Terrorist groups repeatedly include operatives of varying commitment and often rely on a common set of security-reducing bureaucratic tools to manage these individuals. This is puzzling in that covert organizations are commonly thought to screen their operatives very carefully and pay a particularly heavy price for record keeping. The authors use terrorist memoirs and the internal correspondence of one particularly prominent group to highlight the organizational challenges terrorist groups face and use a game-theoretic model of moral hazard in a finitely sized organization to explain why record keeping and bureaucracy emerge in these groups. The model provides two novel results. First, in small heterogeneous organizations longer institutional memory can enhance organizational efficiency. Second, such organizations will use worse agents in equilibrium under certain conditions. The core logic is that in small organizations the punishment strategies that allow leaders to extract greater effort are credible only when operatives can identify and react to deviations from the leaders' equilibrium strategy. This dynamic creates incentives for record keeping and means that small organizations will periodically use problematic agents in equilibrium as part of a strategy that optimally motivates their best operatives.

Political theorists from Plato to the present have concerned themselves not only with the nature of the polity as we know it, but with how it came to be, what purposes it serves, and by what stages it has developed. The last item, however, has more often than not been slighted. This lack now forces itself on our attention for an obvious reason: Never before have so many “new states” come into being in so short a span of time and never before have students of politics been provided with so many living examples of states at all stages of development, many of them conspicuously failing to perform vital functions, frequently to the extent that disorder and violent change prevail.

What is status? How does it work? What effects does it tend to have? A new wave of scholarship on status in international relations has converged on a central definition of status, several causal pathways, and the claim that the pursuit of status tends to produce conflict. The authors take stock of the status literature and argue that this convergence is not only a sign of progress, but also an obstacle to it. They find that the consensus definition conceals critical contradictions between standing and membership, that its causal pathways are promising but often in tension with each other, and that the literature may be overlooking the ways in which status can help states avoid conflict and promote cooperation under certain conditions.

Empirical research has demonstrated the utility of an interest group approach for the study of Soviet politics, as well as for interpreting the politics of tsarist Russia and Eastern European communist systems and the dissident movements. The flowering of group activity in Poland and Czechoslovakia at certain times and the activity of dissent movements show, however, the rudimentary character of “normal” interest groups in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. Although the Soviet system has changed since Stalin's death, it remains fundamentally authoritarian in character. The use of models, such as totalitarian, authoritarian, bureaucratic, corporatist, and pluralist, hinders rather than facilitates an understanding of Soviet politics and of the place of interest groups in that system.

The purpose of this article is to emphasize the importance of the organizational blueprint of labor unions for welfare state outcomes. As a result of the tendency of scholars to view labor as a homogenous and disadvantaged class, the existing literature has paid little attention to this. Many scholars have simply taken labor union support for welfare state development for granted and consequently have focused only on labor union strength. This article argues, rather, that labor union support for welfare state development cannot be taken for granted. It shows that labor unions support or oppose welfare state development depending on their organizational blueprint. This new approach highlights the importance of the labor union movement's organizational structure, as opposed to its organizational strength, for welfare state outcomes. The article also explores how the organizational structure of the labor union movement shapes the stance of employer interest groups toward welfare state development. The empirical findings are based on a comparison of British and Dutch postwar old-age pension development

Under unipolarity, the immediate costs and risks of war are more likely to seem manageable for a militarily dominant power like the U.S. This does not necessarily make the use of force cheap or wise, but it means that the costs and risks attendant on its use are comparatively indirect, long term, and thus highly subject to interpretation. Unipolarity, combined with the opportunity created by September 11, opened a space for interpretation that tempted a highly ideological foreign policy cohort to seize on international terrorism as an issue to transform the balance of power both in the international system and in American party politics. This cohort's response to the terrorist attack was grounded in ideological sincerity but also in the routine practice of wedge issue politics, which had been honed on domestic issues during three decades of partisan ideological polarization and then extended into foreign policy.

