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American Policy-making and the North Korean Aggression

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Alexander L. George
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Extract

The Korean War represented the first American experience with the problem of meeting local Communist aggression by means of limited, if costly, warfare. But despite the revulsion with that experience, and the “new look” at military strategy and foreign policy, it may not be the last. The character of recent weapons developments and the passing of our thermonuclear monopoly make it probable that in the future, as in the past, American policy-makers will be forced to consider the alternative of local conflict, with all its problems and risks, in determining how to respond to the threat or actuality of Communist moves in the peripheral areas.

In these circumstances, analyses of American policy-making immediately before and during the Korean War may well illuminate the perspectives and considerations relevant to this difficult and dangerous type of operation. Here, no more can be done than toexamine the effect of strategic planning and estimates of Communist intentions and behavior on the decision to commit American forces to the defense of South Korea. This decision, and even the crucial decision to commit ground forces to eventual offensive operations against the aggressor, was made within afew days of the North Korean attack. Attention, accordingly, is focused on American policy reactions to the war in the first week or ten days following June 25, 1950.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , January 1955 , pp. 209 - 232
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1955

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References

* When this study was originally undertaken, in the late autumn of 1950, only newspaper materials were available for research purposes. Accordingly, it was regarded as a pilot study which, while it could not yield definitive findings, might at least formulate tpecific hypotheses for testing in the event that more authoritative data became available.

Some months after the original version of the study was completed, the Senate held gearings on the dismissal of General MacArthur. These hearings went into certain aspects of American policy in the Far East exhaustively, if also repetitively, and included the detailed testimony of some of the principal participants in the formation of the American reaction to the North Korean attack. Because the problemo of validating in analysis of American policy based on newspaper accounts is of some interest in Itself, an effort was made in this article to reproduce the essential points of the original Study and to comment separately on the extent to which disclosuresat the MacArthur hearings confirm or contradict impressions derived earlier from newspaper accounts.

For several reasons, which need not be elaborated here, the MacArthur hearings did not produce the ideal type of “inside” material with which to verify impressions gained from contemporary newspaper accounts. To the extent that validation was possible, however, it indicates that a surprising amount of reliable information about American policy calculations can be obtained from the columns of the better metropolitan dailies. Off-the-record background information can often be easily identified and distinguished from personal interpretation provided by the reporter. And the possibility of being misled by faulty reporting can be minimized by relying heavily on correspondents (like James Reston, Hanson Baldwin, the Alsop brothers) who are known to have good contacts in official circles. Finally, with several competent correspondents covering the same story, there is an opportunity to compare and check the information that is provided.

1 Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, To Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from His Assignment to That Area, Washington, D.C., 1951, Part 3, pp. 1990–92. (Hereafter cited as Hearings, part and page.)

2 Ibid., Part 2, pp. 942, 954, 971. See also the testimony of former Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, ibid., Part 4, pp. 2585, 2630.

3 A number of other interpretations of the North Korean attack than those which follow were noted in newspaper accounts. They are not discussed in this report since evidence was lacking that they were shared by American policy-makers or that they influenced the development of policy.

4 James Reston reported in this vein in the New York Times, June 28, 1950, and, more explicitly, in ibid., July 23.

5 “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, xxv (July 1947), pp. 566–82.

6 Cf., in a similar vein, Krock, Arthur, New York Times, June 28, 1950Google Scholar; Albert Friendly, Washington Post, June 28; and John Foster Dulles, speech of July 1, reported in New York Times, July 2.

7 Similar interpretations were reported by Parrott, Lindesay, New York Times, June 26, 1950Google Scholar, and James Reston, ibid., July 23.

8 Cf. Hearings, Part 2, pp. 954, 971.

9 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2585.

10 A parallel might have been drawn with the Soviet blockade of Berlin, probably also intended to forestall, if possible, an Allied initiative—the unification of Western Germany.

