THE Communist conquest of mainland China may be legitimately viewed as the culmination of a century-long interregnum during which the traditional equilibrium of Chinese society was profoundly disturbed by the Western impact, at a time of dynastic decline. The initial impact of the West was in the nature of a shock treatment administered by the Opium War, the subsequent military defeats, the unequal treaties, and the rise of the whole Treaty Ports system. Thus China's first massive contact with the West was associated with humiliation, bewilderment, frustration, and a sense of inequality. In these terms, then, a constant and continuing struggle for equality has been a hallmark of China's development since 1840.

The military and diplomatic defeats suffered by the Chinese made them conscious of the West's technological and industrial superiority. In fact, one of the essential ingredients in China's striving toward equality was economic—expressedin a deep-seated aspiration to catch up, to narrow the gap, and to industrialize. In other words, the Western impact generated “tension between the actual state of economic activities in the country and the existing obstacles to industrial development, on the one hand, and the great promise inherent in such a development, on the other.”

THE death of Joseph Stalin marked the beginning of a new period in the history of the Soviet regime in Russia. It set in motion a train of events in the internal political life of the country which, for better or for worse, will alter the political personality of the Soviet regime as the world came to know it under the influence of Stalin's dominating figure. No one can yet predict with any confidence how this sequence of events will unfold in the years to come. The most that can be done at this early stage is to visualize the forces at work behind the scenes and strive to reach an informed preliminary guess about the direction or directions in which these forces are moving.

That is the task of the present article. It seeks to investigate certain aspects of the post-Stalin train of events which are now themselves a part of history. Its purpose is to cast light upon some of the principal trends and issues in the internal political life of Soviet Russia since Stalin died. These trends and issues are for the most part hidden beneath the surface of Soviet public life; only occasionally, as in the Beria episode, have they erupted into full view of a perplexed and fascinated world. It is necessary, therefore, to study the submerged political realities through their indirect reflection in the public pronouncements of the controlled and official Soviet press. The central importance of the new regime‘s attitude toward Stalin and the Stalin heritage directs attention upon the changing manner in which the official propaganda has presented the image of Stalin to the Soviet people. We shall first tell the factual story of this process, tracing the steps by which Stalin‘s heirs successively dethroned him, partially restored him, and finally refashioned an entirely new Stalin image to fit their present needs. The latter part of the article attempts to interpret the political meaning of the new Stalin myth and of another new phenomenon closely associated with it, the “cult of the Party”

DEEP crises in the life of a nation sometimes lay bare with lightning clarity those basic social ties, loyalties, and commitments which render possible some maintenance of order and control when everything seems about to break down or disappear. In 1945, year of the deepest crisis that the German people have undergone in modern times, groups and organizations like the Junkers or the Nazi Party simply vanished; others, like the military, disappeared at least temporarily or, like the industrialists, were gravely weakened. It was the bureaucracy which became the bedrock, the irreducible minimum of social cohesion upon which, first locally, then in larger units, society was rebuilt. Subsequently, confirmed in its traditional position of control by the occupation powers (certain measures of attempted political purge and technical reorganization notwithstanding), its actual power was enhanced by the innumerable tasks of postwar reconstruction, from the building-up of entire new administrations (in the new Länder as well as on the bi-zonal and then federal levels of government) to the handling of what has been aptly called the “universe of claims” arising out of Nazi, war, and postwar conditions.

LABOR movements in areas of South Asia which are, or were until recently, under the control of British, French, or Dutch administrations have assumed considerable political, social, and economic importance despite the fact that industrialization and wage employment affect only a small segment of the population. As adjuncts of national movements they played a significant role in the struggle for independence; they have served the interests of the Communists and other dissident revolutionary groups; and they have participated in the tasks of economic reconstruction. In some areas, moreover, these labor organizations have exceeded in size not only existing political parties, but also other movementsbuilt on common occupational interests, such as peasant organizations. As a result, they have become afocal point for extra-parliamentary political activities.1 Their importance in most South Asian countries is all the more surprising, considering that they are purely Western institutions characteristic of highly industrialized and occupationally stratified societies. Yet in South Asia these movements are thriving in predominantly agricultural societies, with an occupational stratification bearing little resemblance to that of industrialized countries.