Whereas the Ricardo-Viner specific factors model implies that owners of land and capital stood diametrically opposed to one another on the issue of free trade in nineteenth-century Britain, studies in the economic history literature posit that the economic interests of these two groups of factor owners were not mutually exclusive but rather overlapped as a result of rapid economic changes in the 1830s that intensified landowner diversification into nonagri-cultural ventures. Hence, the former views the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 as capital gaining the political upper hand over the landed elite, whereas the latter implies that landowners with diversified portfolios stood to gain from, or simply became indifferent to, free trade in grain. This paper alters the specific factors model to include the concepts of diversification and investment capital flows. It then tests the political implications of diversification, hypothesizing a positive correlation between constituency diversification and parliamentary voting on repeal of the Corn Laws. Both individual and aggregate sets of data confirm that diversified interests contributed to the free-trade policy outcome.

Works in political culture have employed a variety of approaches with different assumptions and methodologies. Commentary on the field, however, generally fails to take account of these differences or to assess the merits of the different approaches. Recent works that typify five different approaches are evaluated in terms of the ways that they conceptualize preference formation and the linkage between preferences and cultural norms. The tendency in most approaches to conflate preferences and norms points to the need for further theoretical development.

This article represents an attempt to describe Soviet society, and JL particularly the Soviet political system, in terms of a typology of society based on modes of coordinating social activity. It is felt that this approach may be of value in pointing up both some of the similarities and some of the differences between Communist and non-Communist industrialized societies.

From the American point of view, the strategy of deterrence, and the related principle of limiting to tolerable proportions whatever conflicts become inevitable, tend to spring from the premise that the favorable results of a total war can never be sufficient to justify its cost. Such a war, according to that conception, would be too big, too allconsuming, to permit the survival even of those final values, like personal freedom, for which alone one could think of waging it. It need not be certain that it would turn out so badly; it is enough that mere is a large chance that it would.

This article analyzes electoral cycles in distributional bargaining in the European Union. The author argues that governments attempt to increase their EU membership benefits above average levels in the preelection period, hoping to appear politically competent to voters. The theory discusses when and how EU members can increase these gains before elections through negotiations in the Council of Ministers. A time-series cross-sectional analysis of EU member states’ annual budget negotiations from 1977 to 2006 supports the existence of conditional electoral cycles in distributional bargaining and generally points to the importance of accounting for such cycles when analyzing patterns of international cooperation.

Contemporary theories and typologies of welfare states in Western Europe assume that social democratic parties are the engine behind progressive policies on gender roles and on the participation of women in the labor force. The French case challenges these assumptions—this conservative welfare state, surprisingly, provides an extensive system of public day care along with other forms of support that facilitate mothers' employment. This article explains the existence of the French system through a comparative historical analysis of child care policy in France and other European welfare states. The mainfindingsconcern the role of organized religion in shaping contemporary public day care policies. In contrast to most conservative welfare regimes, the French welfare state has been shaped not by clericalism and Christian democracy but by secularism and republican nationalism—forces that influenced some of the earliest public policies for the education of young children in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that later affected the founding of the contemporary day care system in the 1970s. In that latter period of propitious economic circumstances, pragmatic policy elites eschewed moralizing critiques of mothers' employment and established a system of financing that has enabled the long-term expansion of public day care. These findings have implications for our understanding of gender politics and welfare regimes in Western Europe. The secularization of political life—not social democratic power—best explains why public policies in France and in many Scandinavian countries have promoted the demise of the traditional family model.

This article argues that the democratic peace theorists have overlooked the defining development that underlies that peace of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the industrial-technological revolution. Not only did that revolution make democracy on a country scale possible; it also made all the countries that experienced the revolution—democratic and nondemocratic—far less belligerent in comparison with preindustrial times. The democratic peace did not exist among premodern democratic and republican city-states, not because they were not democratic or liberal enough but because they were premodern. Other factors that have emanated from the modern transformation and may generate greater aversion to war apply mostly to liberal democratic countries while being only variably connected to their regime. Such factors include the staggering rise in the standard of living; the decrease in hardship, pain, and death; the dominance of metropolitan life and the service economy; the spread of the consumer and entertainment society; sexual promiscuity; women's franchise; and the shrinking ratio of young males in the population.