11 This came out most clearly and in considerable detail during the MacArthur hearings (Hearings, Part 1, p. 242; Part 2, pp. 753, 930, 932, 966; Part 3, pp. 1671ff., 1681, 1740, 1763, 1818, 1821, 2054; Part 4, pp. 2574, 2575, 2593, 2597ff., 2697). But the essential facts, particularly the reversal on Korea, were reported at the time as well. (See, for example, Ferdinand Kuhn, Washington Post, June 27, 1950; the Alsops, ibid., June 30.)

12 At the hearings, Louis Johnson recalled that at the initial policy meeting of June 25 at Blair House, he had called upon each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and each of the Secretaries of the defense establishment to present their views individually. “Since the Joint Chiefs had no recommendations to make … A major portion of the evening was taken in individual, unrehearsed, and unprepared and uncoordinated statements of the several Chiefs and the Secretaries.” Just before the meeting adjourned, Johnson recalled, he said to the President: “There are two things I haven't discussed with the Secretaries and the Chiefs; I should like to do so and will do unless you order me not to…” The first was a proposal that the Seventh Fleet be ordered to move from the Philippines toward the area of conflict. The second was a proposal to transfer American jets to a base closer to Formosa. Both suggestions were approved. The decision to deneutralize Formosa was not made, however, until the following day. (Hearings, Part 4, pp. 2580–81, 2621.) Secretary Acheson and Johnson differed in some respects in recalling how the decision to deneutralize Formosa was made. (See, for example, ibid., Part 3, p. 2055; Part 4, pp. 2614–15.)

13 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2671.

14 As for Formosa, its strategic importance to the United States was rated appreciably greater than that of Korea. The official position was that it was not in the interest of the United States to allow Formosa to fall into the hands of a hostile power. However, because of the limited military capability available to the United States during this period, strategic planning ruled out the use of US military forces in order to achieve this objective. Reasons for the reversal of this policy on Formosa will not be discussed in this article.

15 Hearings, Part 4, pp. 2581, 2584f.

16 According to Secretary Acheson, although Korea was not of “strategic importance” to the United States, the American action in Korea was “motivated by the security of the United States, because the whole question of collective security is one of the bases of our own security …” (ibid., Part 3, p. 1818).

17 This was explicitly acknowledged at the hearings by General Bradley (ibid., Part 2, p. 1110) and also implied by Secretary Acheson (ibid., Part 3, p. 1818).

18 See General Bradley, ibid., Part 2, p. 890.—As Hanson Baldwin noted (New York Times, June 28, 1950): “A Communist program of conquest during the summer months, in which Korea was to have been the first step, may have been blocked by the United States decision to aid South Korea with armed force. This is the hopeful opinion and belief of leaders of the United States government … It was felt that if South Korea were allowed to succumb, without actual United States armed aid, to Communist aggression, other acts of conquest or provocation would soon follow.”

19 There is considerable material in the Hearings on reasons for employing US forces in Korea. See, especially, Part 2, pp. 958, 1110, 1490, 1504; Part 3, p. 1818; Part 4, p. 2585.

20 At least one commentator, Walter Lippmann, explicitly warned against acting on the simple stereotype that Stalin was another version of Hitler. He noted that “as yet there is nothing to indicate that in the Korean affair the USSR has departed from its policy, which has been to expand the Communist sphere by the use of satellites without committing and engaging its own armed forces … It has been a policy quite different from Hitler's—a policy of very shrewdly calculated risks … by which the profits can be very big though the losses are limited” (Washington Post, July 3, 1950; cf. also his column, July 4).

21 See, for example, Leites, Nathan, A Study of Bolshevism, Glencoe, Ill., 1953, pp.47–53.Google Scholar

22 However, there is some reason to believe that the reassuring picture of Soviet intentions, gleaned from the reply on June 29 to an earlier State Department note, made it somewhat easier for American policy-makers to take the fateful decision of June 30 to commit ground combat troops. Concern over the possibility of Soviet intervention in the Korean War appears to have been one of the factors which influenced earlier American decisions to limit the operation of US forces to South Korea. (See General Marshall's testimony, Hearings, Part 1, pp. 535–36; see also newspaper accounts at the time, especially Drew Pearson, Washington Post, June 30, 1950, and Harold Hinton, New York Times, July 1.)

