INDIA is six years old. Its reactions to the world are still largely a matter not of deliberate policy, but of a set of sometimes in consistent attitudes toward foreigners, attitudes which are only now, under Prime Minister Nehru's constant prodding, crystallizing into a foreign policy. A policy, whether foreign or domestic, is the pursuit by word and deed of a calculated line of action based on the interest, real or mistaken, of a country, or sometimes of its ruling classes. There is still no such calculation of risks and rewards in India's relations with the world, although a certain continuity of planning and thinking is beginning to emerge. Mr. Nehru's proclaimed “judgment of issues as they arise, on their own merits, with an open and independent approach” is by definition the negation of policy, since it precludes the pursuit of a pattern, or even the calculation of India's interests. To those accustomed to the history-rooted calculations of Europe, such an approach to policy-making seems odd.

The Korean War represented the first American experience with the problem of meeting local Communist aggression by means of limited, if costly, warfare. But despite the revulsion with that experience, and the “new look” at military strategy and foreign policy, it may not be the last. The character of recent weapons developments and the passing of our thermonuclear monopoly make it probable that in the future, as in the past, American policy-makers will be forced to consider the alternative of local conflict, with all its problems and risks, in determining how to respond to the threat or actuality of Communist moves in the peripheral areas.

In these circumstances, analyses of American policy-making immediately before and during the Korean War may well illuminate the perspectives and considerations relevant to this difficult and dangerous type of operation. Here, no more can be done than toexamine the effect of strategic planning and estimates of Communist intentions and behavior on the decision to commit American forces to the defense of South Korea. This decision, and even the crucial decision to commit ground forces to eventual offensive operations against the aggressor, was made within afew days of the North Korean attack. Attention, accordingly, is focused on American policy reactions to the war in the first week or ten days following June 25, 1950.

In a speech made in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1949, Sir Winston Churchill said, “For good or ill, air mastery today is the supreme expression of military power, and fleets and armies, however necessary, must accept a subordinate rank.” This statement comes from a figure of world repute whose strategic instincts are steeped in naval tradition. It has been echoed by President Eisenhower in recent speeches and Eisenhower is a General of the Army. We can therefore take it that modern air weapons are supremely important for all major aspects of contemporary strategy and politics. The big questions are these: In an age when atomic and hydrogen bombs have demonstrated that they can devastate cities and military and naval targets in a way never before experienced, would the heavy bomber and long-range rocket inevitably get through and shatter air defense? Or could prohibitive losses be inflicted again and again on the raiders so that the scale of attack dwindled? And, furthermore, could the United States or the USSR, militarily or economically, sustain a long-range atomic or hydrogen bomb and rocket air offensive? These are indeed $64 questions which are likely to be unanswerable for several years to come.

In general terms, by the end of 1952, mainland China's productive capacity was reactivated and its institutional framework transformed to such an extent that the regime felt the time was ripe for launching an ambitious and comprehensive program of economic development. However, the announcement of a Five-Year Plan for China does not seem to have been preceded by a major debate on issues, methods, and problems of industrialization such as occurred in Russia in the 1920's. It would appear that Chinese Communist thinking and policy, as it has emerged, is almost completely hypnotized by the Stalinist model of economic development, with Preobrazhenskis and Bukharins absent from the scene.

These two books are as dissimilar as two books can be which deal with essentially the same problem and are inspired by essentially the same philosophy. The problem is the survival of the West, and the philosophy is one of progressive conservatism. In foreign policy, both authors share a preference for the traditional outlook and methods and an aversion to the crusading tendencies of mass democracy.

For roughly a century—if we take the years from Fourier and Bentham to the triumph of Freud—the study of politics concerned itself mainly with institutions. Fourier, in plotting a Utopia, took his individuals just as they were, expecting by the perfection of social arrangements to turn individual weakness and vice into virtues. Bentham also by-passed the infinite problem of the individual (this was relegated to religion) and concentrated on the finite reform of institutions; the greatest happiness of the greatest number was never the principle of an individual psychology, although since 1832 Bentham's formula has grown ironically appropriate as the individual in a mass society has become, characteristically, a quantity.

In the past few years a large number of books, articles, and pamphlets have been published on the future problems of underdeveloped countries. In most of these accounts, economic, cultural, or administrative questions receive chief attention. Mr. Staley has now produced a book in which the international political problems of the underdeveloped countries are given primary emphasis. In particular, the book concentrates on one problem area: what role do underdeveloped countries play in the present division of the world into a Communist and a non-Communist bloc; what are the doctrines and strategies the Communists have worked out for underdeveloped countries; what chances are there of the underdeveloped countries falling under Communist domination; and, finally, what policies can be adopted by the non-Communist countries, particularly the United States, in order to keep free from Communist infiltration and subversion as large a portion of the world as possible?

The onrush of enormous changes that struck American foreign relations in 1940-1941 brought with it most of the current problems in the administration of foreign affairs. For one change, the conduct of foreign relations has become not only the largest function of the federal government, but also the largest function of all governments in the United States. In 1948, at midpoint between World War II and war in Korea, the costs of foreign relations, including military outlays, accounted for 54 per cent of all money spent by all governments, federal, state, and local, for all public purposes. No matter whether we measure the relative size in costs, in personnel devoted to it, in impact upon the political economy, or in commitments of the United States, this work of government has exceeded all other.

There are times when these two volumes seem to repeat each other; common to each is a core of interest in investment and economic growth, and if the titles divide the terminology, the books share the territory. Nevertheless, each of the authors approaches the problem from his own point of view, and for all the overlap, there are wide areas of individual treatment. Moreover, even where both deal with the same questions, the evidence produced is usually different, and the reader can only be grateful for his double feast of tables, graphs, and citations.

In seeking a rational solution to policy problems, we select and approach the relevant facts in the light of underlying assumptions. Both knowledge of the object and rational certainty about the course to be taken can be attained only by proceeding from assumptions concerning values as well as causal relations. Our thinking is scientific (or, if one prefers another term, rationally disciplined rather than merely emotional) insofar as these indispensable assumptions are made deliberately, methodically, and critically. In applying thought to the problem of international organization, we have not done as well in this respect as we ought. It may be worthwhile, therefore, to call attention to the task of critically examining the assumptions on which the study of problems of international organization actually proceeds.