The countries with underdeveloped economies are primarily peasant countries and their national unity is quite new and fragmentary. The uneducated classes are rooted mainly in local territorial and kinship groups; sometimes they are the dependents of feudal magnates to whom are directed whatever wider loyalties they have. They do not have the strong sense of nationality which drives the leaders of their country, who are often the creators of the new nation and not merely of the new state. These leaders are strong and creative persons who have broken away from the bonds of the old order—the bonds of kin and family and local territory.

Organizing interests in Western Europe is part of the third wave of interest group studies to appear since the development of professional political science at the turn of the century. The first wave was mainly an American phenomenon; the second an effort to export interest group studies to Europe and elsewhere as part of a movement intended to encourage greater realism and less ideologism in European and comparative political studies. The Organizing Interests team has produced a useful book focused in substantial part on the theme of neocorporatism. The authors have not connected their work with the substantial body of earlier interest group research.

While the Soviet system has demonstrated an unusual degree of immunity to the worldwide upsurge of ethnic self-assertion, rising national consciousness among both Russian and non-Russian populations poses a growing, although not necessarily unmanageable, problem for the Soviet leadership. Several issues bearing directly on the resources, power, and status of different nationalities lie at the heart of current debates: the nature and future of the federal system; the pace and pattern of economic development; access to positions of political power; demographic policy; and cultural and linguistic status. Over the long term, the political mobilization of ethnicity is likely to be constrained by both intrinsic and systemic factors, encouraging national elites to focus on strategies and goals that will enhance their power within the system rather than challenging it directly.

Significantly, we have few if any studies of the totalitarian O dictator as a personality type. It may be that we are little closer to a working psychological model of him than Plato took us with his brilliant sketch of the ideal type of the “tyrant” in The Republic. The contemporary literature on totalitarianism does, of course, contain materials that are relevant to the problem of characterization of the totalitarian dictator. Yet no frontal attack appears to have been made upon the problem. The purpose of the present article is to argue the need for one, and to do this in the context of a critical reexamination of the theory of totalitarianism. In the course of it I shall put forward some ideas of possible use in developing a conception of the dictator as a personality type.

Comparative research on the determinants of genocide has surged in recent years, as reflected in the six books under review. The new research makes genocide studies more systematic and theoretical; integrates the topic into mainstream social science disciplines; points to three emerging explanatory paradigms; and yields some surprising cumulative findings. However, the works also reveal significant conceptual, empirical, and methodological problems that limit the comparative enterprise and the search for a general theory. The article argues for an alternative, disaggregated approach that situates genocide within a spectrum of organized violence against civilians and links genocide studies to studies of violence in war.

This article provides a systematic examination of the role of security considerations in shaping mass preferences over international economic exchange. The authors employ multiple survey experiments conducted in the United States and India, along with observational and case study evidence, to investigate how geopolitics affects voters’ views of international trade. Their research shows that respondents consistently—and by large margins—prefer trading with allies over adversaries. Negative prior beliefs about adversaries, amplified by concerns that trade will bolster the partner's military, account for this preference. Yet the authors also find that a significant proportion of the public believes that trade can lead to peace and that the peace-inducing aspects of trade can cause voters to overcome their aversion to trade with adversaries. This article helps explain when and why governments constrained by public opinion pursue economic cooperation in the shadow of conflict.

Students of politics use statistical and quantitative techniques to: summarize a large body of numbers into a small collection of typical values;

confirm (and perhaps sanctify) the results of the analysis by using tests of statistical significance that help protect against sampling and measurement error;

discover what's going on in their data and expose some new relationships; and

inform their audience what's going on in the data.