23 Hearings, Part 5, Appendix K, p. 3192; also General Bradley, ibid., Part 2, p. 1011.

24 General Bradley, ibid., Part 2, pp. 1011, 1112, 1121f.; General MacArthur's testimony is less clear-cut on this point: see ibid., Part 1, pp. 231, 235f.

25 Following a personal reconnaissance of the battlefield, General MacArthur reported immediately to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (early morning of June 30, Washington time) on the condition of the South Korean Army. According to General Bradley's testimony, General MacArthur indicated in this report that “the only assurance of holding the Han River line and to regain lost ground would be through the commitment of United States ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. Accordingly, he stated, if authorized, it was his intentionto move immediately a United States regimental combat team to the combat area in Korea as the nucleus of a possible build-up of two divisions from Japan for an early offensive action in accordance with his mission of clearing South Korea of North Korean forces” (ibid., Part 2, p. 1012). General Mac-Arthur's recollection of his report to the JCS appears faulty in holding that he recommended use of US ground troops for the purpose of holding a bridgehead at Pusan (ibid., Part 1, pp. 235f.).

26 Ibid., Part 2, pp. 1011, 1121f.

27 Ibid., Part 4, pp. 260gf.

28 See Admiral Sherman's testimony, ibid., Part 2, pp. 1650f.

29 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2610; see also General Bradley, ibid., Part 2, p. 1112.

30 Ibid., Part 5, Appendix K, p. 3192.

31 Ibid., Part 4, p. 2610.

32 On this point, see particularly Admiral Sherman's testimony, ibid., Part 2, pp. 1650f.

33 Ibid., Part 1, pp. 393f., 601, 607; Part 2, pp. 948, 1650f.; Part 4, pp. 2610, 2632.

34 There is some reason to believe that the earlier optimistic expectation of a quick, “voluntary” withdrawal may have also attended the initial commitment of small US ground forces to the battlefront. Some American leaders may have believed that the North Korean forces would be withdrawn from South Korea upon their first contact with US forces because Soviet leaders did not want a direct clash with them. (The writer remembers having seen newspaper reports to this effect at the time, but has been unable to locate them for citationhere.)

35 See also Kuhn, , Washington Post, July 8, 1950Google Scholar, and the account of Secretary Ache-son's press conference, ibid., July 13.

36 According to Albert Warner, whose account was said to be based on interviews with “top participants” in the Blair House meetings, “Nothing was expected of this gesture … It was an indirect assurance of the limited American military objective. It would also give Russia an opportunity to retire gracefully from the chessboard in case it was sufficiently moved by the show of American determination” (“How the Korea Decision Was Made,” Harper's Magazine [June 1951], p. 104).

37 Kennan has written: “While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. … it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige” (op.cit. pp. 575f.).

38 On Secretary Acheson's press conference, see also New York Times, June 29, 1950.

39 According to Warner, Albert (op.cit., p. 104)Google Scholar, one objective of the American note of June 27 to the USSR was to reassure it indirectly of the limited American military objective in Korea. One journalist, reporting the State Department's detailed refutation of the charge in the Soviet reply to the effect that the UN action in Korea was illegal, noted: “This was a good sample of the official mood yesterday, and of the effort to keep diplomatic dealing with Moscow ‘correct’ and unprovocative” (Ferdinand Kuhn, Wash ington Post, July 1, 1950).

40 The prestige factor appears to be assigned little importance in Nathan Leites' analysis of the conditions under which the Politburo considers retreat. See Leites, , op. cit., pp. 497–500, 537, 458–60Google Scholar.