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The Romanian Communist Party and the World Socialist System: A Redefinition of Unity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Kenneth Jowitt
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Extract

Undoubtedly David Floyd is correct in his statement that “by far the most important and original of the sections [within the Romanian Workers' Party April, 1964, Statement] for the communist world as a whole was the one dealing with political relations between the communist countries, though it was the statement on Comecon which attracted most attention at the time.” Among the major points the Romanians made in this Statement was that the formal basis of relations enunciated by Khrushchev in 1955 was to become the real basis of relations among socialist nations. Relations were to be based on “the principles of national independence and sovereignty, equal rights, mutual advantage, comradely assistance, noninterference in internal affairs, observance of territorial integrity, [and] the principles of socialist internationalism.” The Romanians spelled this out in underscored print and followed it with the statement that “the strict observance of the basic principles of the new type relations among the socialist countries is the primary prerequisite of the unity and cohesion of these countries and of the world socialist system performing its decisive role in the development of mankind.”

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , October 1970 , pp. 38 - 60
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1970

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References

1 Floyd, David, Rumania: Russia's Dissident Ally (New York 1965), 113Google Scholar.

2 “Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of the International Communist and Working Class Movement (April 1964),” in Griffith, William E., Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-1965 (Cambridge, Mass. 1967), 284Google Scholar.

3 Ibid., 287.

4 Ibid., 286.

5 Ibid.

6 Thompson, James, Organizations in Action (New York 1967), 54, 55, 61, 64Google Scholar.

7 Horowitz, Irving Louis, “Consensus, Conflict, and Cooperation: A Sociological Inventory,” Social Forces, XLI (December 1962), 187Google Scholar.

8 “The 1957 Moscow Declaration (Text),” in Hudson, G. F. and others, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York 1961), 47 (italics added)Google Scholar.

9 Ibid., 51.

10 Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, Articles and Speeches, 94 and 204.

11 See Jowitt, Kenneth, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and 'National Developmen The Case of Romania 1945-1965 (forthcoming Berkeley 1971)Google Scholar, Part III.

12 Gheorghiu-Dej, in Articles and Speeches, 169.

13 Horowitz, 187.

14 Ceausescu, Scinteia, June 10, 1969.

15 Ceauş;escu, Nicolae, The Romanian Communist Party—Continuer of the Romanian People's Revolutionary and Democratic Struggle, of the Traditions of the Wording Class and Socialist Movement in Romania (Bucharest, May 6, 1966), 28Google Scholar.

16 Ibid., 29.

17 Ion Serbänescu, “Internationalismul proletar si lumea contemporană” [Proletarian Internationalism and the Contemporary World], 30 (italics added).

18 For a discussion of decision premises see the excellent volume by Herbert Simon, A., Smithburg, Donald W., and Thompson, Victor A., Public Administration (New York 1964). 57–59Google Scholar.

19 Nicolae Ceausescu, “Raportul Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman Cu Privire La Activitatea Partidului în Perioada Dintre Congresul Al VIII-Lea Si Con-gresul Al IX-Lea Al P.C.R.” [Report of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party on the Activity of the Party in the Period Between the Eighth Congress and the Ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party] in Ceausescu, Nicolae, România Pe Drumul Desăvîrşirii Constructiei Socialiste, I (Bucureş;ti 1968), 62Google Scholar.

20 This position was included in the statement issued at the close of the Moscow meeting of Communist Parties in June, 1969; see “Sarcinile Luptei Impotriva Imperialismului in Etapa Actualä Si Unitatea De Actiune A Partidelor Comuniste Şi Muncitoreşti, A Tuturor Fortelor Antiimperialiste [The Tasks in the Struggle Against Imperialism in the Present Stage and the Unity of Action of the Communist and Workers Parties, of All Anti-imperialist Forces],” Scinteia, June 19, 1969. However, inclusion of this position does not signify that the Soviets accept this argument but rather that it is the price they were willing to pay to have the Romanians attend and sign.

21 “Intäriea Unitätii Mişcärii Comuniste Şi Muncitoreş;ti—Indatorire Supremă” [The Strengthening of the Unity of the Communist and Workers Movement—The Highest Duty] Scinteia, February 28, 1967.

22 Ibid.

23 Crozier, Michel, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago 1964), 164Google Scholar.

24 The political stance Brzezinski has termed “domesticism” is based on the argument that diversity requires greater local power. The Romanian argument goes beyond domesticism.

25 “Statement,” in Griffith, 285.

26 Scînteia, February 28, 1967.

27 “Cuvîntare La Întîlnirea Cu Activul De Partid Din Judetul Constanta” [Speech at the Meeting with the Party Aktif in the County of Constanta] in Ceausescu, Nicolae, România Pe Drumul Desävîrşrii Construcţiei Socialiste (Bucureşti 1969), III, 128Google Scholar.

28 “Răspunderea Partidului Comunist in Faţa Naţiunii,”Scinteia, April 2, 1968. At the 10th Party Congress Popescu was made a member of the Secretariat. The analysis presented in the above article by Popescu is a good example of the error involved when any absolute statement is made concerning the theoretical incapacity of ideologically committed individuals. Popescu's article is analytically quite sophisticated. For an excellent discussion of the relation between theory and ideology, see Geertz, Clifford, “Ideology as a Cultural System,” in Apter, David E., ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York 1964), 47–77Google Scholar.

