased his great abilities; to some, he was a cleverer Oscar Wilde—a court jester for the Fabians and other intellectuals, as Wilde previously had been for salon and café society. Wilson, almost a Messiah during the years 1917–18, was a tragic casualty of the postwar era of disillusion and cynicism. But Wells continued throughout the 'twenties to command its attention and respect.

IF a central problem for any nineteenth-century thinker was that of defining his attitude toward the French Revolution, a central one for contemporary man is his appraisal of the Russian Revolution. The latter problem is even more critical, for nearly one billion people explicitly claim to be heirs and defenders of the Russian Revolution. Forces called into being by the upheaval of 1917 are even more forcefully mobilized and tangibly powerful than those called into being by the French Revolution of 1789 and the “age of the democratic revolution.” Thus, as we approach the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution of 1917 and the volume of writings threatens to reach avalanche proportions, it might be well to take a critical look at the historical studies and reflections that have been called forth in what might well be called the age of the totalitarian revolution.

Both India and Pakistan have made long strides toward stability since winning their freedom from British rule in 1947. What are the prospects for stability in the immediate future, and for their exerting a steadying influence throughout Southeast Asia?

Despite the disorganization and bitterness that accompanied the partition of India, the two young Dominion Governments have thwarted severe early threats to their internal security and have restrained their respective extremists from precipitating a war on the sub-continent. They have each proceeded with political reorganization of the largest populations extant—since the disintegration of China—in non-Communist Asia. Other Asian nations have tentatively accepted the leadership of India in such international issues as Indonesia. In an Asia hard-pressed to adjust to new conditions, the future roles of India and Pakistan may have critical importance.

Recent events in Europe and Latin America have triggered serious debate over federalism. In response, political scientists have turned to the new institutionalism literature in the attempt to understand both the causes and the consequences of federal institutions. Continuing a long tradition in the scholarship on federalism, each of the books under review defines the term differently, reflecting a lack of conceptual agreement that may complicate the development of more robust theories.

Despite these conceptual differences, and their focus on very different time periods, the four books under review are alike in the emphasis they place on bargaining between national and subnational politicians. While this interest in bargaining clearly demonstrates the continuing impact of William Riker's work, much of the new research challenges parts of the Rikerian framework. As a measure of their quality, these four books will significantly shape the course of the emerging literature on comparative federalism, but future work should pay greater attention to interests, ideas, and international factors.

When and why people abandon their old institutions, patterns of behavior, and even places of residence in favor of new ones that are associated with sustained economic growth and development is a question of central importance to social science. Increasingly, political scientists have associated these processes of change with the occurrence of disintegration of particular political units, groups, and systems, and with the integration of others. The changing nature of social and cultural ties signals concomitant modifications in what people define as their community, where they place demands, and where they look for authoritative decisions to be made.

There are at least four approaches useful in predicting what will happen in China after Mao. The “environmental approach” stresses that the Chinese setting—physical, cultural, economic, and international—will govern the courses taken by political actors. The “personality approach” is the opposite, stressing that people, not their surroundings, will determine succession politics. The “societal approach” postulates that it is society (defined as the social environment, including influences from Chinese culture, history, and the structure and operation of Chinese social-political-familial-economic institutions) that is the operationally significant variable. Finally, the “politics approach” assumes that politics itself is the central concern of Chinese life, necessitating a search for general “rules” of politics in China to project the future. These approaches and their implications are each examined in detail, with the conclusion that none is adequate of itself to explain post-Mao politics in China. By combining them, however, it is possible to periodize developments after Mao. Four stages are envisaged. An initial stage would last about three months, during which a collective leadership would form. A second, transitional phase, possibly lasting several years, would be marked by the advent of major policy questions not solvable by Maoist precedent. A third phase would see the emergence of a new leadership, probably operating on a factionalist model. Finally, a fourth stage would be defined after China has returned to normal, “gotten over” Mao's death, and when events are no longer viewable in terms of “succession politics.”

The five-year-old Palestinian uprising, the intifada, was the first of many mass mobilizations against nondemocratic rule to appear in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, East Asia, and the former Soviet Union between 1987 and 1991. Although the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is seldom included by the media or by social scientists in their treatments of this putative wave of “democratization,” many studies of the uprising are available. Although largely atheoretic in their construction of the intifada and in their explanations for it, the two general questions posed by most of these authors are familiar to students of collective action and revolution. On the one hand, why did it take twenty years for the Palestinians to launch the uprising? On the other hand, how, in light of the individual costs of participation and the negligible impact of any one person's decision to participate, could it have occurred at all? The work under review provides broad support for recent trends in the analysis of revolution and collection action, while illustrating both the opportunities and the constraints associated with using monographic literature as a data base.

Technology transfer is becoming an increasingly controversial issue in world politics. After many years of enthusiasm among both importers and exporters of technology, views have started to diversify, and the parties involved have found themselves in conflict. The most visible element of the current controversy is the disillusionment among the countries of the South regarding the ease with which they expected to become industrialized through the importation of Western technology. There are also some signs of disappointment in the West, especially in the United States, where the fear has arisen that the exported technology may be underpriced and that the competitive position of the United States may be eroding relative to that of the importing countries. In this article, I will deal with only one dimension of the current debate—namely, the experience of developing countries as importers of technology from the West.

Foreign aid can be “related” to intervention in many ways. Some argue, with Senator J. W. Fulbright, that aid tends to precede intervention and to increase the probability of intervention. Others would say that aid follows intervention, contending, for example, that American aid to Vietnam was evidence of a prior diplomatic commitment. Still others see aid as an alternative to intervention—if we give aid now we are less likely to have to intervene in the future.