29 See Thompson, 54-82.

30 For an exposition of these several points see “Cuvîntarea Tovărăşului Nicolae Ceauşescu la Consfătuirea Internatională a Partidelor Comuniste Si Muncitoreşti” [Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's Speech at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties], Scînteia, June 10, 1969.

31 Information Bulletin (Toronto 1968), 106, italics addedGoogle Scholar.

32 Ibid., no, italics added.

33 March, James G. and Simon, Herbert A., Organizations (New York 1965), 140–41Google Scholar. Satisficing involves the selection of a satisfactory as opposed to an optimal alternative.

34 There are a number of concepts in the field (of organization theory) that involve the same thing that March and Simon have in mind when they use the term “persuasion.” Thompson and Tuden's notion of “computational decision-making” and Simon's “analytic” approach to conflict are examples. Louis Hartz's notion of “dogmatic liberalism” is also congruent with these concepts. All these concepts refer to an approach to conflict resolution that demands unanimity, assumes the possibility of such, and explain its absence in terms of the misperception, lack of information, or alien nature of the antagonist in the conflict situation. Those wh o adopt a “persuasion” approach to all conflict refuse to admit the structural basis of conflict or its legitimacy. This is equally true of a Brezhnev and of a Mayor Daley.

35 “Cuvîntarea Tovărăşului Nicolae Ceauşescu la Confăturirea internaţională a Partidelor Comuniste Si Muncitoreş;ti” [Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's Speech at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties] Scînteia, June 10, 1969.

38 Huntington, Samuel P., “Political Development and Political Decay,” in Welch, Claude E. Jr., ed., Political Modernization (Belmont, Calif. 1967), 215Google Scholar.

37 Paige, Glenn D., “North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior,” in Barnett, A. Doak, ed., Communist Strategies in Asia (New York 1963), 246Google Scholar.

38 Similarly, the lack of a struggle-context with France may have been an element in the inability of Modibo Keita to establish his leadership and a sufficient degree of elite coherence within the Malian party.

39 On “breaking through” see Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs.

40 For Soviet and East European elites, creation of a democratically centralized party, removal of the threat of organized internal resistance, comprehensive industrialization, the creation of strategic support groups (i.e., skilled workers, state farmers, socialist intelligentsia) and, in the case of East Europe, alliance with the Soviet Union is considered a decisive breakthrough.

41 Haas, Ernst B., “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process” in International Political Communities (New York 1966), 95Google Scholar.

42 Ibid., 95-96.

43 See Thompson, 134, for a discussion of “decision issues.”

44 Ibid., 141.

45 Ibid. In this as in many other instances, the current Romanian elite has demonstrated its organizational-theoretical abilities.

46 Of greatest significance is the Soviet elite's sustained adherence to a traditionally Stalinist-consensual appreciation of bloc unity. Agreement between the Soviet and Yugoslavs or between the Soviets and Romanians has remained a matter of situational congruence, a temporally rather than value-based coincidence of interest. For this reason the Romanians are correct and cautious in their attitude toward and evaluation of the Soviets' zig-zag policy.

47 “Report on the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU, October 18, 1961,” in Alexander Dallin, ed., Diversity in International Communism, 37.

48 “Ziarul Borba despre poziţia U.C.I, fată de consfătuirea partidelor comuniste,” Scĭnteia, May 4, 1968.

49 “Cuvîntarea tovarăşului Iosip Broz Tito” [Comrade Tito's Speech] Scînteia, May 28, 1968.

50 “Cuvîntarea tovarăşului Nicolae Ceauşescu” [Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's Speech] Scînteia, May 28, 1968.

51 Rubashov is the major character in Arthur Koestler's Darkness at Noon (New York 1961), who for ideological and political reasons attempted to change the “Soviet” party's character from inside, i.e., while maintaining his membership in the party.

52 As part of the elaboration of its stress on sovereignty and perhaps in reaction to continued Soviet intransigence, on the 25th anniversary of Romania's liberation the Party initiated a distinctly new definition of that event and by implication of the Romanian Socialist Republic's status in the world community. At one and the same time, the Soviet army is given more attention and credit than has been the case in the past few years, and the role of “other United Nations” forces is now also explicitly recognized. Finally, the role of the Romanian Party's activities prior to 1944 (i.e., 1940-1944) is elaborated in greater detail, while the role of the Romanian army after August 23, 1944, is stressed even more (i.e., its role in defeating the Nazis and the recognition of this role by the major powers at that time). This new approach to the period of liberation is consistent with the stress placed by the Romanian elite on the need to eliminate blocs and substitute for them a world of equal nations, voluntarily choosing what commitments they shall make.

The greater complexity associated with the Party's role in the early forties and the greater emphasis on autonomy—signalled by an approach to the events of 1944 that places the party and nation as major participants in international events (i.e., victory in World War II) rather than as an auxiliary and dependent force (i.e., on the Soviet Union)—are both indices of the regime's attempts at institutionalization.

See Nicolae Ceausescu's speech to the “Grand National Assembly Jubilee Session on Romania's 25th Anniversary of Liberation From the Fascist Yoke,” in Documents, Articles and Information on Romania (Bucharest, August 22, 1969).